la^ 


/ 


u 


DNiv 


t:  \ 


•I^A 


OF 


^iTY 


^/FOR^ 


PALMERSTON 

AND  THE  HUNGARIAN 

REVOLUTION 


CAMBRIDGE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

C.  F.  CLAY,  Manager 

LONDON    :   FETTER  LANE,  E.  C.  4 

NEW  YORK     :    G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
BOMBAY       ] 

CALCUTTA  I  MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  Ltd. 
MADRAS      J 

TORONTO  :  J.  M.  DENT  AND  SONS,  Ltd. 
TOKYO:  MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


*^l 


> 


\ 


^  •  ^  pi(r%  U-v 


PALMERSTON 

AND  THE  HUNGARIAN 

REVOLUTION 

A  DISSERTATION  WHICH  WAS  AWARDED 

THE  PRINCE  CONSORT  PRIZE 

1914 

BY 
CHARLES  SPROXTON,  B.A.,  M.C. 

CAPTAIN,  YORKSHIRE  REGIMENT 
FELLOW  OF  PETERHOUSE 


CAMBRIDGE 

AT  THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1919 


-4^     i^J       /     N-/*    t/ 


^7 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

The  Prince  Consort  Prize  (founded  in  1883 
from  the  Prince  Consort  Memorial  Fund)  was 
awarded  in  1914  to  Arthur  Wilham  Tedder,  B.A. 
of  Magdalene,  and  Charles  Sproxton,  B.A.  of 
Peterhouse.  Charles  Sproxton's.Dissertation,  which 
follows,  has  been  printed,  in  accordance  with  the 
Regulations,  at  the  expense  of  the  University. 
But  the  Syndics  of  the  Press  have  kindly  allowed 
a  Memoir  of  Captain  Sproxton,  contributed  to  The 
Cambridge  Review  by  his  tutor  and  friend.  Captain 
H.  W.  V.  Temperley,  Fellow  of  his  College,  to  be 
prefixed  to  the  Essay,  and  I  have  added  a  few 
biographical  data.  The  Syndics  have,  also,  allowed 
the  reproduction  of  an  excellent  photograph  of 
our  late  Junior  Fellow,  found  among  his  books, 
which  have  been  placed  as  a  memorial  of  him  in 
our  College  Library.  We  have  to  thank  the  Editor 
of  The  Cambridge  Review  for  allowing  the  reprint 
of  the  Memoir.  And  I  desire  also  to  express  my 
gratitude  to  Dr  J.  Holland  Rose,  University 
Reader  in  Modern  History,  who  a'cted  as  Examiner 
for  the  Prince  Consort  Prize  in  1914,  for  allowing 
me,  in  looking  through  the  Dissertation  for  the 
Press,  to  refer  to  the  valuable  MS  notes  made  by 
him  in  the  course  of  his  reading  it.  No  attempt 
has  been  made  to  introduce  any  alteration  into 


M738030 


vi  PREFATORY  NOTE 

text  or  footnotes,  except  where  there  could  be  no 
doubt  that  it  would  have  had  the  immediate  assent 
of  the  writer  of  the  Essay.  Even  his  invariable  use 
of  'English'  and  'England' — where  'British'  and 
'Great  Britain'  would  have  been  more  correct — 
has  not  been  changed.  The  German  quotations  I 
have  thought  it  advisable  to  translate  into  English. 
More  important  alterations  or  enlargements  it 
seemed  best  to  forego,  so  that  this  essay  might 
remain  entirely  the  work  of  the  historical  scholar 
whom  we  have  lost  and  of  whom  it  must  form  the 
only  memorial  in  print.  His  friends  had  reason  for 
hoping  that  he  might  have  a  share  in  the  writing 
of  the  history  of  the  present  war ;  but  he  has  died 
as  one  of  its  heroes. 

A.  W.  W. 

Peterhouse, 
All  Souls'  Day,  1918. 


CHARLES  SPROXTON 


Charles,  the  son  of  Mr  Arthur  Sproxton,  now  of 
Lee  Street,  Holderness  Road,  Hull;  and  formerly  of 
Salt  End,  Medon,  was  born  in  1890,  and  educated 
at  the  Municipal  (Boulevard)  School,  Hull,  where 
he  twice  won  the  Royal  Geographical  Society's 
Medal.  He  entered  into  residence  at  Peterhouse  in 
October,  1909,  with  an  East  Riding  Major  Scholarship, 
and  obtained,  soon  after,  a  College  Exhibition  in 
History,  to  which  study  he  had  from  the  first 
resolved  to  devote  himself.  His  Tutor  in  History 
was  Mr  H.  W.  V.  Temperley,  Fellow  and  Assistant 
Tutor  of  the  College.  In  1911  he  gained  a  Foundation 
Scholarship,  and,  having  in  the  same  year  obtained 
a  First  Class  in  Part  I  of  the  Historical  Tripos  and 
followed  this  up  with  another  First  Class  in  Part  II 
of  the  same  Tripos  in  1912,  graduated  B.A.  and  was 
appointed  a  Hugo  de  Balsham  (Research)  Student 
of  the  College.  He  had  carried  off  the  Gladstone 
Memorial  Prize,  and  in  1914  he  obtained  one  of  the 
Prince  Consort  Memorial  prizes. 

Charles  Sproxton,  who  was  in  the  O.T.C.  at 
Cambridge,  received  his  first  commission  within  a 
month  after  the  declaration  of  war.  He  was  promoted 
Lieutenant  in  Alexandra  and  Princess  of  Wales's 
Own  Yorkshire  Regiment  in  April,  1915,  and  Captain 
in  June,  1916.  He  was  twice  wounded — in  May,  1915 
and  in  June,  1916 — and  was  mentioned  in  despatches 
in  November,  1915,  having  previously  received  the 
Military  Cross  for  conspicuous  gallantry  and  resource, 


viii  CHARLES  SPROXTON 

in  July  and  August  of  that  year,  at  Walverghem  and 
near  Armentieres.  He  came  home  on  sick  leave  in 
the  summer  of  1916,  and  returned  to  active  service 
as  Adjutant  of  his  Battalion.  He  fell  on  July  19th, 
1917,  at  the  Western  Front. 

The  younger  historians  have  suffered  as  much  as 
or  more  than  almost  any  other  branch  of  learning  at 
Cambridge.  At  least  it  is  striking  to  think  that  a 
small  society  of  twelve  resident  members  is  now 
reduced  by  one  half.  It  were  an  invidious  task  to 
say  which  of  these  is  most  missed,  but  certainly  there 
was  an  end  to  bright  promise  of  achievement  when 
Charles  Sproxton  died. 

He  was  interesting  because  he  passed  through  hfe 
with  a  sort  of  mild  serenity,  always  wondering  but 
never  astonished  at  what  it  brought  him.  Born  and 
bred  in  Yorkshire,  accustomed  from  birth  to  the  wild 
moors  round  his  native  home  and  to  the  stern 
objectivity  of  northern  character,  he  was  suddenly 
translated  to  Cambridge.  He  came  up  with  a  County 
Council  Scholarship  and  very  soon  developed  his- 
torical gifts  of  remarkable  power.  The  word 
'developed'  is  perhaps  misleading;  for  his  mind 
resembled  a  cave,  which  revealed  something  that 
was  hidden,  if  you  penetrated  it  in  the  right  way. 
He  did  not  give  the  teacher  the  idea  of  developing 
intellect  or  imagination,  but  of  revealing  it.  His 
power  of  observation  was  not  trained  or  expanded 
by  his  study — study  simply  enabled  scales  to  fall 
from  his  eyes.  He  obtained  a  first  in  both  parts  of 
the  Historical  Tripos,  and  was  Hugo  de  Balsham 
Research  Scholar  at  Peterhouse,  Gladstone  and 
Prince  Consort  Prizeman  and  finally  Fellow  of  his 
College.   There  was  a  sort  of  mild  inevitability  about 


CHARLES  SPROXTON  ix 

his  success  which  surprised  those  who  did  not  know 
him  well,  but  which  his  friends  perfectly  understood. 

His  characteristics  were  those  of  a  nature  shy  and 
retiring  to  outward  view,  but  intense  and  imaginative 
within.  The  freedom  and  joy  of  college  Hfe  appealed 
to  him,  for  he  breathed  an  air  and  a  hfe  which  he 
had  not  hitherto  known  and  to  which  his  nature 
instinctively  responded.  In  pure  historical  work  he 
made  his  mark  by  a  fellowship  dissertation  on  the 
Hungarian  Revolution  of  1848,  on  its  diplomatic 
side,  to  write  which  he  delved  deep  in  the  records; 
among  other  things,  he  discovered  that  a  German 
book  professedly  based  on  the  British  records,  which 
had  deceived  at  least  one  distinguished  British 
historian,  was  a  forgery.  His  forecast  was  afterwards 
verified  and  accepted  by  the  Record  Office,  and 
characteristically  he  neither  claimed  nor  received 
any  credit  for  the  discovery.  His  essay  was  marked 
by  sound  research,  historic  grasp  and  a  real  eye  for 
diplomatic  motive.  Like  all  young  men's  work  it 
offered  itself  to  criticism  on  some  sides,  but  it  was 
a  study  of  extraordinary  promise  and  undoubted 
originality.  It  deserves  to  be  pubhshed  and,  if  it  is, 
will  fill  a  gap  in  our  knowledge  of  the  Palmerstonian 
epoch. 

Yet,  though  he  possessed  rare  historical  attain- 
ments, I  beheve  that  the  chief  influences  upon  him 
were  literary  and  rehgious.  His  imagination  was 
almost  medieval  in  its  wealth  and  in  its  simphcity. 
Francis  Thompson  was  his  King  of  Poets,  who  had 
said  the  last  word  in  imagery  and  style.  Indeed  this, 
writer  appealed  to  him  in  his  moods  of  mysticism,  as 
well  as  by  his  manner.  Unquestionably  his  own 
style  and  thought  were  thus  greatly  influenced,  and 
a  series  of  sonnets  which  he  wrote,  though  full  of 


X  CHARLES  SPROXTON 

originality,  bears  unmistakable  traces  of  Thompson. 
In  the  same  way  the  Anglican  Church,  with  its 
medieval  and  mystic  traditions,  appealed  to  him 
as  did  the  Catholic  to  Thompson.  Father  Figgis  was 
one  of  those  who,  both  by  writings  and  personal 
intercourse,  had  the  deepest  influence  upon  him. 
He  was  one  who  loved  mysticism  for  its  own  sake, 
just  as  he  loved  style.  Words  which  flushed  and 
glowed  or  fell  like  music,  a  faith  which  burned  and 
thrilled,  these  were  part  of  his  emotional  nature. 

His  dreamy  temperament  led  him  to  pensiveness 
and  reflection,  and  one  hardly  thought  of  him  as 
capable  of  action.  Yet  those  who  knew  him  best 
could  again  have  told  a  tale.  When  on  a  visit  to  the 
Lakes  he  astonished  all  his  companions  by  his 
physical  endurance,  as  afterwards  in  the  trenches  he 
bore  hardships  without  a  murmur,  perhaps  almost 
without  realising  that  they  were  such.  There  were 
those,  too,  who  heard  him  speak  in  the  college 
societies,  who  knew  that  his  nature  contained  un- 
expected fires.  Those  who  heard  it  will  never  forget 
one  speech,  in  which  he  spoke  of  Mohammedanism 
as  "the  religion  I  reverence  most  after  my  own," 
or  a  meeting  at  the  Historical  Society  in  which  he 
poured  scorn  on  the  doctrine  that  "  nothing  succeeds 
like  success."  Thus  it  was  that,  when  the  war  came, 
he  had  no  doubt  about  his  choice.  He  did  not  enHst, 
as  some  did,  because  it  was  a  duty,  but  because  he 
considered  it  a  privilege.  In  his  eyes  the  war  was  a 
holy  one  because  a  crusade  against  evil.  Germany 
must  be  made  to  abandon  for  ever  the  unblest  doc- 
trine that  Right  was  Might. 

There  is  Uttle  more  to  tell,  for  the  rest  is,  alas, 
already  an  old  story  among  our  young  men,  a  story 
of  hardships  cheerfully  borne  and  bravery  modestly 


CHARLES  SPROXTON  xi 

concealed.  Though  he  was  mentioned  in  despatches 
for  gallantry  and  received  the  Mihtary  Cross,  one 
could  never  get  any  account  of  the  incident  from 
him.  There  was  still  plenty  of  humour  left  in  him; 
for  instance,  after  he  had  been  in  hospital  with 
jaundice,  he  wrote:  "Trench  warfare,  after  the 
Cambridge  chmate,  is  the  most  enervating  thing  I 
know."  Yet  there  was  always  the  impatience  to  do 
something.  "England  is  a  dreary  place  now,  and  I 
was  really  pleased  when  my  sick  leave  ended.  I  spent 
two  happy  nights  in  Peterhouse,  but  Cambridge  is 
no  more  than  a  melancholy  haunt."  It  was  again 
the  old  story — the  overpowering  emotion  had  made 
one  whose  natural  bent  was  towards  thought  im- 
patient to  distinguish  himself  by  action.  The  Cam- 
bridge and  the  England  which  he  loved  now  stood 
between  him  and  France.  It  was  in  France  that  he 
wished  to  be,  and  it  is  France  which  holds  him  now. 

H.  W.  V.  T. 


The  Essay  Palmerston  and  the  Hungarian  Revolution  is 
based,  for  the  most  part,  on  the  Foreign  Office  records 
in  Chancery  Lane;  and  in  every  case  where  use  has  been 
made  of  these  records,  either  in  paraphrase  or  quotation, 
the  source  is  indicated  in  footnotes.  Not  a  few  have 
appeared  in  print  before,  chiefly  in  Government  pubUca- 
tions.  In  such  cases,  reference  has  been  made  to  the 
relevant  Blue  or  White  Books;  but,  where  the  printed 
copy  differs  materially  from  the  MS  original,  I  have  used 
the  latter,  and  as  a  rule  noted  the  variation  in  my  foot- 
notes. Secondary  authorities  have  been  freely  employed, 
but  not  without  an  attempt  to  appraise  their  worth  as 
'sources,'  and  never  without  sufficient  indication  of  the 
use  made  of  them  either  in  the  text  or  in  the  footnotes. 
I  have  had  no  opportunity  of  working  in  the  archives 
either  at  Vienna  or  Buda-Pest. 

C.  Sproxton. 


PALMERSTON 

AND  THE  HUNGARIAN 

REVOLUTION 


'  En  fait  d'histoire  contemporaine  il  tiy  a  de 
vrai  que  ce  qu'on  necrit  point." 

Van  de  Weyer. 


S.  P. 


PALMERSTON 

AND  THE  HUNGARIAN 

REVOLUTION 


THE  men  who  guided  the  larger  destinies  of 
Europe  during  the  "storm-years"  1848  and 
1849,  w^^^  scarcely  equal  to  the  tasks  which  they 
were  called  upon,  voluntarily  or  involuntarily,  to 
accompHsh ;  for  these  years  do  not  merely  bisect  the 
century,  they  are  its  watershed.  On  the  far  side  He 
benevolent  despotism  and  the  state-system;  on  this 
side,  democracy  and  nationalities.  The  period  from 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  to  the  Civic  Guard  of  Pius  IX 
and  the  Hungarian  Diet  of  1847  is,  in  a  very  real 
sense,  the  fine  flower  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Territorial  frontiers  may  have  been  shifted  some- 
what, old  institutions  rebaptised;  but  the  spirit  is 
the  same :  Joseph  H  would  never  have  dared  to  do  all 
that  the  Congresses  did,  and  Guizot  always  speaks  like 
a  minister  of  Louis  XV.  The  first  French  Revolution 
was  only  perceptible  through  the  completeness  of 
the  reaction;  so  efficaciously  had  the  body  poHtic 
been  purged  that,  outwardly  at  any  rate,  it  appeared 
more  immune  from  the  revolutionary  taint  than  it 
had  in  1788.  Then,  with  incredible  swiftness,  the 
house   of   reaction   collapsed,    and   long   flames   of 


4  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

rebellion  shot  across  Europe  from  the  Atlantic  to 
Bessarabia,  from  Posen  to  the  shores  of  Sicily,  almost 
outrunning  the  telegraph  which  announced  their 
approach.  And  this,  to  use  an  outworn  term,  is  the 
"foundation"  of  modern  Europe.  The  actors,  with 
a  few  exceptions  (and  these  chiefly  south  of  the  Alps), 
are  not  cast  in  a  heroic  mould:  Viennese  schoolboys, 
preferring  a  Katzenmusik  by  night  to  carefully  pruned 
lectures  on  political  science  at  more  seasonable  hours; 
older,  but  scarcely  more  erudite,  students,  proclaim- 
ing the  divine  right  of  a  people  whose  histor}^  and 
culture  they  had  just  manufactured;  the  degenerate 
'48  breed  of  sansculottes,  and  Magyar  honveds,  magni- 
fying some  slight  skirmish  between  outposts  into  a 
Cannae  or  Waterloo.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why 
the  European  Revolution  of  1848  will  never  be  so 
well  known  as  the  French  Revolution  of  sixty  years 
earlier,  although  the  judgment  passed  by  the  cautious 
Springer  upon  the  March-days  of  Vienna  holds  good 
for  the  greater  part  of  Europe,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  he  was  speaking  of  Austria  only : 

We  may  take  various  views  about  the  vitality  of  the 
new  Austria  which  they  tried  to  set  up  on  the  ruins  of 
the  old ;  but  there  can  be  no  conflict  of  opinion  that  in  the 
March-days  the  old  Austria  fell  completely,  justly,  and 
for  ever,  and  that  all  who  have  held  power  since  1848, 
without  distinction,  take  their  stand  upon  the  Revolution  1. 

^  "  Ueber  die  Lebensfahigkcit  des  neuen  Oesterreich,  welches 
auf  den  Triimmern  des  alten  zu  errichten  versucht  wurde, 
kann  man  vcrschiedencr  Ansicht  sein;  dass  aber  in  den 
Marztagen  das  alte  Oesterreich  vollstdndig,  mit  Recht  und  fiir 
immer  zu  Grunde  ging,  allc  Machthaber  seit  1848  ohne  Unter- 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  5 

During  such  momentous  times,  Palmerston,  alone  of 
those  who  were  at  the  head  of  affairs,  reahsed  fully 
what  the  contemporary  phenomena  meant,  whence 
they  were  derived,  and  to  what  profitable  ends  they 
might  be  utiHsed;  he  alone  perceived  that  after  the 
Volkerfruhling  the  political  harvesting  would  not  be 
as  those  that  had  gone  before.  This  is  not  chauvin- 
istic over-estimation;  Palmerston  is  indeed  the  out- 
standing figure  of  1848-9,  a  giant  among  his  fellows, 
not  because  his  proportions  are  in  truth  gigantic 
when  measured  by  the  tape  of  world-history,  but 
because  the  Ficquelmonts  and  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  are 
so  very  dwarfish.  The  space  which  divides  him  from 
Pitt,  the  disciple  from  the  master,  is  the  whole  dis- 
tance between  the  high-water  mark  of  common-sense 
and  the  snow-Hne  of  genius.  But  the  times  were 
crying  out  for  a  httle  undiluted  common-sense,  which, 
as  Lamartine  discovered,  may  well  be  more  fitted 
than  genius  to  cope  with  revolution.  Genius  would 
never  have  made  such  gross  miscalculations  about 
the  future  as  did  Palmerston ;  but  it  would  doubtless 
have  dealt  less  vigorously  with  the  present:  short- 
sightedness is  a  virtue  in  some  crises. 

Palmerston,  then,  was  not  a  great  man;  but  he 
was  the  right  man.  Sir  Stratford  Canning,  had  he 
had  any  gifts  of  oratory,  would  have  made  a  better 
Foreign  Secretary ;  Schwarzenberg  and  Czar  Nicholas 
were  his  equals  as  statesmen,  while  Lamartine  and 

schied  auf  die  Revolution  als  ihre  Basis  fussen,  dariiber  herrscht 
kein  Zwiespalt  der  Meinungen."  Springer,  Geschichte  Oester- 
reichs  seit  dem  Wiener  Frieden,  vol.  11.  pp.  194-6,  and  footnote. 
(Leipzig,  1865.) 


6  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Mazzini  were  incomparably  greater  as  men.  And,  if 
Palmerston  judged  the  phenomena  of  his  time  accur- 
ately, and  proceeded  to  take  the  steps  he  actually 
took,  he  was  indebted  to  his  country's  geographical 
position  no  less  than  to  his  own  innate  common- 
sense.  Not  seldom  has  the  Channel  proved  itself 
more  potent  than  the  personal  element  as  a  maker 
of  history,  and  but  for  it  many  a  Downing  Street 
transgressor  might  have  died  repentant.  Palmerston 
was  on  the  right  side  of  the  Channel  for  the  role  he 
chose  to  play  during  the  Revolution;  and,  standing 
outside  the  universal  ferment,  he  got  a  better  view  of 
it.  It  is  a  comfortable  pastime  to  read  the  Mene  Tekel 
on  a  neighbour's  wall,  to  "rain  homihes"  at  Vienna 
and  point  the  moral  of  governmental  misdeeds  in 
Athens,  when  one  has  nothing  worse  to  face  at  home 
than  potato  famines  in  Ireland  and  Chartist  signa- 
tories who  have  only  a  parchment  existence.  For 
his  interference  abroad  Palmerston  has  been  censured 
everywhere;  at  home,  he  frightened  his  colleagues 
and  was  found  intolerable  in  exalted  circles,  while 
subsequent  historians,  such  as  Spencer  Walpole  and 
Sir  Theodore  Martin,  cannot  condemn  too  plainly 
his  insolence  and  effrontery.  Abroad,  of  course,  he 
is  still  Lord  Feuerhrand,  and  the  European  "  umpire." 
In  the  Enghsh  universities  we  are  apologetic  and 
indignant  by  turns,  when  speaking  of  the  Enghsh 
Foreign  Secretary  who  appointed  himself  tutor  in 
Weltpolitik  and  lecturer  in  international  ethics.  The 
accusation  is  on  the  whole  unjust,  and  the  worst 
that  can  be  said  of  Palmerston  is  that  he  was  no 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  7 

diplomat   in   the   nicer   shades   of   the   term.     "In 
diplomacy,"  said  de  Tocqueville,  "you  must  always 
write,  even  when  you  know  nothing  and  wish  to  say 
nothing";  and  he  might  have  added  that  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten  you  must  take  good  care  that  you 
do  not  say  anything.    That  was  not  Palmerston's 
way,   and,   except  in  rare  moments   of  supremely 
correct  behaviour,  he  usually  did  say  something  very 
unambiguously.    Poor  Lord  Ponsonby,  our  ambas- 
sador at  Vienna,  the  friend  of  Metternich  and  disciple 
of  Talleyrand,  told  Lord  John  Russell  that  "he  had 
received  from  Palmerston  letters  which  are  not  to 
be  submitted  to  by  any  man^" ;  and  Palmerston  was 
usually  more  brusque  and  less  pohte  with  foreign 
Courts  than  with  his  own  servants,  in  spite  of  the 
watchful  eye  and  ready  pencil  of  Queen  Victoria.  To 
be  impohte  and  insulting  in  diplomacy  is  a  mistake ; 
but  it  was  Palmerston's  only  mistake.      Impartial 
readers  must  admit  that  the  kings  and  princes  whom 
Palmerston  called  fools  and  knaves  were  not  far  from 
being  such.  A  large  section  of  the  country— including 
the  Queen  and  the  Prince  Consort— complained  in 
1849-50  that  his  brusquerie  and  habit   of  straight 
talking   had   left   us   without    an   ally   in   Europe. 
Palmerston    rephed    that    right    and    justice    were 
stronger  than  troops  of  armed  men  2,  and  his  admirers 
may  assert  that  the  alhances  were  worthless,  especi- 
ally at  the  price  at  which  they  were  to  be  purchased. 

1  Spencer  Walpole,  Life  of  Lord  John  Russell,  vol.  11.  p.  48 

footnote. 

2  speech  of  July  21st,  1849,  Debate  on  Russian  Invasion  of  j^x 
Hungary,  House  of  Commons.   Hansard,  cvii.  pp.  786-817.       \y 


»  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Palmerston,  it  has  been  said,  judged  the  move- 
ments of  1848  at  their  proper  value.  He  did  not  fall 
into  panic  fear  at  what  was  happening,  and  many  of 
his  despatches  are  filled  with  the  undisguised  note  of 
jubilation  of  a  prophet  justified  in  his  prophesying 
at  the  last.  He  knew  that  the  end  of  social  order 
had  not  come  in  England,  and,  in  spite  of  barricades 
and  fugitive  royalty,  believed  that  the  same  was 
true  of  Europe.  There  was  probably  only  one  man, 
apart  from  himself,  on  whose  judgment  he  placed 
any  reliance,  and  that  man  strongly  corroborated 
this  behef.  Before  he  took  up  his  fifth  residence  in 
Constantinople  in  1848,  Sir  Stratford  Canning  had 
been  sent  as  itinerant  ambassador  to  most  of  the 
Courts  which  lay  between  Ostend  and  the  Golden 
Horn.  He  saw  shivering  burghers  relieve  the  guard 
with  white-gloved  students  in  a  deserted  Berlin, 
and  witnessed  nocturnal  disturbances  at  Vienna; 
and  yet  he  wrote  home  his  firm  belief  that  Central 
Europe  was  sound  at  heart.  What  was  true  of 
Germany  was  true  of  the  rest  of  Europe;  and,  if 
there  was  trouble  ahead,  it  was  the  fault  not  of  the 
peoples,  but  of  the  Courts.  Napoleon  had  been 
finally  overthrown,  not  by  princes  and  statesmen, 
but  by  the  citizen,  the  student  and  the  artisan;  not 
by  diplomacy,  but  by  the  nascent  force  of  nationaUty. 
And  what  had  been  the  reward  for  the  generation 
which  lay  between  Waterloo  and  the  Smoke-riots  at 
Milan?  There  had  been  no  reward:  the  novel  sensa- 
tion of  a  national  self-consciousness,  and  all  the 
hundred  forms  of  a  better  life  that  it  meant,  had 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  9 

been  protocoUed  out  of  existence  at  Troppau  and 
Carlsbad.  Not  only  had  the  doors  of  government 
been  banged  in  the  face  of  the  citizen  and  artisan 
who  had  fought  at  Leipzig,  but  a  despotism  more 
brutal,  and  a  delation  more  searching,  than  any  that 
characterised  the  empire  of  Napoleon,  intruded  upon 
the  innermost  recesses  of  their  private  hfe.  "  Do  you 
think,"  asked  the  Prince  of  Prussia,  afterwards  King 
and  Kaiser  Wilhelm,  "that  if  the  nations  had  known 
in  1813  that  of  all  their  strugghng  no  reahty,  but 
only  the  remembrance,  would  remain — do  you  think 
anybody  would  have  made  sacrifices  so  great?  "  All 
the  time  social  conditions  were  improving ;  inventors 
were  never  more  active;  banks  were  multiplying  in 
great  and  small  cities;  commercial  companies  were 
being  floated  everywhere.  The  excluded  classes  were 
now  something  more  than  ilHterate,  half-starved 
peasants;  they  were  travelled,  prosperous,  and  had 
some  sort  of  education.  Whatever  they  might  think 
at  the  Hofburg,  humanity  no  longer  began  with 
barons.  Such  a  state  of  things  could  not  last  for  ever ; 
apathy  became  discontent,  discontent  grew  into 
disorder,  and  unless  the  Governments  yielded,  dis- 
order would  convert  itself  into  revolution.  In  England 
the  Government  had  yielded  as  early  as  1832,  and,  in 
addition  to  the  Reform  Bill,  there  was  a  widely-read 
Press,  and,  for  the  artisans,  some  trades-union 
activity.  Institutions  which  had  been  so  beneficial 
in  England  would  have  similar  salutary  effects  if 
apphed  to  the  European  Continent — that  is  the  whole 
statement  of  Palmerston's  position,  both  before  and 
after  the  outbreak. 


lo  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

He  once  told  the  Master  of  Trinity  that  no  man 
ought  to  be  doctored  against  his  will :  half  his  official 
life  was  spent  in  doctoring  governments  against  their 
will.  The  student  of  the  Foreign  Office  records  for  the 
later  'forties  grows  weary,  in  spite  of  Palmerston's_ 
crisp  logic  and  sharply-etched  metaphors,  of  the 
eternal  prescription  to  the  ailing  but  recalcitrant 
foreigner-:  "  If  you  would  but  turn  constitutional  and 
copy  our  institutions,  you  might  be  as  happy  and 
prosperous,  and  sleep  as  soundly  in  your  bed,  as  we 
in  England."  The  advice  was  perfectly  sound,  and, 
had  it  been  taken  and  acted  upon  in  the  spirit  in 
which  it  was  given,  much  disaster  would  certainly 
have  been  avoided.  It  is  quite  obvious  from  the 
Memoirs  of  Metternich  that  he,  too,  diagnosed  the 
disease  correctly  and  knew  the  remedy  that  should  be 
applied.  It  would  have  been  as  well  for  his  reputation 
had  he  never  disclosed  the  fact.  Thus  Palmerston 
was  no  revolutionary,  but  honestly  believed  that 
political  institutions  which  had  proved  themselves  of 
sterhng  worth  in  the  United  Kingdom  might  with 
advantage  be  imported  into  Europe,  and  that,  in 
any  case,  the  old  forms  of  government,  as  they  had 
been  fashioned  under  the  auspices  of  the  Holy 
AlHance,  were  no  longer  possible. 

But  however  liberal  and  humane  he  might  be, 
however  frankly  his  sympathies  might  be  enlisted  on 
the  side  of  oppressed  nationalities,  Palmerston  was 
still  Foreign  Secretary,  and  in  that  capacity  his  chief 
duty  was  the  maintenance  of  the  Balance  of  Power. 
It  might  happen  that  humane  considerations  and 
the  maintenance  of  the  Balance  of  Power  did  not 


.-^y  o'^ 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  ii 

always  go  hand  in  hand.   In  that  case,  the  duty  of  a 
British  statesman  clearly  was  to  look  to  the  latter 
first.  Charity  and  diplomacy,  indeed,  usually  seemed 
identical  while  Palmerston  was  at  the  Foreign  Office; 
and  a  despatch  protesting  against  "Bomba's"  latest 
piece  of  cruelty,  or  the  annexation  of  Cracow,  or 
arguing  in  favour  of  the  asylum  extended  by  the 
Swiss  to  poHtical  refugees,  was  equally  justified  by 
the  doctrine  of  the  Evangehsts  and  by  the  doctrine 
of  the  Balance  of  Power.  To  this  rule  there  was  one 
great  exception,  and  that  exception  was  the  revolu-  \ 
tion  in  Hungary :  why  it  should  have  been  an  excep- 
tion will  be  seen  after  a  short  resume  of  Palmerston' s 
ideas  of  the  Balance  of  Power  has  been  attempted. '^^^;^^    «- 
^  And  here  the  fear  of  Russian  preponderance  is  the 
.^(;/#sahent  fact.   Once  that  is  comprehended,  the  maze  is 
'  threaded  easily  enough.    Palmerston  feared  Russia, 

and  in  doing  so  proved  himself  to  be  a  man  of  his 
generation.  It  is  hard  for  us  now  to  think  ourselves 
back  into  the  forty  years  that  separate  the  Moscow 
campaign  from  the  campaign  in  the  Crimea,  and  to 
realise  the  position  which  the  Czar  occupied  during 
that  period  in  the  eyes  of  the  other  European  mon- 
archs  and  statesmen.  The  rout  of  the  Grande  Armee, 
and  the  entry  of  Alexander  I  into  Paris  remained 
unforgotten — Russia  had  repaid  her  ancient  debt  to 
Western  civihzation  with  interest.  But  it  was  not 
merely  the  part  played  by  Russia  in  the  closing  years 
of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  that  invested  her  with  a 
strength  and  grandeur  which  she  did  not  in  truth 
possess.   Even  so  recently  as  sixty  years  ago,  Russia 


12  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 


I 


was,  comparatively  speaking,  unknown,  and  there-  \ 

fore  held  for  magnificent.  Her  enormous  mileage, 
her  untold  millions  of  fanatically  loyal  serfs,  the 
unplumbed  depths  of  the  Slavonic  character — these 
struck  the  imagination  of  the  West,  while  the  real 
weaknesses  of  the  Muscovite  polity  remained  un- 
discovered. There  was  something  un-European  about 
it  all,  something  terrible;  the  saviour  of  the. West 
might  one  day  become  its  destroyer.  This  may  seem 
exaggerated  language  as  applied  to  a  time  within 
the  memory  of  men  still  living,  but  it  describes  an 
actual  state  of  affairs.  De  Tocqueville,  the  sanest  of 
thinkers,  firmly  believed,  on  the  eve  of  the  Crimean 
War,  that  "our  West  is  threatened,  sooner  or  later, 
to  fall  under  the  yoke  or  at  least  under  the  direct 
and  irresistible  influence  of  the  Czars";  and.  French- 
man though  he  was,  he  thought  that  German  unity 
should  be  fostered  as  a  barrier  between  the  threaten- 
ing East  and  the  threatened  West^.  In  1846, 
Hummelauer  told  Stockmar  that  "without  Russia 
there  would  be  no  longer  an  Austrian  State^."  In 
England  the  same  sentiment  is  displayed  time  after 
time  in  Parliamentary  debates  and  in  dozens  of 
forgotten  pamphlets;  the  strength  and  extent  of  the 
idea  are  perhaps  best  gauged  from  the  writings  of 
its  chief  opponent,  Cobden.  Already,  in  1848, 
Panslavism — a  Panslavism  the  headquarters  of  which 
were  in  St  Petersburg — was  a  force  in  diplomacy, 

^  Recollections  of  A  lexis  de  Tocqueville,  edited  by  the  Comte 
de  Tocqueville,  p.  350.    (London,  1896.) 

2  Stockmar,  Memoirs,  vol.  11.  p.  360.  The  conversation  took 
place  after  the  Cracow  affair. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  13 

and  was  to  be  the  compensation  to  Russia  for  the  ' 
failure  of  the  Holy  AUiance.   It  will  be  seen  that  this 
was  at  least  one  of  the  motives  for  the  Russian  inter- 
vention in  Hungary  in  the  spring  months  of  1849.  i 
Side  by  side  with  the  Panslav  schemes  in  Russian 
official  circles  went  the  hope  of  a  Byzantine  future; 
in  the  West  at  any  rate,  the  Czar  was  always  supposed 
to  have  one  eye  fixed  on  the  dome  of  St  Sofia  and  the 
finest   commercial   and  strategical  position  in   the 
world.  There  was  always  a  Constantine  in  the  family 
to  remind  the  Romanoffs  of  their  ultimate  destiny, 
and,  since  there  was  a  real  religious  justification  for 
the  idea,  it  was  popular  with  the  masses.  The  imperial 
epigram    had    long    been    pubhc    property:    "The 
Ottoman  Empire  is  dead;  we  have  only  to  arrange 
for  its  funeral" — and  the  Czar  meant  to  be  sole  heir. 
The  fear  of  Russian  aggrandisement  in  the  Balkans 
underlay  the  whole  of  Stratford  Canning's  later  work 
at  Constantinople,  and  there  is  no  reason  for  believing 
that    the    ambassador's    anti-Russian    counsels    to 
Palmerston  and  the  Porte  were  the  result  of  personal 
pique,  and  not  of  genuine  dread  of  the  designs  of  the 
Czar  and  his  ministers.    How  real  the  danger  was 
may  be  seen  from  a  despatch  of  Canning's  sent  home 
in  the  early  weeks  of  1849,   which  encloses  some 
extracts  from  a  book  printed  in  Moscow,  and  intended 
to  be  circulated  in  the  European  provinces  of  Turkey. 
The  chief  extract  is  as  follows:  "Destroy  quickly  the 
Empire  of  Hagar,  infamous  as  it  is  and  detestable  to 
Heaven, and  give  it  to  the  orthodox  Emperor;  fortify 
the  true  beHevers,  raise  up  the  Christian  race,  and  do 


14  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

not  withdraw  from  us  Thy  great  mercy ^."  The  next 
day,  in  a  private  letter  to  Palmerston,  Canning  hints 
that  the  appearance  of  a  fleet  in  the  Archipelago 
would  have  a  very  good  influence  on  the  course  of 
events  in  the  Balkans.  This  was  over  half  a  year 
before  the  question  of  the  refugees  cropped  up,  and 
contemporaneous  with  the  first  incursion  of  the 
Russian  troops  into  Transylvania,  which  involved  a 
violation  of  Turkish  territory.  "If  the  Russians  are 
only  bullying,"  he  writes,  "a  little  more  determina- 
tion will  keep  them  in  order.  If  they  have  great 
schemes  in  view,  it  will  be  more  necessary  to  check 
them.  This  is  worthy  of  prompt  and'serious  thought. 
The  appearance  of  a  combined  squadron  in  these 
latitudes  of  force  sufficient  to  go  further  if  necessary, 
would  probably  set  all  to  rights;  and  if  one  might 
hope  that,  spite  of  Cobden,  the  pubHc  would  go  with 
you  against  an  exposed  system  of  encroachment, 
hypocrisy,  and  despotic  reaction,  would  not  the 
establishments  at  home  escape  a  severe  trial,  and  the 
peace  of  Europe  have  a  better  chance  of  being 
secured. . .  .  ? 

"In  conversation  with  General  Aupick,"  French 
minister  at  the  Porte,  "the  other  day,  I  found  that 
he  was  entertaining  the  idea  of  a  visit  to  the  Dar- 
danelles by  a  combined  squadron,  and  I  am  inclined 

^  The  Book  was  a  book  of  psalms  and  prayers,  and  the 
extracts  are  given  in  a  French  translation:  it  begins,  "  Ai<  noyn 
du  Pdre,  du  Fils,  etc.  Par  ordre  dit  Tris-Auguste  et  Tris- 
Puissant  Empereur  Nicholas,  etc.  et  avec  la  binMiction  du 
Saint  Synode..  .  .Imprimi  a  Moscou  au  mois  d'avril,  1848." 
Canning  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  4th,  1849. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  15 

to  think  that  he  has  written  home  about  it,  though 
not  perhaps  in  an  ofhcial  form.  Though  not  dissenting 
from  him,  I  was  careful  not  to  encourage  him  in  any 
exaggerated  views,  though,  in  truth,  there  is  enough 
in  our  present  appearances  here  to  warrant  the 
apprehension  of  circumstances  requiring  a  strong 
demonstration  in  favour  of  the  Porte  and  our  Oriental 

policy^." 

One  of  Canning's  most  cherished  aims  was  to 
amehorate  the  condition  of  the  Christian  subjects  of 
the  Sultan;  he  discovered  that  Russian  intrigue  was 
striving  to  dissuade  his  friends  in  the  Council  of  the 
Porte  from  following  his  counsels  in  the  matter, 
because  it  was  not  to  their  interests  that  the  Christians 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  should  be  contented  under 
the  rule  of  Islam.  Equally  clear  and  convincing  is  a 
despatch  written  by  the  EngHsh  charge  d'affaires 
at  St  Petersburg  after  a  conversation  he  had  had 
with  the  Russian  chancellor.  Count  Nesselrode,  on 
the  affairs  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

I  may  observe  that  what  has  struck  me  most  in  the 
various  conversations  which  I  have  had  with  Count 
Nesselrode  and  other  persons,  with  regard  to  this  subject, 

1  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  5th,  1849,  Private  Letter. 
This  was  not  the  first  time  that  Canning  had  hinted  at  the 
appearance  of  an  EngHsh  fleet  in  the  Archipelago.  On 
November  20th  of  the  previous  year  he  had  written  home  that 
Russia  was  so  dictatorial  and  encroaching  that  it  might  be 
advisable  for  the  whole  or  part  of  our  Mediterranean  Fleet 
(probably  in  conjunction  with  the  French)  to  demonstrate  in 
the  Levant  and  Archipelago.  No  EngHsh  war- vessel  had  been 
there  for  some  time,  and  Russia  had  taken  advantage  of  this 
to  assure  the  Sultan  that  the  moral  support  of  the  Western 
Powers  was  wanting.   Nov.  20th,  1849. 


I6 


PALMERSTON  AND  THE 


is  that  they  never  discuss  it  without  evincing  uncon- 
sciously a  latent  conviction  that  the  Turkish  Empire 
merely  exists  from  the  sufferance  and  magnanimity  of 
the  Emperor;  and  that  any  suspicion  therefore,  which  may 
be  thrown  on  His  Imperial  Majesty's  policy  towards  the 
Porte,  is  calling  in  question  the  self-denial,  to  which  that 
power  is  indebted  for  her  existence;  and  that  opposition, 
on  the  part  of  a  Foreign  Government,  to  arrangements 
which  Russia  may  wish  to  concert  with  the  Turkish 
Authorities ...  is  an  absolute  interference  with  the  just 
rights  of  His  Imperial  Majesty.  As  they  are  aware  that 
such  pretensions  will  not  be  admitted  by  Europe,  and 
more  particularly  by  the  Government  of  Her  Majesty, 
they  do  not  proclaim  them;  but,  it  appears  to  me,  they 
consider  Her  Majesty's  Government,  by  the  course  which 
they  are  pursuing  in  Turkey,  to  be  raising  questions  on 
technicalities  and  endeavouring  to  fence  by  legal  sub- 
tilties  a  falling  Empire,  which  nothing  could  prevent  the 
Emperor,  if  he  thought  fit,  from  annexing  to  his  dominions. 
What  is  perhaps  more  surprising,  I  have  found  some  of 
my  colleagues  not  altogether  free  from  similar  impres- 
sions. . .  ^ 

Palmerston  was  in  no  sense  of  the  word  a  fanatical 
hater  of  Russia.  He  had  ample  opportunity  of 
opening  the  old  wound  that  was  Poland,  on  any  day 
of  the  year,  and  would  have  been  cheered  to  the 
echo  by  almost  any  crowd  in  the  British  Isles.  He 
did  not  do  so:  "The  Government  will  never  do  any- 
thing underhand  or  ungentlemanHke  on  those 
matters,"   he  said^.    But  he  did  fear  Russia,   and 


^  Buchanan  to  Palmerston,  March  13th,  1849. 
■^  Palmerston  to  Lord  Bloomfield,  April  nth,  1848,  Bloom- 
field  Papers. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  17 

nowhere  so  much  as  in  the  Near  East.  Consequently, 
he  recognised  it  to  be  his  duty  to  find  a  barrier  to ; 
the  encroachments  of  Russia  westwards  and  south-  '^ 
wards.  In  spite  of  her  manifold  transgressions  against 
Albion  and  common-sense,  in  spite  of  her  unfaith- 
fulness and  obstinacy,  Austria  was  essentially  and 
necessarily  the  ally  of  England  against  Russia;  if 
Russian  aggrandisement  threatened  the  well-being 
of  England  a  thousand  miles  away,  how  much  more 
did  it  threaten  that  of  Austria,  which  lay  right 
athwart  the  path  which  the  Czars  had  marked  out  for 
themselves !  That  which  was  dearest  to  the  heart  of 
the  Russian  statesmen,  ran  straight  counter  to  the 
interests  of  Viennese  diplomacy.  If  Constantinople 
became  once  again  the  capital  of  the  Orthodox  faith, 
Austria  would  be  httle  more  than  a  Russian  enclave; 
if  the  Panslavic  ideal  were  reahsed  according  to  the 
wishes  attributed  to  Nicholas  and  Count  Nesselrode, 
Austria  would  lose  some  of  her  fairest  provinces. 
The  Austrian  Government  could  not  be  ignorant  of 
the  fact  that  their  Servian  subjects  were  already 
coquetting  with  Russia^,  and  a  pro-Russian  agitation 
would  be  much  more  dangerous  to  the  integrity  of 

1  "I  received  last  night  a  confidential  communication  from 
Aali  Pasha  [Turkish  minister  for  foreign  affairs]  to  the 
following  effect;  the  Servians  of  Austria,  equally  discontented 
with  the  Governments  of  Vienna  and  of  Hungary,  wish  to 
separate  themselves  from  the  Empire,  and  either  to  incorporate 
their  population  with  that  of  Turkish  Servia  under  the  autho- 
rity of  the  Porte,  or  to  throw  themselves  entirely  into  the  arms 
of  Russia."  This  was  not  a  piece  of  diplomatic  gossip.  "The 
intelUgence  has  been  conveyed  to  the  Porte  as  well  by  the 
Pasha  of  Belgrade  as  by  the  Servian  Government."  Canning 
to  Palmerston,  Nov.  3rd,  1848. 

s.  P.  2 


1 8  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

the  Austrian  Empire  than  the  revolution  in  Hun- 
gary. 

/  Not  only  was  Austria  the  chief  ally  of  England 
Vagainst  Russia,  she  was  the  only  one.  Germany 
indeed  has  as  good  reasons  as  Austria  to  fear  the 
expansion  of  Russia;  but  then  Germany  did  not  yet 
exist.  Palmerston  was  sagacious  enough  to  recognise 
that  a  United  Germany  must  appear  some  day,  and 
that  when  it  did  appear  it  ought  to  be  the  ally  of 
England,  since  the  two  countries  would  have  two 
common  foes — Russia  and  France.  But  he  was  too 
good  a  Liberal  to  foster  a  Germany  united  on  the 
commercial  principles  of  the  Zollverein,  and  told 
the  Prince  Consort  that  "any  Enghsh  Ministry 
would  be  thought  to  have  much  neglected  its  duty, 
and  to  have  sacrificed  the  commercial  interests  of 
the  country,  if  it  did  not  make  every  proper  effort  to 
persuade  the  States  of  North  Germany,  who  have 
not  joined  the  Zollverein,  to  continue  to  refrain  from 
doing  so^."  Meanwhile,  Germany  was  not  united, 
and  if  Frederick  Wilham  did  anything  at  all,  it 
would  most  probably  be  what  his  august  relative  at 
St  Petersburg  told  him  to  do.  Nor  could  France  be 
rehed  upon.  Nominally,  we  were  the  friends  of  that 
country;  but  it  was  a  singular  friendship,  the  result 
of  necessity  rather  than  of  choice,  of  outward  cir- 
cumstances rather  than  of  an  indwelhng  cordial 
understanding  between  the  two  countries.  Their 
agents  abroad  appraised  the  "friendship"  at  head- 
quarters at  its  proper  worth,  and  carried  on  wretched 
*  Martin.  Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,  vol.  ii.  pp.  447-^- 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  19 

diplomatic  squabbles  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe. 
And  as  the  revolutionary  movement  spent  its  force, 
or  was  ruthlessly  suppressed,  the  position  of  France 
was  indeed  a  difficult  one.  After  the  Government  had 
definitely  broken  with  the   "red  fool-fury,"   after 
Cavaignac   had   restored   order,    and   the   reins    of 
government  had  been  handed  to  Louis  Napoleon,  the 
Administration  was  reduced  to  lead  a  "petty  life, 
from  day  to  day^";  it  could  not  heartily  cooperate 
with  the  restorers  of  order  abroad,  for  that  function 
belonged  to  Russia,  and  the  Left  at  home  was  still 
powerful,  and  had  to  be  placated.   It  could  not  join 
the  innovators,  for  they  were  hopelessly  incapable, 
and  to  support  them  abroad  meant  to  fall  beneath 
their  blows  at  home.   So  the  Government,  if  with  an 
ill  grace,  must  needs  accept  the  "sterile  goodwill  of 
the  English,"  and  "remain  haughty,  while  it  ceased 
to   be   preponderant."     In    any   case,    the   Prince- 
President  had  special  reasons  of  his  own  for  deahng 
tenderly  with  Russian  susceptibihties,  as  will  be  seen 
later,  and  Palmerston  was  still  smarting  from  the 
reverse  he  had  suffered  in  the  matter  of  the  Spanish 
marriages,  and  the  whole  position  of  affairs  in  the 
Iberian  Peninsula.    With  the  conciUatory  Aberdeen 
at  the  Foreign  Office,  a  hearty  cooperation  of  the 
two  Governments  would  have  been  difficult  enough 
to  engineer;  with  '' ce  terrible  Lord  Palmerston" — 
openly  accused  by  Queen  Victoria  herself  of  bringing 
about  the  fall  of  the  July  Monarchy — it  was  out  of 
the  question.    The  two  countries  did  indeed  "co- 
1  De  Tocqueville,  op.  cit.  pp.  340-1.  ' 


20  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

operate  "  in  the  question  of  the  Hungarian  and  Pohsh 
refugees — but  how  unwilhngly,  and  with  what 
mutual  distrust,  is  known  to  anyone  who  has  gone 
,  through  the  relevant  documents.  Since  the  days  of 
Mehemet  Ah,  English  statesmen  watched  French 
activity  in  the  Near  East  only  less  narrowly  than 
they  were  wont  to  watch  Russian  movements  in  the 
same  regions. 

Austria,  then,  was  the  traditional  and  inevitable 
ally  of  England,  and  as  such  was  regarded  by 
Palmerston.  The  fact  is  patent  in  his  despatches,  in 
his  parhamentary  speeches,  and  in  such  records  of 
his  conversations  at  this  date  as  are  extant.  Perhaps 
the  most  interesting  passage  of  all  is  the  account 
which  the  Hungarian  Pulszky  (of  whose  mission  to 
England  more  hereafter)  gives  of  an  unofficial  visit 
which  he  paid  to  Palmerston  in  the  private  room  of 
the  latter  in  Downing  Street.  Palmerston  condemned 
ithe  policy  which  Austria  was  pursuing  with  respect 
to  Hungary,  but  remarked  that  the  Austrian  Empire 
was  of  such  a  nature 

that,  if  it  did  not  already  exist,  it  would  have  to  be 
invented;  that  it  was  an  European  necessity,  and  the 
natural  ally  of  England  in  the  East;  he  therefore  coun- 
selled us  to  reconcile  ourselves  with  Austria,  because  in 
the  frame  of  the  European  State-system  it  would  be 
impossible  to  replace  Austria  by  small  States^. 

^  Pulszk}',  Meine  Zeit,  mein  Leben,  vol.  ii.  p.  322  {4  vols. 
Pressburg  and  Leipzig,  1880-3).  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
the  value  of  this  portion  of  Pulszky's  autobiography,  especially 
since  much  that  is  contained  in  it  is  corroborated  from  other 
sources.  The  conversation  reported  above  most  likely  took  place 
in  March,  1849,  shortly  after  Pulszky  had  arrived  in  England. 


% 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  21 

Palmerston  was  here  repeating  verbatim,  consciously 
or  unconsciously,  what  Palacky  had  said  in  his 
famous  refusal  to  join  the  Committee  of  Fifty. 
Equally  expHcit  are  his  words  in  the  House  of 
Commons : 

Austria  is  a  most  important  element  in  the  balance  of 
European  power.  Austria  stands  in  the  centre  of  Europe, 
a  barrier  against  encroachment  on  the  one  side,  and 
against  invasion  on  the  other.  The  pohtical  independence 
and  liberties  of  Europe  are  bound  up,  in  my  opinion, 
with  the  maintenance  and  integrity  of  Austria,  as  a  great 
European  Power;  and  therefore  anything  which  tends  by 
direct  or  even  remote  contingency,  to  weaken  and  to 
cripple  Austria,  but  still  more  to  reduce  her  from  the 
position  of  a  first-rate  Power  to  that  of  a  secondary  State, 
must  be  a  great  calamity  to  Europe,  and  one  which  every 
Englishman  ought  to  deprecate,  and  to  try  to  prevent^. 

Palmerston,  then,  however  unpalatable  his  advice 
to  Vienna  might  be,  did  sincerely  and  for  statesman- 
like reasons  desire  that  the  Austrian  Empire  should  j 
be  maintained  in  all  its  strength,  for  purposes  of  the ' 
Balance  of  Power,  which  with  him  meant  resistance  { 
to    Russian    aggression    in    South-eastern    Europe.  ' 
Whatever  tended  to  weaken  the  might  of  Austria; 
could  hope  for  no  help  from  him;  this  should  have 
been  obvious  to  anyone  who  was  at  all  acquainted 
with  his  views  on  the  European  situation.   His  poHcy 
with  regard  to  the  Austrian  possessions  in  North 
Italy  is  no  exception;  he  beheved,  and  was  never 

1  Debate  on  Russian  Intervention  in  Hungary,  July  21st, 
1849,  Hansard,  cvii. 


22  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

tired  of  stating,  both  officially  and  otherwise,  that  the 
Italian  possessions  were  a  source  of  weakness  and 
not  of  strength,  to  the  Government  at  Vienna.  They 
were  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  Alps  and  too  far  from 
the  centre  of  the  Empire;  they  constantly  required 
a  large  force  to  keep  them  in  order.  The  Italians  of 
Lombardy  would  never  and  could  never  become  good 
Austrians.  If  all  the  energy  and  resources  and 
attention  of  Austria  were  focused  on  the  west,  she 
would  be  the  less  able  to  fulfil  her  duties  to  the 
European  polity  in  the  east.  Of  course  other  con- 
siderations entered  into  these  views.  Historians, 
especially  continental  historians,  believe  that  his 
jealousy  of  French  influence  led  him  to  interfere  so 
zealously  as  he  did  in  favour  of  the  Lombardo- 
Venetians,  and  doubtless  the  last  thing  that  Palmer- 
ston  would  have  desired  was  that  the  French  should 
be  preponderant  in  northern  Italy.  His  sovereign 
believed  that  he  was  actuated  by  hatred  of  Austria 
pure  and  simple,  and  was  cooperating  with  the  French 
to  drive  the  Austrians  out  of  Italy.  "The  Queen," 
she  wrote,  "cannot  conceal  from  him  that  she  is 
ashamed  of  the  policy  which  we  are  pursuing  in  this 
Italian  controversy  in  abetting  wrong^" ;  and  she 
goes  on  to  point  out  that  if  he  took  his  stand  on  the 
treaties  of  1815  in  the  Schleswig-Holstein  affair,  he 
ought  for  the  sake  of  consistency  to  do  the  same  in 
Italy.   And  on  July  25th  she  wrote  to  RusselP: 

*  Letters  of  Queen   Victoria,  Ed.  1911,  vol.  11.  p.  182.    The 
Queen  to  Palmerston,  July  ist,  1848. 
2  Letters,  vol.  11.  pp.  186-7. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  23 

The  Queen  must  tell  Lord  John  what  she  has  repeatedly 
told  Lord  Palmerston,  but  without  apparent  effect,  that 
the  establishment  of  an  entente  cordiale  with  the  French 
Republic,  for  the  purpose  of  driving  the  Austrians  out  of 
their  dominions  in  Italy,  would  be  a  disgrace  to  this 
country.  That  the  French  would  attach  the  greatest 
importance  to  it,  and  gain  the  greatest  advantage  by  it, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  of;  but  how  will  England  appear 
before  the  world  at  the  moment  when  she  is  struggling  to 
maintain  her  supremacy  in  Ireland,  and  boasts  to  stand 
by  treaties  with  regard  to  her  European  relations,  having 
declined  all  this  time  to  interfere  in  Italy,  or  to  address 
one  word  of  caution  to  the  Sardinian  Government  on 
account  of  its  attack  on  Austria^,  and  having  refused  to 
mediate  when  called  upon  to  do  so  by  Austria,  because 
the  terms  were  not  good  enough  for  Sardinia,  if  she 
should  ally  herself  with  the  arch-enemy  of  Austria  to 
interfere  against  her  at  the  moment  when  she  has  recovered 
in  some  degree  her  position  in  the  Venetian  territory? 

On  August  2ist  she  wrote  with  a  note  of  despair: 
"Lord  Palnxerston  will  have  his  Kingdom  of  Upper 
Italy  under  Charles  Albert,  to  which  every  other 
consideration  is  to  be  sacrificed."  On  September  7th 
she  characterised  his  idea  of  wresting  the  Italian 
Provinces  from  Austria  by  French  arms  as  a 

most  iniquitous  proceeding.  It  is  another  question 
whether  it  is  good  policy  for  Austria  to  try  to  retain 
Lombardy;  but  that  is  for  her  and  not  for  us  to  decide. 
Many  people  might  think  that  we  should  be  happier 
without  Ireland  or  Canada^. 

^  This  reproach  was  also  hurled  against  Palmerston  in 
Parliament ;  it  was,  however,  not  true :  see  the  Correspondence 
(Bluebook)  on  the  Affairs  of  Italy;  and  Helfert,  Geschichte  der 
Oesterreichischen  Revolution,  vol.  i.  p.  337. 

2  Letters,  pp.  191,  194;  and  Friedjung,  Oesterreich  von  1848 
his  i860,  vol.  II.  part  i.  p.  138.    (Stutl^gart  and  Berlin,  1912.) 


24  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Radetzky's  army  and  the  blunders  of  Charles  Albert 
upset  Palmerston's  plans,  and  he  did  not  live  to  see 
the  last  Austrian  turn  his  back  on  the  Po;  but  both 
the  Queen  and  Disraeli  were  mistaken  when  they 
accused  him  of  assuming  "from  the  first  squabble 
between  the  monarch  and  some  of  his  subjects... 
that  Austria  was  to  be  blotted  out  of  the  map  of 
nations."  On  the  contrary,  as  has  been  stated,  the 
j  maintenance  of  the  Austrian  Empire  as  a  power  of 
/  the  first  magnitude  was  one  of  the  chief  aims  of  his 
{  statesmanship.  He  did  sincerely  long  for  Itahan 
"Hberties,"  and  was  genuinely  disgusted  with  the 
administrative  brutahty  of  a  foreign  master  in  the 
land  where  he  had  spent  so  many  happy  days  in  his 
boyhood.  But  in  his  North-Itahan  pohcy  he  was 
primarily  thinking  of  Austria,  whose  chief  work  lay 
along  the  Russian  frontier,  and  for  whom  Lombardo- 
Venetia  was  in  truth  not  the  "shield  of  Ajax,"  but 
the  "heel  of  Achilles";  if  he  was  cruel  to  the  Austria 
of  1848,  it  was  that  he  might  be  kind  to  the  Austria 
of  the  future.  That  matters  were  not  regarded  in  the 
same  hght  at  Vienna,  is  neither  an  occasion  of  offence 
nor  of  surprise^ ;  but  Teutonic  sympathies  and  regard 

Queen  Victoria's  Letters  and  Memoranda  on  Palmerston's 
policy  in  the  late  'forties,  are  perhaps  the  most  remarkable 
series  of  royal  documents  in  modern  history. 

^  In  point  of  fact,  there  was  a  deeply-rooted  feeling  in 
Austria  and  Germany,  in  1848-9,  that  the  North-ItaUan 
possessions  (or  at  any  rate  Lombardy)  should  be  completely 
renounced;  see  the  quotations  from  contempcrary  news- 
papers, e.g.  the  Augshurger  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  given  in 
Springer,  op.  cit.  vol.  11.  pp.  242-3.  And  in  May,  1848,  before 
Radetzky's  victories  of  course.  Hummelauer  told  Stockmar 
that  "  Austria  believes  she  has  to  found  a  new  Empire,  which 
is,  for  the  first  time,  to  render  its  old  name  illustrious;  and  she 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  25 

for  the  inviolable  settlement  of  1815 — which  had 
been  violated  more  than  once  by  every  Government 
in  Europe — should  not  have  blinded  the  Court  of 
St  James'. 

But  it  is  in  his  attitude  to  the  Hungarian  Revolu- 
tion that  Palmerston's  pohcy  with  respect  to  Austria 
is  best  seen.  With  the  internal  history  of  that  move- 
ment, and  its  origins,  we  are  not  here  concerned. 
But,  if  successful,  it  would  have  made  Hungary 
de  facto,  what  the  Magyar  patriots  claimed  that  it 
always  had  been  de  jure,  completely  independent  of 
the  Austrian  Hereditary  Provinces,  and  united  to 
them  by  the  barest  of  personal  unions.  At  first,  it 
seemed  as  if  this  was  actually  to  happen,  for  the 
Opposition,  supreme  ahke  in  the  Diet  at  Pressburg, 
and  in  the  country,  carried  everything  before  them, 
and,  on  April  loth,  the  Emperor-King  Ferdinand 
gave  his  approval  to  the  Bills  of  the  preceding 
session,  which  freed  the  country  from  the  rule  of  the 
Viennese  bureaucracy,  and  secured  Hungary  to  the 
Hungarians.  A  Hungarian  cabinet  was  set  up,  with 
Count  Louis  Batthyanyi  as  minister-president,  which 
was  responsible  to  the  Emperor  alone;  and,  for  the 
time  being,  the  Archduke  Stephen,  Palatine  of  thej 
land,  was  invested  with  full  regal  powers.  That  the^^ 
whole  of  the  country,  even  of  the  strictly  Magyar 
population,  was  behind  the  movement,  cannot  be 
asserted.    The  greater  nobles  were  opposed  to  it,  if 

will  therefore  make  Hungary  the  nucleus  of  a  new  State,  and, 
if  necessary,  even  place  the  capital  there."  Stockmar,  Memoirs, 
vol.  II.  p.  355. 


26  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

for  no  other  reason,  because  it  meant  the  loss  of  their 
feudal  rights  and  privileges — especially  their  century- 
old,  though  in  part  (1832)  repealed,  immunity  from 
taxation — and  not  more  than  a  mere  handful,  of 
whom  the  chief  were  the  Batthyanyis,  Count  Ladis- 
laus  Teleki,  and  Count  Juhus  Andrassy,  joined  it  at 
any  time.  The  most  renowned  of  all  the  nobles, 
Count  Stephen  Szechenyi,  though  strenuously  in 
favour  of  economic  and  social  progress,  was  op- 
posed from  the  very  first  to  that  complete  separa- 
tion from  the  Hereditary  Provinces  which  Kossuth 
and  his  followers  had  in  view.  And  Francis  Deak, 
a  greater  statesman  and  profounder  thinker  than 
Szechenyi,  passed  the  severest  condemnation  which 
it  is  possible  for  a  man  to  pass  on  the  April  Laws: 
"You  cannot  talk  reason  with  a  drunken  man,  and 
at  present  the  Diet  is  drunk."  Nor  was  it  only  the 
greater  nobles  that  held  aloof  from  the  movement :  a 
large  proportion  of  the  educated  classes,  and  m.any 
members  of  the  liberal  professions,  were  opposed  to 
it,  and  perhaps  the  majority  of  the  really  rich  burgher 
population.  But  in  the  mid-months  of  1848  it  really 
looked  as  if  Kossuth's  tongue  would  undo  the 
history  of  more  than  three  hundred  years,  and  de- 
stroy the  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe.  Frankfort 
was  delighted,  for  a  united  Germany  and  an  in- 
dependent Hungary  seemed  natural  alhes.  The 
Magyars  perceived  that  a  strong  and  united  Germany 
would  prevent  a  Slav  preponderance  in  the  Austrian 
Empire,  while  the  Germans  saw  that  the  Govern- 
ment at  Vienna  would  either  oppose  the  unity  of  the 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  27 

Fatherland,   or  would   at   any  rate  insist   on   the 
hegemony  therein.    But  the  fangs  of  Austria  were 
drawn,  if  Hungary  ceased  to  be  merely  a  part  and 
parcel  of  it.   "In  Hungary,"  said  Bunsen,  "they  are 
fighting  a  battle  in  which  the  victory  of  the  Germans 
may  easily  lead  to  the  slavery  of  Germany — not  in 
a  distant  future,  but  for  the  present  generation^." 
The   democrats    at   Vienna    fraternised   with   their 
brothers  beyond  the  Leitha,  recognising  the  common 
cause    of   the    new-born    peoples    against    a    dying 
despotism  and  an  out-worn  bureaucracy;  and,  al- 
though the  Wessenberg-Bach  Ministry  were  in  their 
hearts  of  course  opposed  to  the  Hungarian  Revolu- 
tion, they  dared  not  say  so  openly.  But  the  unbroken 
course  of  Magyar  success  was  not  to  continue  for 
long,  and  there  were  rocks  in  plenty  ahead.    After 
all,  the  true-born  Magyars  were  but  an  island  in  | 
an  ocean  of  ahen  stems;   to  these  stems — various 
branches  of  the  great  Slav  family — Kossuth  and  his 
friends  showed  scant  consideration  in  the  moment 
of   triumph.     On    whatever   grounds   the    Magyars    , 
might  justify  their  recent  proceedings  against  the    ' 
German   monopoly   of   government   in    Hungary — 
nationahty,   numbers   or   history — the   surrounding 
races  had  equally  good  grounds,  or  could  plausibly 
claim  that  they  had,   for  objecting    to   a   Magyar 
hegemony  in  their  own  regions.    But  the  majority  of 
the  Diet  now  at  Pest,  the  capital,  was  distinguished 
neither  by  consistency  nor  by  compassionateness. 
Although  the  unprejudiced  student  must  decide, 
1  Bunsen,  Tagebiicher,  vol.  in.  p.  i. 


28  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  for  the  Magyars  as  against 
the  Government  at  Vienna,  he  will  recognise  that 
the  ultimate  failure  of  the  former  was  largely  due  to 
the  arrogance  and  injustice  they  had  displayed,  in 
the  first  instance,  towards  the  neighbouring  races. 
Strife  was  perhaps  in  any  case  inevitable,  in  a 
country  which  was  ethnologically  a  veritable  mosaic, 
at  a  time  when  national  Gleichberechtigung  was  the 
order  of  the  day.  Long  before  1848  had  run  its 
course,  anti-Magyar  movements  had  appeared  every- 
where except  in  the  plains  watered  by  the  Theiss 
and  the  Upper  Danube,  where  the  population  was 
homogeneous:  in  Galicia  towards  the  north,  among 
the  Roumanians  and  German  colonists  of  Transyl- 
vania in  the  east,  and  among  the  Croats  and  Serbs  of 
Croatia,  the  Banat  and  the  Mihtary  Frontier.  These 
\  movements  were  not  at  first  dynastic  or  Austrian, 
and  threatened  the  integrity  of  the  Empire  every 
whit  as  much  as  did  the  Magyar.  It  was  due  to  the 
sentiments  and  genius  of  one  man  that  the  chief  of 
them,  the  Croatian,  became  of  almost  decisive  mo- 
ment in  the  restoration  of  the  Emperor's  authority. 
From  the  first,  Jellacic,  Ban  of  Croatia,  had  been 
recognised  at  Pest  as  an  enemy  to  be  brought  over 
or  annihilated;  and,  on  June  loth,  1848,  an  imperial 
manifesto  degraded  him  from  his  offices  and  branded 
him  as  a  traitor.  But  the  Court  was  merely  biding 
its  time,  and  waiting  for  favourable  news  from  Itaty. 
In  the  first  week  of  August,  Radetzky  entered  Milan 
in  triumph,  and  within  a  month  another  rescript 
was   pubhshed   by    Ferdinand — secure   behind   the 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION        '  29 

guns  of  Olmutz — annulling  the  declaration  of  June  ' 
loth,  and  restoring  Jellacic  to  all  his  former  honours. 
That  was  on  September  4th;  exactly  a  week  later, 
the  Ban  crossed  the  Drave  into  Hungary,  at  the  head 
of  an  army.  The  war  in  Hungary  had  begun.  Already 
in  August  the  Palatine's  vice-regal  powers  had  been 
withdrawn,  and  on  September  25th  he  resigned.  On  \ 
October  3rd,  after  Jellacic  had  been  compelled  to 
withdraw  as  a  result  of  the  engagement  at  Velenze, 
an  imperial  manifesto  was  published  which  dissolved 
the  Hungarian  Diet,  and  declared  its  late  resolutions 
null;  a  state  of  siege  was  proclaimed  over  the  whole 
land,  and  Jellacic  was  appointed  vicegerent  of  the 
King  {Stellvertreter  des  Konigs)  and  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  troops  in  Hungary.  So  far  no  soldiers 
had  been  actually  sent  from  Vienna  to  take  the 
field  against  the  Hungarians,  but  on  October  5th  ! 
the  Government  sent  off  an  Italian  battalion;  next 
day  an  attempt  was  made  to  despatch  Austrian 
troops,  and  this  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the 
third  and  last  Viennese  Revolution  of  1848.  Had  the 
Hungarians  acted  vigorously,  they  might  have 
dictated  their  own  terms  to  the  Court  party  in  the 
capital  of  the  Empire;  but  they  were  strangely 
dilatory,  and  had  scruples  about  "invading"  the 
Hereditary  Provinces  until  they  should  have  received 
a  definite  invitation  from  the  Viennese  democrats. 
When  they  finally  did  move  forward,  it  was  too  late : 
for  Windischgratz,  the  conqueror  of  Prague,  had  . 
already  united  with  Jellacic,  and  the  conduct  of  the  \ 
Hungarian  leaders  was  not  of  the  sort  that  wins 


30  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

battles.  They  met  with  a  reverse  from  the  Imperialists 
at  Schwechat  on  October  30th,  and  fled  back  across 
the  frontier.  On  the  next  day  Vienna  fell.  After  the 
battle  of  Schwechat,  the  Hungarians  had  nothing 
to  hope  for  from  the  Viennese,  large  numbers  of 
whom  they  had  already  ahenated  by  their  outspoken 
condemnation  of  the  continuous  disturbances  in  the 
city,  and  of  the  month-long  anarchy  there.  They  had, 
also,  wounded  the  national  pride  of  the  Austrians  by 
their  reluctance  to  furnish  Magyar  troops  for  the 
Itahan  war,  and  had  made  enemies  of  the  prosperous 

i  classes  by  their  refusal  to  take  over  part  of  the 
Austrian  national  debt.  The  war  would  now  be  fought 
on  their  own  soil  and  would  be  a  war  to  the  finish. 
The  complete  triumph  of  the  anti-Magyar  Court 
party  was  marked  by  the  accession  on  December  2nd 
of  the  eighteen-year-old  Francis  Joseph;  his  uncle 
the  Emperor  Ferdinand  had  been  induced  to  resign 
the  Crown,  and  his  father  the  Archduke  Francis 
Charles  to  waive  his  right.  The  Hungarian  Diet, 
which  had  taken  no  notice  of  the  rescript  of  October 

^  3rd,  with  every  legal  right  in  the  world  declared  the 
accession  of  the  new  King  unconstitutional,  and  still 
transacted  business  in  the  name  of  King  Ferdinand. 
Meanwhile,  Windischgratz,  with  Fabian  slowness 
although  not  with  Fabian  wisdom,  had  been  preparing 
for  the  invasion  of  Hungary,  and  on  January  5th, 

i  1849,  the  Austrians  entered Buda-Pest.  Kossuth  and 
the  Government  had  already  fled  to  Debreczin  on  the 
Theiss.  During  the  early  weeks  of  the  new  year 
nothing  of  moment  was  decided  between  the  anta- 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  31 

gonists;  and,  except  in  the  official  bulletins  of  each 
side,  no  great  battles  were  fought  and  no  heavy 
losses  sustained.  ^  But,  while  Windischgratz  was 
cumbrously  arranging  the  organisation  of  the  occu- 
pied but  unconquered  regions,  the  Magyars  were 
preparing  for  a  war  a  outrance.  The  battle  of  Kapolna  1 
marks  the  turning-point;  although,  tactically,  the 
victory  rested  with  the  Austrians  and  they  became 
lords  of  Hungary  up  to  the  Theiss,  from  the  strategic  ; 
point  of  view  the  tide  had  already  set  in  for  the 
Hungarians  (February  26-27).'  As  the  winter  passed 
away,  the  Hungarian  recruits  proved  less  unequal 
to  the  Imperialists  in  discipline  and  experience,  and 
their  numbers  were  being  daily  increased  by  the 
energetic  action  of  the  Committee  of  Defence  at 
Debreczin.  In  the  last  days  of  March,  Arthur  Gorgei 
was  named  Commander-in-Chief;  in  less  than  a 
month  he  had  won  three  considerable  battles,  and  on 
April  22nd  he  entered  the  fortress  of  Komorn,  the 
key  of  the  west,  in  triumph.  Bem  in  Transylvania, 
and  Perczel  in  the  south,  were  equaUy  successful. 
The  Magyars  were  masters  of  their  country  once 
again,  with  the  exception  of  the  three  strong  places 
Arad,  Buda  and  Temesvar;  and  Windischgratz  was 
removed  from  his  command.  AH  the  world  knew 
that,  when  a  favourable  opportunity  should  arise,- 
the  Austrian  Government  (where  Schwarzenberg 
was  now  at  the  head  of  affairs)  intended  to  dissolve 
the  Diet  at  Kremsier,  and  to  impose  a  centralising 
constitution  on  the  whole  Empire,  including  Hungary.  \ 
This  moment  was  considered  to  have  arrived  after  \ 


32  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

I  the  victory  at  Kapolna,  and  on  March  4th  the  famous 
Constitution  octroyee  was  pubhshed.  This  instrument 
virtually  annihilated  the  Hungarian  Constitution,  and 

(  gave  to  the  Magyars  a  watchword  which  would  have 
been  intelligible  to  the  whole  of  Europe.  Nor  was  it 
more  acceptable  to  the  other  races  of  the  Empire 
whom  it  so  ruthlessly  disillusioned:  the  Slavs  of  the 

\  south  read  in  it  the  negation  of  all  their  hopes,  and 
from  that  moment  hated  the  dynasty  for  whom  they 
had  just  been  shedding  their  blood.  A  little  clever 
diplomacy  at  Debreczin  might  have  worked  wonders 
amongst  the  late  antagonists  of  the  Magyars.  But 
Kossuth's  was  a  bolder  game,  and  he  answered  the 
octroyee  Constitution  with  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 

'pendence  of  April  14th,  which  proclaimed  the  depo- 
sition for  ever  of  the  perjured  Habsburgs  from  the 
throne  of  St  Stephen ;  until  the  form  of  government 
should  be  finally  decided,  Kossuth  was  asked,  and  of 
course  consented,  to  carry  on  the  executive.  This  is  no 
occasion  for  passing  judgment  on  the  Declaration  of 
Independence;  ethically,  there  is  much  to  be  said  in 
its  favour.   But  it  certainly  did  not  square  with  the 

I  conscience  of  the  majority  of   Hungarians,   whose 

( passion  for  legahty  was  incorrigible,  and  it  was 
notoriously  unpopular  in  the  camps.  Under  whatever 
banner  they  might  fight  henceforth,  their  battlecry 
could  no  longer  be  a  protest  of  legahty  against 
illegahty :  compared  with  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence, the  Constitution  of  March  4th  was  innocence 
itself.  Meanwhile,  with  Gorgei  at  Komorn,  the  events 
of  1848  were  repeating  themselves.    There  was  no 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  33 

longer  any  formidable  Austrian  army  save  that  of 
Radetzky  in  Italy,  and  a  short  vigorous  march 
would  have  seen  the  Hungarians  masters  of  Vienna 
in  the  opening  days  of  May.  Once  again,  the  oppor- 
tunity was  neglected — Gorgei's  strategical  justifica- 
tion of  his  conduct  is  anything  but  convincing — and, 
after  some  days  spent  at  Komorn,  the  Hungarian 
commander  turned  eastwards,  resolved  to  lay  siege 
to  the  fortress  of  Buda  at  his  leisure.  Henceforth, 
the  cause  of  the  Magyars  was  hopeless.  On  May  ist, 
the  Wiener  Zeitung  announced  that  the  Austrian 
Government  had  been  induced  to  solicit  the  armed 
assistance  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia;  and,  on  May 
nth,  the  Journal  de  St  Petersbourg  printed  the 
Czar's  manifesto  in  reply:  "We  shall  not  refuse." 
For  a  time,  the  Hungarian  papers  tried  to  hide  the 
fact  from  the  people,  and  spoke  of  differences  between 
Russia  and  Austria,  which  must  finally  lead  to  a  war 
between  the  two  Powers;  but,  on  May  17th,  even  the 
Kozlony  was  constrained  to  admit  officially  the  reality 
of  the  intervention.  After  that,  the  restoration  of 
"order"  could  only  be  a  question  of  weeks.  Attacked 
from  every  point  of  the  compass,  and  weakened  by 
fatal  internal  dissensions,  the  various  Hungarian 
corps  fought  with  a  bravery  that  did  not  belie  their 
reputation  of  a  thousand  years ;  and  Gorgei  did  not 
finally  lay  down  his  arms  at  the  feet  of  the  Russian 
commander  until  August  13th.  Whatever  his  motives 
were — and  the  charge  of  treason  is  certainly  not 
proved — the  surrender  at  Vilagos  saved  much  boot- 
less suffering  and  futile  bloodshed;  but  it  is  equally 

s.p.  3 


34  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

indisputable  that  Gorgei  might  have  been — and, 
under  any  Government  more  settled  than  that  of 
Hungary  in  1848-9,  doubtless  would  have  been — 
court-martialled  for  several  of  his  actions  during  the 
earlier  course  of  the  struggle.  Nothing  remained 
now  but  for  the  imperial  victors  to  punish  the  crimes 
of  a  year  and  a  half  of  revolution.  On  October  5th 
General  Klapka,  the  last  warrior  of  the  struggle  for 
independence,  surrendered  the  fortress  of  Komorn; 
and  on  the  following  day  the  bloody  assizes  were 
opened  at  Arad^. 

When,  in  the  spring  months  of  1848,  the  estabhsh- 

/  ment  of  an  independent  Hungarian  Ministry  received 
the  imperial  sanction,  the  condition  of  Europe 
beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  very 

'  favourable  to  the  Magyar  claims.  It  has  been  already 
mentioned  that  the  Assembly  at  Frankfort  was 
strongly  in  favour  of  these  claims,  and  indeed,  on 
July  22nd,  declared  unanimously  for  an  alliance 
with  the  Government  at  Pest.  Already  in  May, 
Ladislaus  Szalay  and  Dionys  Pazmandy  (who  later 

^  The  best  and  most  recent  account  of  the  Hungarian 
movement  is  that  given  by  Friedjung,  Oesterreich  von  1848  bis 
i860,  vol.  I.,  2nd  ed.,  1908.  Springer,  whose  book  was  pub- 
Hshed  in  1865,  is  more  detailed;  he  had  no  access  to  the  vast 
mass  of  material,  public  and  private,  which  Friedjung  was 
able  to  draw  upon;  but  his  general  conclusions  will  probably 
never  be  assailed.  Helfert's  work,  Geschichte  Oesterretchs  vom 
Ausgang  des  Wiener  Aufstandes  (4  vols.,  Prague,  1 1869-86)  is, 
also,  of  the  greatest  value.  The  libraryful  of  contemporary 
histories,  memoirs,  Enthiillungen,  etc.  is  of  no  value  to  anyone 
save  the  historian  of  passion  and  error.  The  Histoire  Politique 
de  la  Revolution,  by  Irdnyi  and  Chassin  (2  vols.,  Paris,  1859), 
though  written  by  a  Parisian  democrat  and  a  Magyar  revolu- 


I 


/    HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  35 

became  President  of  the  Hungarian  Chamber),  had 
been  named  Hungarian  plenipotentiaries  to  the 
Central  Power;  and,  when  they  passed  through 
Vienna  on  their  way  to  Frankfort,  Pillersdorf,  Presi-  ^ 
dent  of  the  Austrian  Cabinet,  told  the  Minister  for 
Hungary  in  Vienna,  Prince  Esterhazy,  that  he 
completely  approved  of  the  full  powers  and  instruc- 
tions which  had  been  given  to  them,  and  had  himself 
nothing  to  add.  These  instructions  could  not  be 
very  acceptable  to  the  Austrians,  for  they  frankly 
looked  forward  to  a  state  of  affairs  when  the  Heredi- 
tary Provinces  should  be  a  mere  fraction  of  that 
greater  Germany  which  was  to  be  the  close  ally  of  a 
powerful  and  independent  Hungary.  As  to  this  there 
were  no  delusions  at  Vienna;  and  that  the  Ministry 
left  open  for  future  use  the  back  door  of  chicanery, 
was  shown  by  its  referring  to  Szalay  and  Pazmandy, 
not  as  plenipotentiaries  of  the  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment, but  as  delegates  {Abgeordnete  des  tmgarischen 
Reichstages) ;  inasmuch  as  their  credentials  were 
not  signed  by  the  Emperor-King,  the  issue  of  a 
formal  " lettre  de  creance"  could  always  be  denied,  if 
necessary  1.  The  whole  wretched  ambiguity  was  turned 

tionary,  contains  much  that  is  indispensable.  Most  of  the 
documents  that  matter  are  to  be  found  in  Adlerstein,  Archiv 
des  tmgarischen  Ministeriums  und  Landesvertheidigungsaus- 
schusses  (3  vols.,  Altenburg,  1851).  The  Dahlmann-Waitz 
Bibliography  is  very  poor  for  this  period. 

1  See  Springer,  vol.  11.  p.  497,  and  Alter,  Die  auswartige 
Politik  der  ungarischen  Revolution,  1848-49,  pp.  27-32  (Berlin, 
1912,  unter  Benutzung  neuer  Quellen);  also,  W.  H.  Stiles, 
Austria  in  1848-49  (2  vols.,  Washington,  1852)  and  Schlesinger, 
Aus  Ungarn  (Vienna,  1850).   Alter's  account  of  the  Frankfort 

3—2 


36  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

to  account,  long  afterwards,  in  the  trial  of  Count 
Louis  Batthyanyi.  At  Frankfort,  Schmerling,  in  his 
passion  for  correctness,  refused  to  overlook  the 
diplomatic  flaw;  and  since  Szalay  could  not  obtain  a 
recognition  of  his  ambassadorial  character,  he  left 
the  town  in  the  early  days  of  October,  to  coquet  with 
the  democrats  at  Baden. 

But  it  was  from  the  two  free  and  constitutional 
Powers  of  the  west  that  Kossuth  hoped  for  the 
greatest  things.  England  had  always  been  the 
declared  enemy  of  reaction,  and  the  avowed  friend 
of  struggling  nationahties;  while  Lamartine  had 
recently  declared  that  France  could  never  allow  the 
treaties  of  1815  to  be  used  as  a  pretext  for  withholding 
from  the  people  their  inherent  rights.  Almost 
without  exception,  the  extant  memoirs  and  pamphlets 
written  by  contemporary  English  and  French  travel- 
lers in  Hungary  are  violently  anti-Austrian,  and  at 
Pest  the  Enghsh  and  French  residents  publicly 
congratulated  the  new-born  nation.  When,  on 
March  15th,  three-hundred  Hungarians  repaired  to 
the  Hotel  de  Ville  in  Paris  and  presented  an  address 
to  the  Provisional  Government  of  the  French  Repub- 
Hc,  Lamartine  responded:  "La  Hongric  comptc  en 
France  autant  d'amis  qii'ily  a  de  citoyens  fran^ais I ^ " 
Moreover,  Kossuth  honestly  believed  that  France 
and  England  must  perceive  that  a  free  and  powerful 

mission  is  taken   from   these  latter  two   works.     Stiles  was 
U.S.A.  agent  at  Vienna  at  the  time,  and  his  relations  with  the 
Party  of  Independence  in  Hungary  were  especially  cordial. 
^  Iranyi  and  Chassin,  vol.  i.  p.  196. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  37 

Hungary,  whose  sole  connexion  with  Austria  proper 
was  the  slender  nexus  of  a  personal  union,  was  the 
best  safeguard  of  the  Balance  of  Power  in  the  East, 
although  he  never  seems  to  have  laid  down  with 
logical  precision  why  the  Balance  of  Power  should  be 
specially  safeguarded  by  such  a  circumstance.  In 
his  more  oratorical  moments,  he  was  even  wont  to 
assert  that  the  two  countries  were  under  a  moral 
obHgation  to  defend  the  constitutional  conquests  of 
April,  1848.  Kossuth  never  committed  a  graver 
error  of  judgment,  for  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  neither 
England  nor  France  was  prepared  to  equip  a  single  ^ 
battahon  or  furnish  a  single  ship  to  fight  for  the* 
cause  of  Hungarian  independence.  Kossuth  was  not 
alone  in  his  mistake,  and  the  traveller  in  Hungary 
today  is  constantly  asked  the  secret  reason  why 
England  did  not  intervene  in  favour  of  the  patriots 
of  1848-9,  when  Palmerston  was  so  obviously  in 
favour  of  such  intervention;  while,  at  the  time, 
hundreds  of  Enghsh  Radicals  were  quite  certain  that 
the  real  wishes  of  the  Foreign  Office  were  frustrated 
by  a  German  camarilla  at  St  James'.  The  whole 
matter  may  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words.  Palmerston  • 
beheved  that  the  independence  of  Hungary  was  quite  j 
incompatible  with  the  one  essential  task  which  the'^ 
Dual  Monarchy  had  to  perform — the  turning-back  of 
the  tide  of  Russian  aggrandisement  westwards  and 
southwards.  Kossuth  beheld  the  Enghsh  statesman's 
policy  in  Italy,  beheved  that  it  was  dictated  by 
purely  anti-Austrian  sentiments,  and  naturally  de- 
duced therefrom  the  further  behef,  that  Palmerston 


38  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

could  not  choose  but  look  favourably  upon  the 
Hungarian  movement.  This  was  a  fundamental 
mistake;  for  Palmerston  was  not  the  murderer,  but 
the  surgeon,  of  Austria.  As  he  saw  things,  the  cession 
of  the  Italian  Provinces  was  the  amputation  calcu- 
lated to  fit  Austria  for  her  real  life-work;  to  make 
Hungary  independent  was  to  cripple  the  Monarchy 
in  its  most  vital  organ.  To  such  maiming  he  would 
be  no  party;  and  he  was  perfectly  candid  in  his 
views  from  the  very  first.  If  the  Hungarians  were 
deceived,  it  was  not  through  anything  that  had 
reached  them  from  the  English  Foreign  Office.  Not 
once  had  the  Queen  to  chide  him  for  his  pro-Magyar 
sympathies,  before  it  was  quite  clear  that  the  Magyar 
cause  was  hopeless.  After  the  Russian  intervention 
in  Hungary,  he  forfeited  much  of  his  popularity  in 
England,  and  was  accused  by  many  of  his  own  party 
of  hobnobbing  with  the  butchers  of  St  Petersburg 
and  Vienna,  simpty  and  solely  because  he  was 
determined  that  Austria  should  be  strong,  and  able 
I  to  fulfil  her  duty  to  the  West.  After  Vilagos,  he 
made  an  attempt  to  save  the  Hungarians,  but  not 
Hungary.  What  follows  is  merely  an  amplifica- 
tion of,  and  comment  upon,  this  judgment  of  his 
conduct. 

The  Hungarians  did  not,  indeed,  fail,  through  lack 
of  assiduity  or  perseverance,  to  obtain  help  from 
either  England  or  France;  but  from  the  Government 
of  neither  country  were  they  able  to  obtain  a  recog- 
nition of  their  independence  and,  consequently,  the 
establishment    of    regular    diplomatic    intercourse. 


s 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  39 

According  to  Alter,  in  May,  1848,  a  Note  was  de- 
spatched to  the  French  Foreign  Office,  and  a  similar 
Note  was  sent  off,  about  the  same  time,  to  Palmerston. 
These  Notes  requested  the  consent  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments to  the  appointment  of  Hungarian  representa- 
tives at  Paris  and  London,  and  asked  that  French 
and  English  diplomatic  agents  should  be  sent  to 
Hungary.     Both   Foreign   Secretaries,    Bastide   for 
France  and  Palmerston  for  England,  responded  in 
a  manner  which  was  scarcely  calculated  to   raise 
enthusiasm  at  Buda-Pest.   The  French  Government 
refused  to  make  any  binding  declaration,  and  for 
the  present  reserved  its  final  decision ;  but  a  French 
agent   without   diplomatic   character   was   sent   to 
Hungary  to   inform   the  Government   of  the  true 
state  of  affairs.    Palmerston's  answer  did  not  differ 
essentially  from  that  of  Bastide:  the  receipt  of  the 
Hungarian  Note  was  formally  acknowledged;  but  any 
sort  of  decision  was  reserved  until  the  Government 
was  aware  of  completed  facts  of  real  pohtical  worth. 
Until  then,  the  Enghsh  Government  did  not  think 
that   diplomatic   correspondence   was   a   necessity^. 

1  Alter,  pp.  48-52.  Alter  gives  no  date  for  the  English  Note 
and  Palmerston's  answer,  and  his  references  are  merely 
"Batthyanyi  and  Palmerston,  London,  Archiv  des  Foreign 
Office,"  and  "Palmerston  and  Batthyanyi,  A.  d.  F.  O."  I  have 
not  seen  the  documents  in  the  Foreign  Office  records  in  Chan- 
cery Lane,  and  they  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  Bluebook, 
Correspondence  relative  to  the  Ajfairs  of  Hungary,  1847-9, 
presented  to  both  Houses  of  Parliament  by  Command  of  Her 
Majesty,  August  15th,  1850.  But  the  Note  was  doubtless  sent; 
see  Kossuth's  speech  of  July  nth,  1848,  and  the  letter  of 
the  English  Agent,  Blackwell,  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  5th,  1849. 
The  letter  says  that  in  April,  1838,  the  Hungarians  requested 


40  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

How  bitter  Kossuth's  disappointment  was,  is  seen  in 
the  speech  on  the  defences  of  the  country,  which  he 
dehvered  in  the  Lower  House  of  the  Diet  on  July  nth, 
1848.  The  Hungarian  Cabinet,  he  declared,  immedi- 
ately after  its  accession  to  power,  had  placed  itself 
in  communication  with  the  Enghsh  Government, 
and  pointed  out  to  the  latter  that  there  was  no  truth 
in  the  accusations  which  so  many  people  were  trying 
to  spread  abroad^;  the  Hungarians  had  not  wrested 
their  rights  and  freedoms  from  their  King  by  virtue 
of  an  insurrection,  but  stood  on  common  ground  with 
him.  They  had  also  pointed  out  how  the  interests 
of  the  two  countries  in  the  regions  of  the  Lower 

the  English  Government  to  estabhsh  a  Consulship  at  Pest.  It 
may  here  be  stated  that  the  whole  of  Alter's  work  at  the  Eng- 
lish and  Parisian  Archives  was  done  for  him  by  another  hand. 
'The  references  to  our  Foreign  Office  records  throughout  his 
\book  are  almost  invariably  wrong,  except  in  the  case  of  those 
despatches  which  were  printed  in  the  Bluebook.  A  portion 
of  his  work,  for  instance,  is  taken  up  with  the  narration  of  the 
plans  of  aUiance  between  the  Hungarians  and  Sardinians,  and 
his  chief  authorities  are  the  despatches  of  a  certain  "Sir 
Hudson,"  whom  he  states  to  have  been  Enghsh  Minister  at 
Turin,  to  Palmerston.  Abercromby  was,  of  course,  our  Minister 
at  Turin  in  1848-9,  and  during  his  absence  Bingham  was  Charg6 
dAffaires.  Nor  was  there  any  English  agent,  diplomatic  or 
consular,  of  that  name  in  Italy  at  the  time.  Moreover,  I  have 
gone  carefully  through  the  Sardinian  volumes  at  the  Record 
Office,  and  can  find  nothing  which  in  the  least  corresponds  to 
the  despatches  so  freely  "used"  by  Alter.  His  orthography 
of  Enghsh  names  is  not  impeccable,  either,  e.g.  Ponsonby  is 
always  referred  to  as  "Posonby."  It  is  only  fair  to  add  that, 
except  for  mere  errors  of  pagination,  he  is  quite  trustworthy 
when  using  French  and  German  published  works. 

^  This  may  well  have  been  a  reference  to  the  English  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna,  Lord  Ponsonby,  whose  anti  Magyar  sentiments 
Kossuth  and  his  friends  had  ample  opportunities  of  knowing. 


i 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  41 

Danube  were  identical.  They  had  received  a  reply 
on  the  part  of  the  English  Government,  such  as  they 
might  have  expected  from  the  liberal  views,  such  also 
as  they  might  have  expected  from  the  egoistically 
matter-of-fact  policy,  of  that  nation.  In  the  mean- 
time, they  might  be  assured  that  England  would 
only  assist  them  in  so  far  as  she  found  it  consistent 
with  her  own  interests.  Concerning  France,  the 
orator  was  yet  more  outspoken.  The  French  were 
indeed  the  heralds  of  freedom  in  the  old  world,  but 
it  would  never  do  to  make  the  existence  of  the 
Hungarian  nation  dependent  on  the  protection  and 
alhance  of  France.  Had  not  France  at  that  very 
moment  lived  through  another  Eighteenth  of 
Brumaire?  She  stood  on  the  threshold  of  a  dictator- 
ship; the  world  might  see  a  second  Washington 
appear,  but  it  might  also  see  a  second  Napoleon. 
One  thing  at  least  could  be  learnt  from  the  example 
of  France:  not  every  revolution  was  in  the  interests 
of  freedom,  and  a  nation  was  never  so  near  the  yoke 
of  slavery  as  when,  in  searching  after  freedom,  it 
found  license.  In  the  streets  of  Paris  the  blood  of 
twenty  thousand  citizens  had  been  shed  by  the  hands 
of  their  fellows.  For  the  rest,  v/hether  Cavaignac 
proved  himself  Washington  or  Napoleon,  one  thing 
was  certain — France  was  far  away.  Poland,  too, 
had  relied  on  French  sympathies.  The  sympathy 
had  indeed  existed;  but  Poland  was  no  more^. 

^  Adlerstein,  op.  cit.  vol.  11.  pp.  58-9.  Iranyi  and  Chassin, 
op.  cit.  vol.  II.  pp.  14-17.  Memoir  of  Louis  Kossuth,  by 
E.  O.  S.  (London,  1854),  p.  343. 


/' 


42  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

The  Hungarians  had  far  more  reason  for  bitterness 
against  the  French  Government  than  against  the 
EngHsh ;  but  they  ought  not  to  have  been  victims  of 
any  delusions  about  the  matter,  since  it  was  patent 

'^  to  all  Europe  that  a  reaction  had  set  in  at  Paris  after 
the  June  disturbances  had  been  quelled.  Cavaignac 
and  Bastide  could  not  afford  to  play  with  schemes  of 
a  Franco-Hungarian  alliance,  for  their  chief  concern 
was  to  show  the  Czar  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  French  Republic,  and  to  this  end  it  was 
necessary  to  hold  aloof  from  all  Governments  in- 
fected with  the  revolutionary  taint,  into  which 
category  the  Government  at  Pest  certainly  fell. 
The  Russian  Chancellor  Nesselrode  was  never  tired 
of  emphasising  to  General  Lefio,  the  French  ambas- 
sador in  St  Petersburg,  the  solidarity  of  Austria  and 
Russia  in  European  affairs.   Towards  the  revolution- 

lary  allies  of  the  Pest  Government,  also,  the  Frankfort 

j  Assembly  and  the  promoters  of  a  united  Italy,  the 
French  Government  in  the  autumn  of  1848  showed 

'  itself  very  reserved,  for  reasons  not  solely  connected 
with  the  desire  to  do  that  which  was  pleasing  to  the 
eyes  of  Nicholas  and  his  Minister  Nesselrode. 

In  September  Count  Ladislaus  Teleki  was  chosen 
by  the  Diet  Hungarian  Minister  in  Paris,  perhaps 
the  chief  motive  of  his  appointment  being  the  wish 
of  his  numerous  friends  to  free  him  from  the  influence 
of  ultra-radical  comrades  in  Pest^.    His  chief  char- 

*  Springer,  vol.  11.  p.  600,  footnote:  quoted  by  Alter,  p.  82. 
Ir^nyi  and  Chassin  assert  that  Teleki  arrived  in  Paris  at  the 
beginning  of  September,  vol.  11.  p.  463. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  43 

acteristic  was  an  unlimited  capacity  for  committing 
his  Government,  without  any  sort  of  authorisation, 
to  his  own  hare-brained  schemes.  He  was  received 
only  in  a  private  capacity  by  Bastide  and  Cavaignac. 
A  fair  sample  of  his  judgment  may  be  found  in  his 
belief,  down  to  the  very  eve  of  the  presidential 
elections,  that  Ledru-Rollin  would  be  the  fortunate 
candidate:  then,  he  said,  Hungary  would  be  sure  of 
support!  After  the  election  of  Louis  Napoleon,! 
Teleki  was  no  longer  received  by  any  French  Minister,  \ 
and  he  had  to  content  himself  with  the  friendship  of 
the  extreme  Left  and  a  few  Legitimists.  He  and  an 
able  staff  were  very  active  in  the  French  Press,  and 
he  managed  to  trouble  the  Prince-President  with 
considerable  persistency  by  way  of  the  letter-box. 
As  the  clouds  gathered  more  thickly  over  Hungary, 
and  communication  with  the  outside  world  became 
more  difficult,  the  whole  management  of  foreign 
affairs  gradually  fell  into  Teleki' s  hands.  Towards 
the  close  of  the  year,  when  Windischgratz  was 
preparing  to  march  on  Pest,  Teleki  received  orders 
from  the  Government  to  send  Szalay,  the  quondam 
Minister  at  Frankfort,  to  England.  On  December  i 
nth,  the  latter  sent  his  credentials  through  the  post 
to  Palmerston.  In  his  accompanying  letter,  Szalay 
reminded  Palmerston  that  it  was  an  Englishman  who 
at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  had 
mediated  between  Hungary  and  Austria  during  the 
insurrection  of  Rakoczy.  "This  fact  alone  conclu- 
sively proves,"  he  wrote,  "that  the  relations  of  the 
Hungarian   Crown   to    Austria    have    always    been 


44  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

considered  as  being  within  the  domain  of  inter- 
national law,  as  a  portion  of  those  questions  which 
have  to  be  decided  by  the  concurrence  of  the  Great 
Powers."  The  credentials  themselves  offered  a 
tempting  bait  to  the  Foreign  Secretary  of  a  nation  of 
shop-keepers,  and  are  worthy  of  quotation  in  their 
entirety. 

Budapest, 

November  12th,  '48. 
Sir, 

Considering  that  Hungary^  by  its  geographical 
position,  by  the  amount  and  richness  of  its  natural  pro- 
ductions, is  able  to  offer  immense  advantages  to  English 
industry,  which  has  been  so  prodigiously  developed,  and 
that  the  establishment  of  commercial  relations  between 
the  two  countries  might  be  of  great  importance  to  Great 
Britain  herself,  I  have  to  request  you,  in  the  name  of 
the  Hungarian  Government,  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
Cabinet  of  her  Britannic  Majesty  to  our  country,  and  to 
offer  to  that  Cabinet  all  information  necessary  to  explain 
our  actual  position. 

You  will  in  the  first  place  show,  that  if  Hungary  were 
to  revert  to  the  bonds  which  united  her  to  Austria  before 
the  events  of  March,  English  industry  and  commerce 
would  for  ever  remain  excluded  from  the  markets  of 
Hungary,  which  Austria  would  continue  to  monopolise. 

You  will  endeavour  to  give  to  the  Government  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty  a  just  notion  of  the  course  of  events  of 
which  our  country  has  become  the  theatre.  You  will,  for 
this  purpose,  show  how  desirous  we  were  to  make  to  the 
Austrian  Dynasty  all  concessions  in  any  way  compatible 
with  the  welfare  of  our  country,  even  to  the  prejudice  of 
our  good  right,  founded  on  our  laws,  which  guarantee 
the  independence  of  Hungary,  and,  although  driven  to 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  45 

extremities,  we  have  yet  taken  special  care  not  to  quit 
the  legal  ground  laid  down  by  so  many  oaths  of 
Sovereigns. 

You  will  show  all  the  atrocities  tc  which  we  have  had  to 
submit  on  the  part  of  the  Austrian  Court,  notwithstanding 
our  perfectly  loyal  conduct. 

Should,  however,  the  great  nation,  alive  to  its  own 
interests,  show  a  disposition  to  protect  a  cause  so  just  as 
ours,  you  are  authorised  to  open  preliminary  negotiations 
with  the  British  Government  in  the  name  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Hungary.  Such  negotiations  must,  however,  not 
be  definitively  concluded,  except  by  a  treaty  to  be  made 
by  an  Envoy  of  the  British  Government  to  Hungary. 

As  regards  the  statistical  basis  of  such  negotiations,  you 
have  only  to  refer  to  the  commercial  tables  officially 
published  by  the  Austrian  Statistical  Department;  these 
tables  will  dissolve  even  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  of 
exaggeration  on  our  part. 

Assure  the  Cabinet  of  Her  Majesty  of  our  most  perfect 
consideration,  and  employ  in  the  execution  of  your 
commission  all  that  zeal  which  we  are  accustomed  to 
find  in  you. 

The  President  of  the  National  Committee  of  Defence. 

(Signed)  LOUIS  KOSSUTH  1. 

On  December  13th  Lord  Eddisbury,  the  Under- 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  replied  in  a  manner  so 
correct  and  formal  that  neither  Queen  Victoria  nor 
Schwarzenberg  could  have  desired  to  add  or  erase  a 
single  word. 

Sir, 

I  am  directed  by  Viscount  Palmerston  to  acknow- 
ledge the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the  nth  inst.,  and  in 

1  Correspondence  relative  to  the  Affairs  of  Hungary,  No.  78, 
Szalay  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  nth,  1848,  and  Enclosure. 


46  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

reply  I  am  to  say  that  Viscount  Palmerston  is  sorry  he 
cannot  receive  you.  The  British  Government  has  no 
\  knowledge  of  Hungary  except  as  one  of  the  component 
parts  of  the  Austrian  Empire;  and  any  communication 
which  you  have  to  make  to  Her  Majesty's  Government 
in  regard  to  the  commercial  intercourse  between  Great 
Britain  and  Hungary  should  therefore  be  made  through 
Baron  Roller,  the  Representative  of  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  at  this  Court  ^. 

Szalay  in  his  answer  refuted  the  charge  that 
Hungary  was  one  of  the  "component  parts  of  the 
Austrian  Empire,"  with  a  quotation  from  the  famous 
Tenth  Article  of  the  Diet  of  1790-1 :  De  independentia 
Regni  Hiingariae.  He  likewise  pointed  out  that  it 
was  hardly  to  be  expected  that  the  envoy  of  the 
Hungarian  Government  should  select  one  "whose 
functions  emanate  from  a  Ministry  at  open  war  with 
Hungary,"  as  the  channel  for  his  communications 
with  the  British  Government. 

But  there  are  countries  which  may  not  be  conquered; 
Hungary  is  of  that  number.  And  the  Government  of  that 
country  flattered  itself  that  Great  Britain  would  listen 
to  the  information  offered  as  to  the  actual  state  of  the 
countries  appertaining  to  the  Hungarian  Crown;  that 
Great  Britain,  seeing  that  among  all  territories  called 
Austrian,  it  was  Hungary  alone  that  remained  excluded 
from  the  ultra-Democratic  tempest,  and  looking  to  the 
immense  resources  of  the  kingdom,  would  draw  the 
inference  that  Hungary  is  qualified  to  form  the  centre 
round  which  further  provinces  may  group,  and  will  group, 
themselves,  capable  of  forming  a  sufficiently  great  and   , 

*  Correspondence,  No.  79,  Eddisbury  to  Szalay,  Dec.  13th, 
1848. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  47 

extended  political  organisation  to  afford  guarantees  for 
order  and  for  wise  and  beneficent  liberty ;  the  Government 
of  Hungary  was  happy  to  believe  that  Great  Britain,  in 
the  interest  of  Europe,  and  her  own  interest,  would  hold 
out  a  ready  and  firm  hand  to  assist  Hungary  in  the 
accomplishment  of  this  work. 

It  appears  to  me.  My  Lord,  that  the  question  of  my 
official  reception  might  be  adjourned  until  I  should  have 
furnished  you  with  such  information  on  the  actual  state 
of  Hungary  as  might  guide  the  Government  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty  in  any  further  steps  which  they  might 
take  as  regards  Hungary.  It  is  in  this  hope  that  I  have 
the  honour  to  notify  Your  Lordship  that  I  shall  stay  some 
time  longer  in  London  ^ 

Four  days  later  came  the  more  than  laconic 
response : 

In  reply  to  your  letter  of  the  15th  instant,  I  am  directed 
by  Viscount  Palmerston  to  say  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  can  take  no  cognizance  of  those  internal 
questions  between  Hungary  and  the  Austrian  dominions 
to  which  your  letter  refers ;  but  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment has  no  diplomatic  relations  with  Hungary  except 
as  a  component  part  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  and  can 
receive  communications  respecting  Hungary  only  through 
the  diplomatic  organ  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria  at  this 
Court^. 

After  this  latter  reply,  even  Szalay  perceived  the 
hopelessness  of  the  mission,  and  returned  to  Switzer-  j 
land  and  his  Baden  revolutionaries.   Perhaps,  during 

1  Correspondence,  No.  80,  Szalay  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  15th, 
1848. 

2  Correspondence,  No.  82,  Eddisbury  to  Szalay,  Dec.  19th, 
1848. 


48  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

his  stay  in  London,  he  may  have  written  home  what 
must  have  been  manifest  to  the  most  complete 
stranger  in  the  metropohs :  that  the  Enghsh  were  for 
the  most  part  entirely  indifferent  to  the  fortune  of 
arms  on  the  Danube  and  Theiss,  and  at  best  luke- 
warm for  the  Hungarian  cause.  During  1848,  there 
was  a  tremendous  amount  of  enthusiasm  in  the 
country  for  the  rebellious  Lombardo-Venetians,  when 
one  considers  how  little  interest  either  inside  or 
outside  Parliament  is  usually  demonstrated  in  this 
insular  kingdom  for  foreign  affairs.  But  there  was 
none  for  the  Hungarians ;  whether  we  read  the  Foreign 
Office  records  for  1848,  or  the  leading  newspapers, 
the  space  devoted  to  their  affairs  is  surprisingly 
small.  Egoism — as  Kossuth  had  hinted  on  July  nth 
— doubtless  had  something  to  do  with  this;  whatever 
the  Magyars  might  believe,  the  Russell  administra- 
tion and  the  vast  mass  of  the  electorate  did  not  hold 
that  the  Hungarian  cause  and  European  hberty 
stood  and  fell  together.  Much  less  was  it  an  article 
of  faith  in  London  that  Enghsh  interests  proper 
would  be  affected  favourably  by  an  independent 
Hungary.  Palmerston,  as  we  have  seen,  beheved 
precisely  the  reverse.  But  the  apathy  and  indifference 
so  conspicuous  outside  governmental  and  parlia- 
mentary circles  was  mainly  due  to  ignorance. 
Metternich  was  wrong  when  he  said  that  Italy  was 
only  a  geographical  expression;  it  was  certainly  not 
a  political  entity,  but  it  stood  for  whatever  had  been 
best  in  history  and  art  and  civilization.  In  the 
remotest  of  Enghsh  provincial  centres,  the  "cause" 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  49 

of  Italy  was  easily  comprehensible ;  but,  for  thousands 
of  citizens — and  these  not  the  lowest  class — on  this 
side  of  the  North  Sea,  the  term  "Hungary"  was 
nothing  more  than  the  second  half  of  a  compound, 
and  the  Magyars  were  regarded  as  Austrian  pro- 
vincials.   Enthusiasm  at  Pest  or  Debreczin  for  an 
independent  Wales  was  about  as  likely  as  enthusiasm 
at    London    or    Birmingham    for    an    independent 
Hungary;    or,    considering    the    intelligent    interest 
which  so  many  Magyars  took  in  lands  remote  from 
their  own,  perhaps  much  more  Hkely.    Even  if  an 
Enghshman's  geography  and  history  were  far  above 
the  average,  it  needed  very  close  insight  and  very 
assiduous  reading  to  understand  what  precisely  the 
Magyar  "cause"  was.  If  the  Latinity  of  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction  and  the  Laws  of  1790-1   was  matter  of 
dispute  at  Pest,  in  England  passion  and  eloquence 
for  the  Magyars  could  scarcely  be  expected.    Over 
here,  forensic  subtlety  has  never  been  regarded  as 
furnishing  a  just  casus  belli. 

Before  1849  had  run  its  course,  all  this  had  been 
completely  altered,  and  the  country  had  worked 
itself  into  a  perfect  frenzy  for  the  Hungarians.  This 
was  only,  however,  when  their  cause  had  become 
quite  hopeless,  and  when  it  appeared  identified  with  / 
the  cause  of  humanity.  Haynau's  butcheries,  the 
trial  of  Louis  Batthyanyi,  and  the  public  flogging 
by  the  military  of  high-born  ladies — these  were 
events  of  a  nature  to  fan  to  white  heat  the  passions 
of  Upper  Tooting  and  Tillicoultry.  Most  Enghshmen 
are  potential  Palmerstons,  and  love  nothing  better 

s.p.  4 


50  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

than  to  wax  indignant  over  the  inhumanity  of  the 

foreigner;  so,  petitions  poured  into  the  Foreign  Office 

I  declaiming  against  the  monsters  who  were  masters 

\  in  Austria,  while  the  series  of  Bluebooks  on  Convict 

Discipline   and   Transportation,    describing   at    the 

length   of  several  thousand  pages   a  condition   of 

affairs  in  our  Australasian  colonies  which  might  have 

made  Radetzky  shudder  and  Schwarzenberg  weep, 

were  left  unread.    But  this  demonstration  of  feeling 

for  the  Hungarians  during  the  summer  months  of 

1849  was  not  solely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  war  had 

ceased  to  be  an  affair  of  legality  and  become  one  of 

sentiment.  The  country  was  much  better  informed 

than  it  had  been  in  the  previous  year,  and  this  was 

chiefly  due  to  the  efforts  of  Francis  Pulszky.  Perhaps, 

as  has  been  said,  Szalay  had  written  to  Hungary 

that  until  the  Enghsh  were  better  informed  about 

Foreign  Affairs  no  help  could  be  expected  from  that 

quarter.   Certain  it  is  that  Szalay's  successor  was  to 

busy  himself,  not  with  the  Government,  but  with  the 

man  in  the  street.    England  was  a  constitutional 

country,  and,  if  the  Enghsh  people  could  be  taught 

what  the  Magyars  were  really  fighting  for,  and  the 

justice  of  that  fight,  then  Downing  Street  must  of 

necessity  take  steps  in  favour  of  the  Magyars^. 

*  "Die  ungarische  Regierung  entschloss  sich  nunniehr  zu 
einer  anderen  Taktik  England  gegeniiber.  Der  Agitator  soUte 
dem  Gesandten  den  Weg  bahnen,  die  englische  Regierung 
sollte  durch  die  oUentliche  Meinung  zu  einer  Stellungnahme 
zugunsten  Ungarns  gezwungen  werden.  Dicse  Spekulation 
war  nicht  unklug  und  nicht  ganz  ohne  Bcrechtigung."  Alter, 
p.  100. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  51 

Quite  at  the  end  of  the  year  1848  Pulszky  was 
commissioned  to  go  to  London,  but  not  as  a  diplo- 
matic agent.  His  chief  task  was  to  win  over  pubhc 
opinion,  and  find  out  some  way  whereby  a  large 
consignment  of  weapons  might  be  sent  to  Hungary^. 
The  choice  was  one  of  the  best  Kossuth  ever  made, 
although  he  repented  of  it  a  short  time  afterwards. 
Pulszky,  unHke  so  many  of  his  colleagues,  who  were 
intended  to  gain  hostile  Governments  and  unsym- 
pathetic peoples  for  the  Hungarian  movement,  was 
more  than  an  amateur  at  the  game  of  diplomacy. 
In  Hungary  he  had  already  been  Under-Secretary' 
for  Finance,  and  later  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  In  addition,  his  inteUigence  was  of  a  high  ^ 
order,  his  industry  was  amazing,  and  his  personality  ( 
not  devoid  of  charm.  Above  all,  he  understood  the 
art  of  treading  warily.  Teleki's  moments  of  magnifi- 
cent optimism,  alternated  with  fits  of  black  despair, 
were  entirely  alien  to  him ;  nor  did  the  national  vanity 
of  a  Kossuth  lead  him  to  the  belief  that  Hungary 
was  unconquerable,  and  that  Europe  would  inevit- 
ably see  to  it  that  she  was  not  conquered.  He  came 
to  London  at  the  end  of  February  and,  soon  after, 
made  that  unofficial  visit  to  Palmerston  which  has*' 
already  been  recorded,  and  the  outcome  of  which 
was  so  disheartening  to  the  Hungarians.  But  Pulszky 
had  expected  to  find  an  apathetic  Government,  and 
set  to  work  all  the  more  zealously  in  his  appointed 
province — the  gaining  of  sympathy  among  the  public. 

^  Pulszky,  Meine  Zeit,  mein  Leben,  vol.  11.  p.  282.  (Followed 
by  Alter,  p.  102.) 

4—2 


52  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

He  soon  had  a  group  of  talented  English  friends 
devoting  their  journalistic  efforts  to  the  cause  which 
he  represented.  Chief  of  these  were  John  Mitchell 
Kemble,  the  historian  of  the  Anglo-Saxons;  Charles 
Henningsen^,  a  versatile  and  travelled  man,  who  had 
fought  with  Zumalacarreguy  in  Spain,  and  later  be- 
came Kossuth's  secretary;  Francis  Newman  and 
Toulmin  Smith.  Their  campaign  of  pubhcity  was  far 
more  successful  than  Teleki's  in  Paris,  and  this,  when 
one  considers  the  material  with  which  the  two  agi- 
tators worked,  is  perhaps  Pulszky's  best  claim  to  the 
gratitude  of  his  country.  Among  the  papers  which 
printed  the  articles  of  Pulszky  and  his  friends  were 
The  Daily  News,  Morning  Advertiser,  Spectator, 
Examiner,  Observer,  and  even  Palmerston's  most 
ardent  champion  in  all  Fleet  Street,  The  Globe.  In 
addition  to  these  were  the  popular  Sunday  papers, 
and  several  provincial.  But,  although  within  a 
month  of  his  coming  to  England  fourteen  important 
papers  had  opened  their  columns  to  him,  Pulszky's 
success  was,  after  all,  shght.  The  Times  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  him;  Parhament — where  his 
most  ardent  champion  was  Lord  Dudley  Stuart — 
was  equally  disappointing. 

All  the  more  radical  members  of  the  Government  party 
joined  us;  but  they  constantly  proclaimed  the  non-inter- 
vention policy  of  England,  both  as  regards  Hungary  and 

1  Pulszky  wrongly  calls  him  Hennigsen;  see  the  British 
Museum  Catalogue:  his  chief  literary  effort  was  the  description 
of  his  year's  campaigning  in  Spain.  (See  also  his  pamphlets 
Kussuth  and  the  'Tunes,'  1851;  and  The  Past  and  Future  of 
Hungary,  1852.) 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  53 

the  whole  world,  and  they  took  no  sort  of  steps  to  prevent 
the  Russian  intervention.  They  bestowed  their  pity  both 
upon  us  and  upon  Austria;  the  latter  they  believed  had 
taken  a  false  path,  which,  unless  it  were  abandoned 
betimes,  must  lead  to  her  ruin,  but  they  never  promised  us 
anything  except  good  counsel  and  sympathy. 

Precisely  so;  Palmerston's  more  radical  friends  held 
exactly  the  same  views  on  the  subject  as  the  Foreign 
Secretary  himself.  And  what  Lord  Eddisbury  had 
written  to  Szalay,  concerning  the  international 
position  of  Hungary,  was  repeated  in  a  still  more 
practical  manner,  and  from  another  quarter,  to 
Pulszky.  Kossuth  had  concluded  an  agreement  with 
the  Fiume  shipbuilding  firm  of  Matkovics  for  the 
purchase  of  a  frigate,  which  was  to  secure  that 
harbour  to  the  Hungarians,  notwithstanding  the 
Croatian  insurrection,  and  to  faciHtate  the  importa- 
tion of  armaments  by  sea  into  the  country.  The 
frigate  was  built  in  Fiume,  and  then  taken  to  London 
to  be  equipped  as  a  vessel  of  war.  While  it  was  still 
in  England,  however,  Windischgratz  entered  Pest, 
and  Matkovics  either  through  fear  or  for  some  other 
reason,  handed  it  over  to  the  Austrian  Embassy  in 
London,  which  straightway  proceeded  to  confiscate 
it.  The  approval  of  the  EngHsh  Government  had 
been  given  to  this  step,  and  therefore  Pulszky  was 
instructed  to  seek  restitution  through  the  law-courts, 
whose  independence  of  the  executive  was  a  matter 
of  European  knowledge,  and  was  indeed  regarded 
by  many  continental  pubHcists  as  the  chief  safe- 
guard of  the  EngHsh  Constitution,   What  a  German 


54  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

camarilla  had  denied  was  to  be  obtained  in  a  place 
where  justice  and  equity  spoke  out  fearlessly. 
Pulszky,  accordingly,  laid  the  original  of  the  agree- 
ment between  the  Hungarian  Government  and 
Matkovics  before  several  eminent  London  lawyers, 
friends  of  his:  could  the  frigate  be  reclaimed  for  his 
Government  on  such  a  ground?  Their  opinion  was 
unanimous.  A  sovereign  independent  Hungary  was 
not,  and  could  not  be,  recognised,  especially  as  the 
Austrian  Government  not  only  in  law,  but  in  fact, 
was  master  of  the  land,  although  perhaps  for  the 
moment  a  portion  of  the  Hungarian  territory  had 
withdrawn  its  allegiance  from  this  master.  The 
Hungarian  Government  represented  the  insurrection, 
not  the  land,  and  no  English  tribunal  could  possibly 
dispute  or  invalidate  the  confiscation  of  the  vessel 
by  the  Austrian  Government,  which  legally  was  also 
the  Government  of  Hungary.  Pulszky  dared  not, 
after  this,  take  the  matter  into  the  courts^. 

More  discouragement  followed  for  him  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  of  April  14th,  for  the 
English  were  very  much  out  of  humour  with  it. 
^J^  certain  Colonel  Bikkes}^  was  sent  as  special  envoy 
to  London  with  the  original  declaration,  which  was 
translated  for  him  by  Pulszky,  who  spoke  Enghsh 
quite  fluently.   He  was,  also,  instrumental  in  bringing 

^  Pulszky,  vol.  II.  pp.  332-33 — not  p.  323,  as  Alter  asserts. 
The  latter  (pp.  103-5)  gives  some  details  which  are  not  in 
Pulszky's  account;  he  christens  the  vessel  "Kossuth,"  and 
condemns  her  to  " ein  unriihmliches  Ende  als  Baumwollschiff," 
apparently  following  official  EngUsh  and  Austrian  sources, 
which  I  have  not  seen. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  55 

about  a  meeting  between  the  Colonel  and  Palmerston 
in  the  private  house  of  the  Foreign  Secretary,  who, 
however,  "recognised  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence simply  as  an  interesting  document."  In  the 
letter^  in  which  Bikkesy  sent  this  Declaration  (July 
19th,  1849)  was,  also,  enclosed  "  a  Declaration  of 
the  principles  on  which  the  Government  of  Hungary 
is  ready  to  regulate  its  policy  as  regards  its  com- 
mercial regulations  with  Great  Britain."  This  docu- 
ment, "  taking  for  its  provisional  basis  the  most 
favourable  tariff,"  was  to  be  not  only  a  witness  of 
the  "amicable  feehng  with  which  the  Government 
of  Hungary  is  animated  towards  the  Government  of 
Her  Majesty,"  but  also  a  "pledge  of  its  intention, 
when  the  affairs  of  the  country  are  definitely  arranged, 
to  adopt  the  most  liberal  commercial  principles." 
The  statement  of  the  tariff — incredibly  concise  for 
one  of  Kossuth's  official  docun>ents — if,  on  the  one 
hand,  it  did  offer  very  real  commercial  advantages 
to  England,  was  to  be  equally  useful  to  the  hard- 
pressed  and  fugitive  Government: 

English  goods  will  enjoy  provisionally  the  same  advan- 
tages granted  heretofore  to  Austrian  goods  imported  into 
Hungary.  Articles  of  commerce  rendered  necessary  by 
the  actual  state  of  Hungary,  such  as  arms  (including 
sabres,  bayonets,  weapons  and  saddlery),  cloth,  canvas, 
leather,  ready-made  shoes  for  soldiers,  etc.,  shall  be  free 
of  duty;  and,  as  regards  arms,  bounties  shall  even  be  given. 

Had  the  English  Government  been  actually  wilHng 
to  negotiate,  and  so  depart  from  its  former  attitude  of 

1  Correspondence,  No.  234. 


56  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

the  most  correct  neutrality,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine 
how  a  considerable  trade  could  have  been  carried  on, 
when  the  Magyars  saw  themselves  constrained  to 
conduct  their  foreign  affairs  from  Paris,  and  were  lucky 
if  they  could  manage  to  get  a  bundle  of  despatches 
sent  off  by  the  anything  but  safe  overland  route  via 
Constantinople.  In  point  of  fact,  not  even  a  bare 
acknowledgment  by  the  Under-secretary  of  the 
receipt  of  Bikkesy 's  letter  appears  in  the  Bluebook ; 
and  if,  as  has  been  asserted,  one  of  the  motives  which 
prompted  Kossuth  to  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence was  the  desire  to  give  to  his  Government  an 
international  standing  which  sympathetic  but  scrupu- 
lously correct  statesmen  at  Paris  and  London  could 
recognise,  he  was  doomed  to  disappointment ;  as,  also, 
was  his  repeated  attempt  to  appeal  to  the  English 
on  the  strongest  of  grounds,  the  pocket.  Shortly 
after  Bikkesy's  mission,  Kasimir  Batthyanyi,  the 
Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  sent  to 
Pulszky  his  credentials  for  the  English  Government. 
But  his  friends  told  him  that  even  private  inter- 
course would  be  broken  off  if  he  claimed  an  official 
position,  and  he  made  no  attempt  to  hand  in  his 
credentials.  In  the  Bluebook  are  only  two  letters 
from  Pulszky  to  Palmerston,  and  the  second  of  these 
bears  a  date  two  days  subsequent  to  Gorgei's 
surrender  at  Vilagos. 

"My  task,"  says  the  Hungarian,  "could  therefore 
only  be  that  of  recruiting  more  and  more  friends  for 
the  Hungarian  cause,  so  that  our  Government,  in  case 
we  should  one  day  be  victorious,  might  be  actually 
recognised." 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  57 

As  a  recruiting-sergeant  he  was  certainly  not  a 
failure,  and,  as  has  been  mentioned,  the  outburst  of 
pro-Magyar  sympathy  in  England  in  the  late  summer 
of  1849  was  to  a  large  extent  due  to  his  efforts  and 
those  of  his  friends.  His  original  home  in  London 
had  been  a  boarding-house  in  Golden  Square ;  but  it 
was  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  "representative  of 
the  interests  of  Hungary"  must,  if  he  was  to  do  good 
work  in  EngHsh  society,  find  a  more  ambitious 
residence.  He  therefore  migrated,  perforce,  to  Jermyn 
Street,  that  home  of  younger  sons  of  peers  and  M.P.'s 
who  had  left  their  wives  in  the  country;  although, 
as  he  adds  with  a  note  of  humorous  regret,  Cardinal 
Wiseman  had  not  been  too  proud  to  Hve  opposite  to 
the  boarding-house  in  Golden  Square.  In  spite  of 
Jermyn  Street,  Pulszky  won  over  but  few  of  the 
upper  ten  thousand;  among  the  upper  middle 
classes,  however,  the  Hberal  professions  and  the 
learned  world — he  was  once  a  well-known  figure  in  the 
British  Museum  reading-room — he  gained  numerous 
friends  for  himself  and  his  country.  His  recruits 
among  the  newspaper-reading  public  in  and  outside 
London  must  have  numbered  very  many  thousands. 
His  mission  is  certainly  one  of  the  most  interesting 
episodes  of  the  Hungarian  struggle  for  independ- 
ence^. 

1  The  above  sketch  of  Pulszky 's  mission  in  London  is  based 
on  the  account  towards  the  end  of  the  second  volume  of  his 
autobiography,  cited  above.  That  account  has  been  condemned 
as  wortliless;  but  I  can  see  no  reason  for  such  a  condemnation. 
Wherever  possible,  I  have  tested  the  accuracy  of  his  statement, 
and  have  come  across  nothing  worse  than  slips  of  memory, 


58  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

If  it  is  clear  from  the  history  of  the  Hungarian 
missions  in  London  that  Palmerston  never  intended 
to  aid  the  revolted  Hungarians  in  any  sort  of  manner, 
the  Foreign  Ofhce  records  point  still  more  irresistibly 
to  the  same  conclusion.  In  fact,  until  after  Vilagos 
the  "affairs  of  Hungary"  troubled  him  very  little; 
then,  as  will  be  seen,  he  took  up  their  cause  vigorously 
enough.  At  that  late  hour  it  was  partly  a  question  of 
humanity,  partly  of  diplomacy  and  the  Balance  of 
Power,  partly  of  Sir  Stratford  Canning's  initiative, 
partly — perhaps  chiefly — of  pubhc  opinion.  For 
Palmerston  is  in  one  sense  closely  akin  to  Louis 
Kossuth;  he  is  the  British  statesman,  par  excellence, 
of  public  opinion.  Unlike  the  Hungarian,  he  was 
never  carried  away  by  the  voice  of  the  multitude, 
never  led  to  take  up  a  line  of  conduct  which  he 
himself  did  not  hold  to  be  right  or  the  best,  merely 
because  the  clamour  of  Demos  declared  it  right  and 
the  best.  But  if  it  was  possible  to  walk  in  the  sun- 
shine of  popular  favour  without  ignoring  the  path 
of  duty,  then  Palmerston  would  do  so.  Thus  it 
comes  about  that  as  democratic  passions  mount  at 
Tooting,  and  vituperation  waxes  more  riotous  at 
\  Notting  Hill,  the  despatches  from  the  Foreign  Ofhce 
become  more  and  more  outspoken  and  the  advice 

and  one  or  two  mistakes  in  orthography,  which  may  be  his  or 
his  printer's.  He  is,  certainly,  not  boastful,  and  what  he  says 
of  Palmerston  is  confirmed  by  everything  else  that  I  have  been 
able  to  discover.  The  account  of  the  mission  given  above  is 
carried  only  as  far  as  the  Russian  intervention,  because  it  is 
desirable  to  treat  the  diplomatic  campaign  against  that  inter- 
vention as  a  connected  whole. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  59 

less  and  less  palatable.    The  Austrians  deserved  it, 
-and  Hungary  had  been  preserved  to  them,  which 
was  Palmerston's  chief  concern. 

All  this  was  very  hard  on  Ponsonby,  the  Ambassa- 
dor at  Vienna,  who  was  in  his  element  at  the  Hofburg 
and  at  Schonbrunn,  and  who  saw  in  the  Hungarian 
movement  merely  an  attempt  "at  the  advancement 
of  the  new  French  system^."  Even  a  Stratford 
Canning,  had  he  been  at  Vienna,  would  have  found 
it  embarrassing  to  read  some  of  Palmerston's  de- 
spatches to  the  Austrian  Government ;  but  for  Lord 
Ponsonby  it  must  have  been  heart-breaking.  Palmer- 
ston  finally  lost  all  patience  with  him,  and  v/rote  the 
private  letter  printed  in  Ashley's  biography : 

I  write  you  this,  and  desire  you  to  do  your  best,  though 
I  hear  from  many  quarters  that  you  oppose  instead  of 
furthering  the  policy  of  your  Government;  and  that  you 
openly  declare  that  you  disapprove  of  our  course.  No 
diplomat  ought  to  hold  such  language  as  long  as  he  holds 
his  appointment.  It  is  idle  trash  to  say  that  we  are  hostile 
to  Austria  because  we  may  disapprove  of  the  policy  of  a 
Metternich,  or  the  cruelties  of  the  Manning  administration 
which  now  governs  Austria;  you  might  as  well  say  that  a 
man  is  the  enemy  of  his  friend  because  he  tells  that  friend 
of  errors  and  faults  which  are  sinking  him  in  the  esteem 
of  men  whose  good  opinion  is  worth  having 2. 

Pridham,  an  Enghsh  traveller  in  Austria-Hungary 
at  the  time,  had  an  opportunity  of  hearing  Ponsonby's 

1  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  May  sth,  1848. 

2  Ashley,  Life  of  Palmerston,  vol.  11.  p.  122,  Ed.  1879, 
Nov.  27th,  1849,  i.e.  during  a  critical  period  of  the  Refugees 
Question. 


\ 


6o  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

views,  and  has,  also,  left  it  on  record  that  the  ideas 
of  the  Ambassador  were  decidedly  not  those  which 
seemed  to  animate  the  Foreign  Office.    Blackwell, 
the  secret  agent,  tells  the  same  tale.    But  the  Am- 
bassador must  not  be  judged  too  harshly.  Metternich 
and  the  rest  of  them  could  be  very  charming  in 
private  hfe,   and,   if  Ponsonby's  pohtics  were  less 
progressive  than  those  of  his  chief,  it  is  good  to  read 
of  him  that,  during  the  troubled  times  of  1848,  he 
was  the  calmest  and  most  imperturbable  of  men. 
When  Windischgratz  bombarded  Vienna,  the  Enghsh- 
man  was  the  last  to  leave  the  city,  walking  "com- 
posedly through  the   Karnthner  Thor^."    But   his 
despatches  are  very  dull  reading,  and  add  absolutely 
nothing  to  our  knowledge  of  the  Viennese  or  Hun- 
garian Revolutions;  when  one  remembers  the  volume 
of  Lord  Gower's  despatches,  and  Ponsonby's  oppor- 
tunities of  seeing  and  knowing,  one  perceives  how 
insignificant  his  contribution  to  the  history  of  the 
V olkerfruhling  really  is.     His  reports   are,   in   fact, 
neither  more  nor  less  than  what  he  heard  in  Govern- 
ment circles,  and  what  he  got  out  of  the  inspired 
periodicals :  the  official  language  of  Viennese  bureau- 
crats rendered  still  more  uninspiring  by  a  blend  of 
Ponsonby's    own    particular    brand    of    diplomatic 
persiflage.    Palmerston  made  matters  worse  when  he 
compiled  the  Correspondence  on  the  Affairs  of  Hun- 
gary.   Ponsonby  held  strong  personal  views  on  the 
work  and  character  of  Kossuth,  and  when  he  ex- 

*  Lord  Augustus  Loftus,  Diplomatic  Reminiscences,  vol,  I. 
p.  129. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  6l 

pounds  these  views  the  despatches  begin  to  be 
interesting;  but  Palmerston,  out  of  respect  for  the 
fame  of  Ponsonby,  or  of  Kossuth,  or  of  both,  piti- 
lessly excised  these  passages  when  the  papers  were 
laid  on  the  table  of  the  House.  But  it  is  with 
Palmerston's  despatches  to  Ponsonby  that  we  are 
chiefly  concerned.  His  lack  of  sympathy  for  the 
Hungarian  cause,  and  his  real  views,  are  seen  in  the 
absence  of  such  despatches.  While  he  daily  compiled 
long  and  eloquent  sermons  on  the  affairs  of  Italy,  he 
wrote,  during  the  whole  of  1848,  only  two  brief  Notes 
touching  Hungarian  matters,  which  he  thought  worthy 
of  inclusion  in  the  Bluebook.  The  earlier  of  these 
states,  if  somewhat  perfunctorily,  a  genuine  desire, 
and  ends  with  the  true  Palmerstonian  parting  sting: 

It  is  much  to  be  wished  that  the  Austrian  Government 
may  be  able  to  pursue  a  course  of  policy  which  may  keep 
together  and  reunite  in  a  closer  and  firmer  manner  those 
discordant  elements  of  the  Austrian  Empire  whose 
differences  seem  at  present  to  threaten  it  with  dissolution. 
But  such  a  result  can  hardly  be  accomplished,  as  some 
persons  about  the  Court  of  Vienna  seem,  to  think,  by 
military  force  alone  ^. 

The  second  merely  enclosed  a  copy  of  Eddisbury's 
letter  of  December  13th  to  Szalay^.  The  same  is  true 
as  to  the  early  months  of  1849,  ^^  ^^.ct,  until  the 
Hungarians  had  been  beaten  and  their  cause  was 
becoming  popular  in  England.  Once  again,  the 
Italian  despatches  are  legion. 

*  Palmerstonto  Ponsonby,  Sept.  29th,  1848.  Correspondence, 
No.  47. 

2  Correspondence,  No.  79. 


62  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

The  only  despatch  of  this  period  which  possesses 
any  interest  is  one  dated  July  2nd,  ordering  Mr 
Blackwell  to  resume  his  duties  as  agent  for  Her 
Majesty's  Government.  Blackwell  had  served  both 
Aberdeen  and  Palmerston  in  a  non-diplomatic 
character  in  Hungary.  His  reports  on  the  work  of 
the  Diet  of  1847-8 — printed  in  the  Correspondence — 
are  of  especial  merit  and  interest,  and  he  was  a  far 
more  intelhgent  observer,  and  acute  judge,  of  events 
and  men  than  Lord  Ponsonby.  His  sympathies  were 
frankly  pro-Magyar,  and  he  was-  persona  grata  at 
Pest;  but  many  of  his  reports  are  wonderfully 
unbiased.  He,  like  so  many  contemporaries,  mis- 
judged the  amazing  recuperative  powers  of  Austria, 
and  wrote  to  Palmerston  to  warn  him  against 
bolstering  up  the  sick  man  of  Vienna : 

I  must  observe  that  an  opinion  begins  to  prevail  here 
at  Pest  that  H.M.  Government  is  determined  to  maintain 
the  integrity  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  even  at  the  risk 
of  a  European  war.  I  trust  that  such  an  opinion  is 
totally  without  foundation,  being  convinced  that  this 
Empire  is  already  virtually  dissolved,  and  that  no  power 
on  earth  will  be  able  to  reconstitute  it^. 

|His  chief  desire  was  to  be  appointed  Consul-General 

/at  Pest,  a  desire  not  wholly  aHen  to  the  Hungarian 

Cabinet,  but  which  Palmerston,  of  course,  did  not 

fulfil.    To  Blackwell  also  the   Hungarian  Ministers 

*  Blackwell  to  Palmerston,  April  25th,  1848;  in  Ponsonby's 
despatch  of  May  7th;  an  extract  from  this  report  is  printed 
in  the  Bluebook  (No.  21)  but  the  most  interesting  passages 
are  omitted. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  63 

disburdened  their  intentions  with  regard  to  their 
alHances : 

The  Premier  Count  Louis  Batthydnyi  then  proceeded 
to  say  that  I  was  perfectly  aware  that  Hungary  was  now 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  an  independent  kingdom  and 
that  in  their  political  and  commercial  policy,  the  Hun- 
garian ministers  would  of  course  only  take  into  considera- 
tion the  interests  of  Hungary.  On  the  supposition  that 
the  Austrian  Hereditary  States  would  be  incorporated  in 
the  renascent  Germanic  Empire,  and  that  Lombardy 
and  Galicia  must  eventually  be  abandoned,  he  observed, 
that  the  question  arose  whether  Hungary  should  look 
for  support  to  Germany  or  to  England.  He,  for  his  own. 
part,  preferred  England,  for  a  hundred  reasons  which  it 
was  unnecessary  to  state;  but  "the  British  Government 
must  show  some  signs  of  life"  (I  give  his  own  words), 
"must  show,  by  the  speedy  appointment  of  a  Consul- 
General,  that  England  is  aware  of  the  political  as  well  as 
the  commercial  importance  of  Hungary. ...  It  is"  con- 
cluded the  Premier  "my  firm  conviction  that  the  moral 
support  of  England  is  all  that  we  require.  If  this  support 
be  afforded,  the  discordant  social  element  of  our  country 
will  be  speedily  neutralised;  but  if  the  British  Govern- 
ment should  hesitate — should  continue  to  be  ignorant  of 
Hungary  as  an  independent  kingdom,  we  must  look  to 
the  Germans,  and  strive  to  render  our  political  and 
commercial  interests  compatible  with  those  of  the  German  \ 
Confederation  1." 

Klauzal,  who  held  the  portfoHo  of  Trade,  Agriculture 
and  Manufacturing  Industry,  and  was  substantially 
a  Free-trader,  spoke  in  a  similar  strain  to  Blackwell. 

1  Blackwell  to  Palmerston,  April  25tli,  1848.   The  passages 
given  above  are  omitted  in  the  Bluebook. 


64  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

The  allusion  to  the  Zollverein  was  a  clever  idea,  for 
Palmerston's  dislike  to  that  union  must  have  been 
known  both  to  Blackwell  and  Batthyanyi;  but  the 
appeal — as  has  been  seen — to  our  commercial  inter- 
ests was  fruitless.  More  than  a  year  later,  after  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  and  when  the  Russian 
intervention  was  a  certainty,  Blackwell  wrote  with 
an  undercurrent  of  bitterness,  that  in  April  1848  the 
Hungarians  only  desired  the  moral  support  of  England, 
which,  if  granted,  would  in  all  human  probabihty 
have  prevented  war.  But  that  support  at  that  time 
had  not  been  forthcoming^. 

On  July  2nd,  1849,  Palmerston  ordered  Blackwell 
to  resume  his  mission;  but  he  was  not  to  reside  in 
Hungary  this  time: 

. .  .in  the  present  state  of  things  H.M.  Government  do 
not  think  it  expedient  that  Mr  Blackwell  should  go  to 
Hungary.  His  presence  there  as  a  person  sent  to  make 
reports  to  the  British  Government  would  be  liable  to 
misconstruction  by  both  parties  engaged  in  the  war. 
The  Austrian  Government  might  consider  it  as  an  un- 
friendly proceeding,  calculated  to  give  encouragement 
to  the  Hungarians,  and  the  Hungarians  might  view  it  in 
the  same  light,  and  might  found  upon  it  expectations  of 
assistance  and  support  which,  as  H.M.  Government  do 
not  intend  to  take  any  part  in  the  contest,  would  be 
disappointed:  and  the  Hungarians  might  therefore,  if 
their  affairs  should  go  ill,  found  upon  Mr  Blackwell's 
mission  complaints  that  they  had  been  misled  by  the 
British    Government   and    had    been    induced    by    false 

1  Blackwell  to  Palmerston,  May  nth,  1849.  Dated  from 
4,  Charles  Street,  Clarendon  Square. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  65 

hopes  of  assistance  to  neglect  opportunities  of  coming  to 
terms  by  negotiation  1. 

Blackwell  was  therefore  to  reside  at  Graz  in  Styria, 
and  to  refrain  from  any  proceedings  which  might 
appear  to  identify  him  with  either  belHgerent. 

The  Russian  intervention  in  the  summer  of  1849  \ 
came  as  a  surprise  to  nobody,  either  on  the  Continent  \ 
or  in  Great  Britain.  It  was  common  knowledge,  as 
de  Tocqueville  said,  that  Nicholas  had  "  made  for  him- 
self, out  of  the  cause  of  authority  throughout  the 
world,  a  second  Empire  yet  vaster  than  the  first." 
There  were,  indeed,  a  score  of  reasons  why  the  Czar 
should  save  the  Dual  Monarchy  from  utter  dis- 
integration; of  these,  some  were  dictated  by  policy, 
and  motives  of  self-interest,  some  by  that  truly 
imperial  generosity  which,  as  no  historian  has  yet 
denied,  was  one  of  the  autocrat's  chief  characteristics. 

"When  Nicholas  I  offered  his  aid/'  says  Dr  Friedjung, 
"he  was  partly  moved  by  the  consideration  that  the 
victory  of  the  Hungarian  Revolution  would  have  for  its 
immediate  consequence  the  falling  away  of  Poland  from 
Russia,  since  several  thousand  Poles  were  serving  in  the 
Hungarian  Army.  This,  however,  was  not  his  prime 
motive.  For  he  regarded  himself  as  the  guardian  of  the 
monarchical  and  conservative  cause  in  Europe,  and  had, 
in  addition,  at  his  meeting  with  the  Emperor  Francis  at 
Miinchengratz  in  1833  vowed  to  the  latter  that  he  would 
stand  by  his  son  under  every  circumstance.   With  all  his 

1  Palmerston  to  Mr  Magenis,  July  2nd,  1849.  Magenis  was 
Charge  d'Afiaires  at  Vienna  during  Lord  Ponsonby's  absence 
in  May,  June  and  the  first  half  of  July,  1849.  Blackwell's 
mission  ceased  October  31st,  1849. 

S.  P.  «; 


66  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

severity,  Nicholas  was,  after  his  kind,  an  ideahst;  other- 
wise, he  would  never  have  set  on  foot,  for  the  sake  of  an 
alien  cause,  a  considerable  army,  without  claiming  in 
return  the  slightest  aid  from  Austria.  Common  prudence 
demanded  that  he  should  at  the  same  time  assure  himself 
of  the  consent  of  the  Viennese  Cabinet  to  an  attempt  on 
Constantinople ;  but  he  gave  himself  up  to  the  belief  that 
the  Austria  which  he  had  saved  would  never  deny  to  him 
this  proof  of  gratitude.  The  common  campaign  against 
Hungar)^  was  agreed  upon  as  a  family  affair  between  the 
two  reigning  houses;  Nicholas  behaved  as  the  fatherly 
friend  of  his  youthful  neighbour:  and  Schwarzenberg, 
without  possessing  a  single  vein  of  sentiment,  understood 
how  to  keep  this  feeling  awake,  through  the  medium  of  the 
ladies  of  the  Imperial  house  of  Austria^." 

The  above  account  is  perhaps  a  little  too  unquaUfied ; 
in  spite  of  the  genuine  and  deep-rooted  desire  to 
protect  his  "youthful  neighbour,"  the  Czar  prob- 
ably did,  at  any  rate,  attempt  to  stipulate  for  some 
return  on  account  of  the  magnificent  service  he  was 
rendering  to  the  Austrian  monarchy.  The  English 
Consul-General  at  Warsaw,  Colonel  du  Plat,  wrote 
to  Palmerston  on  June  2nd  an  account  of  an  interview 
between  Nicholas,  the  Chancellor  Nesselrode  and 
General  Daehn.  The  Czar  had  demanded  Daehn's 
opinion  on  the 

incorporation  of  Galicia  with  the  Kingdom  of  Poland, 
with  the  view  of  better  keeping  dowTi  {comprimer)  for 
the  future,  Polish  turbulence  with  the  strong  hand  and 
iron  will  of  the  Emperor. 

^  Friedjung,  op.  cit.  vol.  i.  p.  216. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  67 

Daehn  had  replied  that  such  a  scheme  would  demand 
too  many  soldiers,  and  would  involve  too  great  an 
expense. 

"I  should  ask  for  Cracow,  for  the  Salt  Mines  of  Wieliczka, 
and  for  certain  districts  lying  between  those  two  places; 
with  a  few  small  parcels  of  territory,  to  obtain  a  better 
military  frontier  for  the  present  Kingdom  of  Poland: 
by  such  an  arrangement  it  might  be  possible  even  to 
diminish  the  Army  usually  kept  in  Poland,  and  the 
Exchequer  would  benefit  at  the  rate  of  some  nine  or 
ten  milhons  of  florins  (about  ;^250,ooo)  annually,  which 
are  now  paid  to  Austria  for  salt."  I  understood  that  the 
Emperor  appeared  to  approve  this  view;  but  His  Majesty 
did  not  express  any  opinion  1. 

Whether  this  interview  really  took  place  or  not  is  by 
no  means  certain.  Du  Plat's  authority  for  it  was 
perhaps  not  of  the  best.  It  would  appear,  however, 
to  be  safe  to  assert  that  nothing  was  definitely  settled 
in  black  and  white  between  the  two  monarchs 
regarding  the  Czar's  future  poHcy  towards  the 
Ottoman  Empire. 

Nor  was  the  intervention  altogether  unconnected 
with  the  affairs  of  Germany.  Once  reestabhshed  in  her 
pristine  might,  and  again,  as  of  old,  the  bulwark  of 
conservatism,  Austria,  Nicholas  thought,  would  be 
able  to  combat  the  building-up  of  a  united  Germany; 
or,  at  any  rate,  she  would  be  able  to  prevent  its  having 
a  democratic  basis.  A  strong  Germany  on  his  western 
frontier  could  in  no  case  be  pleasing  to  the  Czar; 
but  a  strong  Germany,   the  foundations  of  which 

1  Colonel  du  Plat  to  Palmerston,  June  2nd,  1849. 

5—2 


66  PAI.MERSTON  AND  THE 

were  rooted  in  revolution,  would  be  as  absolutely 
detestable  as  an  independent  Hungary  and  an  inde- 
pendent Poland. 

"The  Russians,"  wrote  the  English  Charg^  d 'Affaires 
in  St  Petersburg,  "look  forward,  by  speedily  relieving  the 
Austrian  Government  of  the  embarrassments  of  the 
Hungarian  War — to  enable  them  to  act  with  greater 
decision  and  energy  in  the  affairs  of  Germany;  and  it  is 
evidently  contemplated  that  Austria  will,  ere  long,  have 
an  opportunity  of  recovering  what  is  here  considered  to 
be  her  legitimate  influence  in  that  country,  and  of  com- 
bating the  revolutionary^  projects  of  the  repubUcan  and 
anarchical  party  in  the  smaller  states  of  the  Confederation, 
by  employing  her  own  forces  for  that  purpose,  while  she 
may  leave  her  territories  under  the  protection  of  the 
advanced  guard  of  the  Russian  armies^." 

Finally,  as  already  hinted,  the  Russian  statesmen 
wished  to  show  the  Slavs  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  to 
whom  they  had  to  look  for  aid  and  protection  in  their 
hour  of  need.  The  intervention  was  in  this  respect  no 
more  than  a  stone  in  the  great  Panslav  edifice  which 
they  were  erecting  at  St  Petersburg 2. 

The  Hungarians  beheved  that  England  and  France 
must  do  something  at  last.  Twelve  months  of  failure 
at  Paris  and  London  had  taught  them  tluit  the 
Western  Powers  were  not  prepared  to  sacrifice  a 
single  man  for  the  Independence  of  Hungary.  In 
May  1849,  however,  it  was  no  longer  a  question  of 

1  Andrew  Buchanan  to  Palmerston,  May  loth,  1849.  Lord 
Bloomfield,  the  English  Ambassador  in  St  Petersburg,  was 
on  leave  of  absence  in  this  country  at  the  time. 

'^  Black  well  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  5th,  1849. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  69 

the  independence  or  subjugation  of  Hungary  merely, 
but  of  the  naked  and  avowed  aggrandisement  of 
Russia  towards  the  west.  England,  whose  great 
object  of  dread  was  that  expansion,  which  would 
upset  the  Balance  of  Power,  must  now  see  how  Euro- 
pean liberties  were  in  truth  bound  up  with  the 
Magyar  cause;  and  the  most  scrupulously  correct  of 
statesmen  might  safely  throw  overboard  the  policy  of 
non-intervention,  in  the  face  of  so  great  a  departure 
from  that  policy  by  the  enemy.  Moreover,  Turkey  was 
now  quite  definitely  threatened,  and,  with  Turkey, 
the  commercial  interests  of  England  in  the  Near  East, 
and  ultimately  her  empire  beyond  Persia  and  the 
Himalayas:  it  was  a  fundamental  maxim  of  the 
Foreign  Office  that  India  must  be  defended  on  the 
shores  of  the  Bosphorus^. 

On  April  17th,  Blackwell,  at  that  time  resident  in 
London,  reported  to  Palmerston  the  views  of  the 
moderate  men  in  Hungary,  who  were  already  seeking 
the  friendly  mediation  of  England. 

My  correspondents  in  Hungary  belong  to  the  party  of 
Moderate  Liberals,  or  what  the  French  would  term  the 
Left  Centre.  This  party — the  most  influential  in  Hungary  ' 
— is    sincerely    desirous    of   settling    the    disputes    with    \ 
Austria,   through  the  mediation  of  H.M.   Government.    / 
If  the  Austrian  ministers  wish  to  avoid  involving  Europe   \ 
in  a  general  war  by  demanding  the  aid  of  Russia,  I  should    \ 
imagine  that  they  would  now  (after  the  recent  victories     \ 
of  the  Hungarians)  gladly  avail  themselves  of  any  overture 
which  Your  Lordship  might  deem  it  advisable  to  make 
to  them. 

^  Pulszky,  op.  cit.  vol.  11.  p.  336. 


70  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  Hungarians,  or  at 
least  the  party  alluded  to,  would  consent  to  an  arrange- 
ment on  the  following  terms : 

ist.    The  Kingdom  of  Hungary  to  consist  of  Hungary, 
proper :  that  is  to  say,  Hungary  north  of  the  river  Drave, 
and  Transylvania. 

2nd.  Croatia,  Slavonia,  with  their  military  frontiers, 
and  Dalmatia  to  be  constituted  as  the  representatives 
of  those  provinces  might  decide  at  a  Diet  to  meet  for  the 
purpose  at  Agram. 

3rd.  Hungary  to  have  a  port  on  the  Adriatic — either 
on  the  Hungarian  Littoral  or  in  Istria — with  the  right 
of  road  to  it;  in  the  same  manner  as  Austria  has  a  right 
of  road  through  the  Bavarian  territories  from  Salzburg 
to  the  Tyrol:  a  right  which,  if  I  be  not  mistaken,  is  guar- 
anteed by  the  Treaties  of  1815.. .  . 

I  have  ventured  to  make  this  communication  to  Your 
Lordship,  from  the  conviction  that  if  the  disputes  between 
Austria  and  Hungary  be  not  speedily  settled  by  the 
amicable  mediation  of  a  Foreign  Power,  a  European  war 
is  unavoidable,  and  from  my  considering  myself  in  some 
measure  authorised  to  express  an  opinion  respecting  the 
affairs  of  Hungary,  with  which  I  ought  at  least  to  be 
thoroughly  acquainted. 

I  am  perfectly  aware  that  my  views . . .  differ  materially 
from  those  of  Her  Majesty's  ambassador  at  Vienna^. 

A  few  weeks  later  he  wrote  again.  He  had  not,  he 
stated,  had  knowledge  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence when  writing  his  last  letter.  But  the 
Hungarians  would  still  accept  British  mediation  on 
the  terms  stated  in  that  letter,  if  the  Russian  inter- 
vention could  be  avoided.   Had  Szalay,  he  continued, 

*  Blackwell  to  Palmerston,  April  17th,  1849. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  71 

been  able  to  manage  an  interview  with  Palmerston 
when  in  England,  he  was  to  have  made  a  similar 
proposal.  If  the  Austrians  dechned  the  mediation  of 
Great  Britain,  and  the  arms  of  the  Hungarians  were 
successful,  then  they  "would  be  incHned  to  place  a 
member  of  the  Coburg-Kohary  family  on  the  throne, 
provided  they  could  calculate  on  his  being  recognised 
by  England."  The  time  for  mediation  had,  indeed, 
gone  by;  but  Palmerston  might  still  exercise  a 
salutary  influence  without  compromising  Her  Ma- 
jesty's Government.  Such  influence,  if  the  Hun- 
garians were  successful,  would  sufhce  to  determine 
the  form  of  government  and,  if  this  were  monarchical, 
the  person  to  be  chosen  King^. 

At  Debreczin,  when  they  knew  that  the  Czar's 
assistance  had  been  definitely  requested  and  as 
definitely  promised,  they  began  the  campaign  against 
the  imminent  peril  by  investing  their  agent  in  London 
with  a  diplomatic  character.  The  time  was  now 
come  for  Pulszky  to  turn  from  the  man  in  the  street 
to  Palmerston  in  Downing  Street.  In  the  letter  which 
contained  the  nomination  of  Francis  Pulszky  as 
Charge  d' Affaires  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  was 
enclosed  a  note  to  Palmerston  on  the  Russian 
intervention : 

'  I  hope  that  Your  Excellency,  faithful  to  your  just  and 
liberal  policy,  will  not  be  indifferent  to  such  an  infraction 
of  the  law  of  nations,  and  that  you  will  interpose  the 
powerful  protest  of  Great  Britain  to  prevent  it. 

1  Blackwell  to  Palmerston,  May  nth,  1849. 


72  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

At  the  same  time,  it  was  pointed  out  to  Pulszky  how 
the  intervention  must  infaUibly  upset  the  Balance 
of  Power,  and  the  new  Charge  d' Affaires  was  in- 
structed to  obtain  from  Great  Britain  a  recognition 
of  the  right  of  the  Hungarian  Government  to  com- 
municate   freely   with   other   Governments,    and    a 
protest  so  solemn  against  the  intervention  that  the 
first  step  of  a  Russian  soldier  on   Hungarian  soil 
would  be  regarded  as  nothing  less  than  a  casus  belW^. 
To   make   assurance   doubly   sure,    the    Hungarian 
Cabinet  were  prepared  for  great  sacrifices,  as  they 
still  believed  that,  if  the  price  offered  were  great 
enough,  the  Foreign  Office  would  have  to  surrender 
to  the  demands  of  the  mercantile  and  trading  classes. 
To  this  end  they  were  ready  to  sacrifice  that  terri- 
torial   integrity    of    their    country,    the    inviolable 
maintenance  of  which  had  been  one  of  the  chief 
paragraphs  in  the  programme  of  revolution.   In  this 
sense  Kasimir  Batth3^anyi  wrote  to  Pulszky  from 
Debreczin,  on  May  19th,  that,  if  necessary,  the  Hun- 
garian Government  were  prepared  to  offer  Semlin  to 
England,  which  would  assure  to  the  latter  the  com- 
mercial preponderance  on  the  Lower  Danube.    If  a 
strong  place  on  the  Adriatic  were  demanded  in  addi- 
tion,  the   harbour  of  Buccari  would   serve.    These 
cessions  would  naturally  depend  on  the  course  of 

1  Foreign  Office  Records,  F.O.  7,  375,  May  15th,  1849. 
Contained  in  a  letter  from  Pulszky  dated  August  i6th,  but 
not  in  the  Bluebook.  In  that  volume  is  printed  a  letter  from 
Pulszky  to  Palmerston  of  the  same  date  (No.  298),  containing 
a  rhetorical  protest  against  the  intervention  and  the  perjured 
House  of  Habsburg-Lorraine. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  73 

negotiations  and  the  ultimate  sanction  of  the  Hun- 
garian Government ;  in  any  case,  they  could  be  realised 
only  on  one  condition :  "  if  we  in  return  can  obtain  the 
actual  armed  protest  of  England  against  the  Russian 
intervention."  Hungary  was,  also,  prepared  to  enter 
into  a  commercial  treaty  with  England,  the  basis  of 
which  should  go  beyond  the  "most  favoured  nation" 
tariff  which  Bikkesy  had  been  instructed  to  offer; 
for,  according  to  the  new  scheme,  English  trade  was 
to  enjoy  more  advantages  in  Hungary  than  Austria 
had  formerly  enjoyed.  The  letter  concludes  with  a 
passionate  appeal  to  Pulszky  to  take  almost  any 
steps,  if  he  could  but  secure  the  energetic  protest  of 
the  British  Government  against  the  Russian  inter- 
vention. 

I  believe  that  England — according  to  her  earlier 
utterances — will  not  tolerate  this  insolent  violation  of  all 
natural  rights.  The  arrival  of  an  English  fleet  in  the 
Dardanelles  would  make  us  sure  of  Turkey ;  but  why 
could  not  England,  in  order  to  make  a  really  emphatic 
protest,  send  a  fleet  into  the  Baltic^? 

Palmerston,  doubtless,  received  this  letter  (although 
it  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  Foreign  Office  records), 
for  Pulszky  had  powerful  friends  in  England,  and,  in 
addition,  ample  means  of  seeing  Palmerston  privately. 
When  the  Western  Powers  still  maintained  silence, 
and  after  the  main  Russian  army  had  crossed  the 

*  Batthyanyi  to  Palmerston:  Debreczin,  May  19th,  1849. 
Printed  in  the  collection  of  Batthyanyi's  Official  Letters  to 
Pulszky,  at  the  end  of  vol.  11.  of  Pulszky's  autobiography. 
This  collection  is  not  complete. 


74  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

frontier,  the  passion  of  appeal  was  converted  into 
the  passion  of  menace,  and  the  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment threatened  to  toss  the  firebrand  of  Revolution 
into  the  magazine  of  the  nations.  Such  is  the  argu- 
ment of  the  Circular  Note  of  June  25th,  which 
Kasimir  Batthyanyi  addressed  to  the  Hungarian 
agents  abroad: 

The  tinder  is  in  our  hands,  and,  if  it  be  necessary  to  fire 
it  off,  we  shall  only  take  counsel  for  our  own  safety;  and 
it  may  easily  come  to  pass,  that  the  barbarian  of  the 
North  shall  live  to  see  a  second  burning  of  Moscow, 
which  will  consume  more  than  the  dead  walls  of  a  city*. 

Still  later,  when  the  Hungarians  were  in  a  yet  more 
desperate  position,  a  final  attempt  was  made  to 
purchase  the  help  of  England  in  a  letter  dated 
Szegedin,  July  14th,  and  written  in  Batthyanyi's 
hand  throughout,  which  probably  did  not  reach 
Pulszky  until  after  Hungary  lay  at  the  feet  of  the 
Czar.  If  England  would  take  steps  to  assure  the 
national  independence  of  Hungary,  Kossuth  and 
Batthyanyi  would,  in  their  turn,  attempt  to  bring 
about  the  recognition  by  the  Magyars  of  a  King  pro- 
posed by  England,  who  should  be  a  member  of  the 
deposed  dynasty,  but  not  Francis  Joseph.  "But 
now  or  never!"  There  follows  a  still  more  amazing 
proposition:  if  England  were  not  opposed  to  such 
a  scheme,  Turkey,  the  Turkish  protectorates  and 
Hungary  might  together  compose  a  union  of  states 

*  Alter,  pp.  175-6;  the  text  of  the  note  is  in  Korn,  Kossuth 
und  die  Ungarnin  der  Tii/kei  (Hamburg  and  New  York,  185 1), 
pp.  20  et  seq. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  75 

(Staatsverband),  of  which  Turkey  should  be  the  head, 
and  which  should  be  quite  capable  of  taking  Austria's 
place  in  the  family  of  nations.  Hungary  would,  of 
course,  preserve  her  national  independence;  and 
England  would  have  the  opportunity  of  putting  the 
pohcy  of  Russia  to  shame,  and  of  securing  a  position 
in  the  Near  East  such  as  she  had  never  had  before. 
The  integrity  of  Turkey  would  be  guaranteed  for 
years ;  while  to  England  would  fall  the  choice  of  the 
form  of  government  and  of  the  person  at  the  head  of  a 
new  kingdom,  which  would  be  a  market  for  her  trade, 
and  a  rich  source  of  increase  to  her  material  and 
political  power^. 

Doubtless,  Pulszky  was  too  httle  of  a  pohtical 
ideahst  to  hand  this  letter  over  to  Palmerston,  even 
supposing  he  received  it  before  the  surrender  at 
Vilagos  had  robbed  it  of  whatever  practical  worth  it 
may  originally  have  possessed.  But  to  the  historian 
it  is  of  the  greatest  interest.  It  shows  that  Kossuth 
and  his  Foreign  Secretary  at  last  understood  what 

1  Count  Kasimir  Batthyanyi  to  Pulszky,  July  14th,  1849. 
In  the  appendix  to  Pulszky,  vol.  11.,  Alter  (p.  186)  asserts  that 
the  Turkish  Grand  Vizier  Reshid  Pasha  was  pleased  with  the 
idea;  but  that  England,  who  saw  that  it  would  put  the  whole 
of  the  Balkans  in  a  blaze,  and  did  not  hesitate  a  moment  to 
point  out  its  dangers  to  Turkey,  repeated  her  admonitions  to 
neutrality,  and  declared  that  in  case  of  war  Turkey  must  not 
expect  her  support.  As  his  authorities  for  this,  he  cites  de- 
spatches from  Canning  to  Palmerston  and  from  Palmerston 
to  Canning,  which  do  not  exist.  Although  there  is  no  mention 
of  the  scheme  in  Canning's  despatches,  Batthyanyi,  in  his 
letter,  states  positively  that  it  was  Canning's:  "So  much 
I  know ;  Sir  Stratford  Canning,  to  quieten  the  English  Govern- 
ment, has  set  this  as  a  condition  for  the  recognition  of  our 
independence." 


76  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

exactly  Palmerston  meant  when  he  spoke  of  Austria 
as  a  European  necessity,  and  of  the  impossibihty  of 
preserving  the  Balance  of  Power  if  small  independent 
states  were  substituted  in  its  place.  Amongst  these 
states  Palmerston  reclconed  Hungary.  But  the 
argument  did  not  apply,  if  Austria's  place  were  to  be 
taken,  not  by  an  isolated  Hungary,  but  by  a  powerful 
Balkan  Confederation,  stretching  from  the  Carpa- 
thians to  Constantinople,  from  Fiume  to  the  Black 
Sea,  with  the  inexhaustible  Asiatic  hinterland  to 
draw  upon  in  case  of  need.  Such  a  Confederation, 
young  and  vigorous,  while  Austria  was  old  and  effete, 
animated  by  the  fiercest  hostility  against  Russia  in 
place  of  Austrian  subservience  to  that  Power,  and,  in 
extent  of  territory  and  population  incomparably 
superior  to  the  dominions  of  Francis  Joseph — such 
a  Confederation  must  for  Palmerston's  policy  in  the 
Near  East,  surely,  seem  worth  half  a  dozen  Austrias^. 

^  Alter,  p.  19 1,  speaks  of  yet  another  attempt  to  gain  the 
assistance  of  England.  "A  short  time  afterwards,  after  the 
failure  of  the  plan  to  let  England  stand  godmother  to  the 
Danubian  Empire  under  the  suzerainty  of  Turkey,  Kossuth 
had  taken  steps  to  offer  the  crown  to  a  member  of  the  English 
royal  family.  Kossuth,  indeed,  thought  that  he  must  make  a 
better  offer  to  the  proud  dynasty  of  England  than  to  the 
modest  House  of  Coburg-Kohary ;  and  thus,  in  the  last  days 
of  July,  Count  Teleki  was  commissioned  to  repair  to  London 
as  special  envoy  of  the  Hungarian  Government,  and  not  only 
once  more  to  offer  to  the  English  Government  the  monopoly 
of  trade  in  Hungary,  but  also  to  invite  Prince  Arthur,  a 
younger  son  of  Queen  Victoria,  to  accept  the  crown  of  the 
triune  kingdom  of  Hungary,  Croatia  and  Dalmatia — a 
dominion  which  therefore  would  include,  not  only  the  lands 
of  the  crown  of  St  Stephen,  but  also  a  piece  of  Austrian 
territory."  Of  these  posthumous  papers  of  Cobden  I  know 
nothing ;  the  account  in  Korn  differs  from  that  in  Alter,  and 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  77 

But,  however  great  the  sacrifices  which  the 
Hungarians  were-  prepared  to  make,  they  were 
sacrifices  to  an  unheeding  Power.  Palmerston,  who 
had  underrated  the  force  of  the  Hungarian  movement  ; 
during  the  closing  months  of  1848,  in  the  spring  of  ! 
1849  saw  the  very  existence  of  the  Austrian  Empire 
threatened.  The  Russians  alone  could  save  it;  so 
the  Russians  should  save  it,  and  meet  with  no  protest 
from  the  Foreign  Office.  He  had  little  fear  for  the 
future.  Gratitude  is  seldom  a  decisive  factor  in 
diplomacy,  and  the  memory  of  Austrian  statesmen 
was    proverbially    short.      The    rescued    Viennese 

is,  obviously,  not  true.  He  says  that  the  Court  of  St  James' 
was  not  altogether  averse  from  the  proposal  to  make  Prince 
Arthur  king  of  the  "noble  Hungarian  nation,"  and  continues: 
"This,  together  with  the  uncertainty  as  to  what  claims  Russia 
would  put  forward,  if  she  succeeded  in  suppressing  Hungary, 
induced  the  English  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  allow  traces 
to  appear  of  the  possibiHty  of  a  recognition  of  Hungarian 
independence."  Korn  gives  no  date,  except  the  general  indica- 
tion :  "  at  the  time  of  the  Russian  invasion  of  Hung:ary."  Philipp 
Korn,  formerly  commandant  of  the  Kaschau  division  of  the 
German  Legion  in  Hungary,  lived  for  a  year  with  Kossuth  and 
the  refugees  in  Turkey.  His  book  was  pubHshed  in  1851,  and 
dedicated  to  Theresa  Pulszky.  It  will  be  observed  that  Alter 
purges  Korn's  account  of  the  most  glaring  mistakes :  one  would 
hke  to  see  the  cited  paper  by  Cobden.  The  date  given  by  Alter 
would  make  the  offer  of  the  Crown  to  Prince  Arthur  coincident 
with,  or  earlier  than,  the  offer  contained  in  the  letter  of  July 
14th,  which  assigned  to  England  the  disposal  of  the  Hungarian 
Crown,  but  added  that  the  choice  must  fall  on  a  Habsburg.  A 
long  list  of  Teleki's  letters  is  printed  in  Pulszky,  vol.  11. ;  but 
there  is  nothing  at  all  corresponding  to  Alter's  "commission" 
in  the  closing  days  of  July.  Doubtless,  there  was  some  talk  of 
offering  the  crown  of  St  Stephen  to  a  member  of  the  English 
royal  house — as  it  was  certainly  offered  to  other  royal  houses — 
and  Korn  confounded  this  with  the  actual  proposal  made  in 
the  letter  of  July  14th. 


78  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Government  would  soon  perceive  that  the  sometime 
rescuer  was  the  eternal  enemy,  and  would  shape  its 
policy  accordingly^.  Palmerston's  despatches  leave 
no  room  for  doubt  on  this  point. 

"Much  as  Her  Majesty's  Government  regret  this 
interference  of  Russia,"  he  wrote  to  Buchanan  on  May 
17th,  "the  causes  which  have  led  to  it,  and  the  effects 
which  it  may  produce,  they  nevertheless  have  not  con- 
sidered the  occasion  to  be  one  which  at  present  calls  for 
any  formal  expression  of  the  opinions  of  Great  Britain 
on  the  matter'^." 

To  Colonel  du  Plat  he  was  still  more  laconic  and  to 
the  point ;  that  most  conscientious  of  Consul-Generals 
was  forbidden  to  express  any  opinion  whatever  on 
the  contest  in  progress  between  Austria  and  Hungary, 
or  upon  the  Russian  intervention.  "The  British 
Government  are  spectators  to  those  events,  and 
neither  parties  to,  nor  judges  of,  them^."  The 
Charge  d'Affaires  at  Vienna  was  not  even  honoured 
with  a  special  despatch  on  the  subject;  he  received 
for  his  instruction  nothing  more  than  copies  of  the 
Russian  Circular  on  the  intervention  (which  repre- 

^  "The  English  ministers  were  indeed  very  indignant  at  the 
Russian  intervention  and  foresaw  that  it  would  lead  to  a 
Turkish  war.  Yet  they  took  no  action  which  might  have 
weakened  the  Austrian  Monarchy;  for  they  regarded  it  as  a 
safe  ally  in  the  Eastern  Question,  and  knew  only  too  well  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  gratitude  in  poUtics,  and  that  in 
the  end  interests  always  gained  the  victory  over  feelings." 
Pulszky,  vol.  II.  p.  338. 

*  Palmerston  to  Buchanan,  May  17th,  1849,  Correspondence, 
No.  179. 

*  Palmerston  to  du  Plat,  May  24th.  1849. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  79 

sented  it  as  a  matter  of  self-defence),  and  of  the 
despatch  of  May  17th  to  Buchanan^. 

But  the  whole  poHcy  of  Palmerston  is  most  clearly 
seen  in  the  correspondence  which  passed  between  him 
and  the  cleverest  of  all  the  Enghsh  diplomatic  agents 
abroad.   To  trace  this  poHcy,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
go  back  to  a  date  about  twelve  months  prior  to  the 
Russian  intervention  in  Hungary.   In  June  1848,  the 
very  month  when  Canning  took  up  his  fifth  residence 
at  Constantinople,  disturbances  broke  out  in  the  two  \ 
Danubian  Principalities,   Moldavia  and  Wallachia. 
There  v/as  real  justification  for  the  discontent  of  the 
inhabitants ;  and  a  few  wise  concessions  would  have 
restored  order  and  set  all  to  rights.   These  the  Porte, 
under    Canning's    guidance,    was    quite    wilHng    to 
sanction;  but  Russia  claimed  that  the  stipulations 
of  the  Treaty  of  Adrianople  gave  to  her,  also,  the 
right  to  preserve  order  in  the  Principalities ;  and,  when 
Turkey,  in  opposition  to  Canning's  advice  to  avoid 
a  military  occupation  of  the  provinces,  despatched  , 
troops  across  the  Danube,  4000   Russians  entered  , 
Moldavia.    In  a  short  time,  the  inhabitants  were  * 
groaning  under  a  huge  army  which  they  had  to 
support  at  their  own  cost.    Although  the  Russian 
Government  claimed  in  their  Circular  on  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Principalities  that  they  had  entered  with 
the   consent   of  the   Porte,   their  views   as  to   the 
measures  which  should  be  taken  for  the  restoration 
of  tranquilhty  differed  toto  coelo  from  those  of  the 
Turkish  statesmen. 

1  Palmerston  toMagenis,  Correspondence,  No.  185. 


8o  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

"Turkey,"  says  Mr  Lane-Poole,  "moved  by  the 
strenuous  counsels  of  the  British  Ambassador,  was  for 
mild  measures,  amnesty  to  the  '  reformers,'  liberal  amend- 
ments in  the  Constitution,  and  the  speedy  removal  of  the 
Russian  troops.  The  Czar,  on  the  other  hand,  imperiously 
demanded  a  severe  repression  of  the  'revolution,'  punish- 
ment of  the  'rebels,'  repudiation  of  free  institutions,  and 
a  prolonged  joint  occupation  in  the  interests  of  order. 
It  was  the  old  contest  between  the  principles  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  and  the  liberal  policy  of  George  Canning  ^" 

Sir  Stratford  saw  in  the  affair  yet  another  milestone 
on  the  road  from  St  Petersburg  to  Constantinople, 
especially  when  he  learned  that  Russia  was  seeking 
for  an  intimate  alliance  with  the  Porte.  When  the 
Turkish  statesmen  pressed  for  a  defensive  alliance 
with  England,  he  was,  without  doubt,  disappointed 
that  Palmerston  did  not  close  with  the  idea  at  once. 
At  St  Petersburg  they  affected  great  regret  at  what 
had  taken  place,  and  disclaimed  all  ideas  of  aggran- 
disement. From  the  nature  of  the  Czar's  relations 
with  Turkey,  it  was  impossible  to  "  avoid  cooperating 
with  the  Ottoman  forces";  and  radicahsm  must  be 
suppressed  on  their  own  frontiers.  "Notts  V avons  fait 
a  notre  corps  defendant,"  said  Nesselrode^.  When 
Palmerston  had  heard  Nesselrode's  explanation,  he 
replied  as  follows  to  Bloomfield: 

H.M.  Government  place  entire  confidence  in  the  de- 
claration and  assurance  which  the  imperial  Government 
has  given  in  regard  to  this  event;  and  H.M.  Government 
entertain  no  doubt  that  the  Government  of  Russia  will 

^  Life  of  Sir  Stratford  Canning,  vol.  ii.  p.  178. 

'^  Lord  Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  July  i8th,  184S. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  8i 

avail  themselves  of  the  earliest  opportunity  which  the 
course  of  events  may  afford  them  to  withdraw  their 
troops  from  the  Principalities,  and  to  replace  them 
within  the  Russian  frontier^. 

It  soon  became  evident  that  an  early  evacuation 
could  not  be  hoped  for;  and,  as  the  winter  passed 
away,  the  boasted  concord  and  cooperation  of  the 
two  occupying  Powers  gave  place  to  a  state  of  affairs 
which  did  not  seem  far  removed  from  a  Russo- 
Turkish  war.  Sir  Stratford  Canning  became  more 
and  more  alarmed,  and  urged  Palmerston  to  prepare 
himself  for  the  worst.  The  latter,  of  course,  was 
frankly  on  the  side  of  Turkey  in  the  matter,  and  it 
was  doubtless  chiefly  due  to  him  that  the  French 
Government  also  made  representations  in  the  same 
spirit.  But  his  behaviour  throughout,  in  spite  of  a 
little  sharp  language  now  and  then,  betrays  quite 
unwonted  complaisance^.  In  fact,  he  believed  that 
one  of  the  main  aims  of  the  Russian  movement  in 
the  Danubian  Principalities  was  the  ultimate  lending 
of  assistance  to  Austria  against  the  Hungarians,  and 
that  the  Czar's  eyes,  for  the  time  being  were,  not  on 

1  Palmerston  to  Bloomfield,  Aug.  2nd,  1848.  See  also  the 
debate  in  the  Commons  of  March  22nd,  1849.  Palmerston  said 
that  "he  was  confident  that  the  Russian  Government  had  no 
intention  of  making  a  permanent  encroachment  on  the  Turkish 
Empire."  It  was  a  question  of  time,  not  of  ulterior  intentions. 
Hansard,  cm.  pp.  1128  et  seq. 

2  " Pourquoi  I'Angleterre  temoigne-t-elle,  en  presence  de 
V occupation  des  provinces  danubiennes,  tant  de  tranquilliti  et 
une  confiance  si  grande  dans  la  moderation  de  la  Russie?  Cela 
m'etonne,  et  me  suggere  des  craintes  dont  je  ne  puis  me  defendre." 
De  Tocqueville  to  Lamoriciere  (no  date),  in  R.  Pierre  Marcel, 
Essai  Politique  sur  Alexis  de  Tocqueville  (Paris,  1910),  p.  500. 

s.  P.  6 


82  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Constantinople,  but  on  Buda.  Immediately  before 
the  occupation,  Lord  Bloomfield  had  written  to  him 
that  the  attention  of  the  Russian  Government  was 
"more  particularly  directed  to  Hungary  and  Croatia, 
and  to  the  proceedings  of  the  Slavonic  tribes  at 
Carlowitz^."  That  Palmerston  took  the  same  view 
was  manifest  already  before  the  end  of  1848: 

"There  are  some  who  imagine,"  he  wrote,  "that  the 
advance  of  that  force  into  those  provinces  is  not  wholly 
unconnected  with  the  events  which  have  been  passing 
in  Hungary,  and  that  the  Emperor  has  contemplated  the 
possibiUty  of  his  being  asked  by  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment to  assist  in  restoring  order  at  Pest  2." 

Three  days  afterwards,  he  repeated  the  same  idea; 
in  the  latter  despatch  he  asserts  that  a  lengthy 
occupation  of  the  Principahties  was  not  to  be  ex- 
pected, for  the  Austrian  Government  had  just  been 
successful  at  Vienna,  and  therefore  had  nothing 
serious  to  apprehend  either  from  the  revolt  at  home 
or  from  the  "civil  dissensions"  in  Hungary 2. 

At  the  end  of  January,  the  intention  of  the  Russian 
General  Liiders  to  use  Wallachia  as  a  stepping-stone 
from  Russia  to  Transylvania  was  known  to  Canning; 
and  in  February  that  intention  was  carried  out. 

"It  seems  evident,"  wrote  Palmerston  on  April  6th, 
"that  the  occupation  of  the  Principalities  by  Russian 
troops,  and  the  progressive  increase  in  the  number  of 
those  troops,   are  measures  which  have  been   adopted 

1  Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  June  6th,  1848. 

2  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Nov.  7th,  1848. 
•  Palmerston  to  Cannmg,  Nov.  loth,  1848. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  83 

nearly  as  much  with  the  view  of  enabling  Russia  to  afford 
military  assistance  to  Austria  in  Hungary  and  Tran- 
sylvania, as  with  reference  to  events  which  have  happened 
in  the  Principalities  themselves ;  and  if  this  is  so  it  follows 
that  it  cannot  be  expected  that  the  Russians  should 
evacuate  the  Turkish  provinces  until  the  Civil  War  in 
Hungary  shall  have  been  brought  to  a  successful  termi- 
nation by  the  Austrians^." 

The  last  phrase  of  this  despatch  is  especially  note- 
worthy; it  implies  a  quiet  acquiescence  in  the  task 
which  the  Russians  had  set  for  themselves  in  the 
occupation  of  the  Principalities.  It  was,  doubtless, 
very  wrong  of  them  to  use  Turkish  territory  for  such 
purposes;  but  Palmerston  would  have  been  the  last 
to  object  to  anything,  even  from  St  Petersburg, 
tending  to  restore  to  the  Viennese  Government  the 
revolted  eastern  half  of  its  lands.  He  wrote  again, 
a  month  later: 

I  always  thought  that  one  of  the  main  motives  for  the 
Russian  occupation  of  the  Danube  provinces  was  a  desire 
to  be  ready  to  assist  Austria  in  Hungary  in  case  of  need, 
and  this  seems  now  to  have  been  the  case.  How  far  it 
may  be  wise  for  Austria,  or  how  far  it  may  answer  her 
ends  in  the  long  run,  thus  to  have  recourse  to  a  Russian 
army  to  coerce  her  own  subjects,  time  will  show:  but 
certainly  one  should  think  that  she  would  have  done 
better  to  have  tried  all  means  of  conciliation  before  she 
had  recourse  to  such  foreign  aid.  It  is  possible,  too,  that 
Russia  may  not  find  her  account  in  this  intervention  to 
the  extent  that  she  imagines ;  and,  when  so  many  of  her 
troops  are  gone  abroad,  she  may  find  work  start  up  for 
them  at  home.  However,  we  do  not  mean  to  meddle  with 

1  Palmerston  to  Canning,  April  6th,  1849. 

6 — 2 


84  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

the  matter  in  the  way  of  protest,  or  in  any  other  manner. 
We  of  course  attach  great  importance  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  Austrian  Empire  as  an  essential  element,  and  a 
most  valuable  one,  in  the  balance  of  power,  and  we  should 
deeply  regret  anything  which  should  cripple  Austria  or 
impair  her  future  independence^. 

Nor  did  Palmerston  greatly  fear  the  permanent 
acquiescence  of  Austria  in  Russian  preponderance 
on  the  Lower  Danube.  On  March  20th  he  wrote  on 
the  subject  to  Ponsonby: 

1  have  to  instruct  Your  Excellency  to  take  an  oppor- 
tunity of  drawing  the  attention  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment to  the  proof  which  the  recent  entrance  of  Russian 
troops  from  Wallachia  into  Transylvania  has  afforded  of 
the  great  importance  which  would  attach  to  the  Danube 
Principalities,  if  in  the  possession  of  Russia,  as  strategic 
points  from  whence  the  Austrian  Empire  might  be 
threatened  and  attacked.  The  Austrian  Government  may 
at  the  present  moment  think  only  of  the  advantages 
which  it  has  derived  from  the  entrance  of  a  friendly 
military  force  into  an  Austrian  Province  which  is  in  a 
state  of  revolt,  but  the  Austrian  Government  is  too 
sagacious  not  to  look  further  into  futurity,  and  not  to 
see  that  if  a  strong  Power  like  Russia  was  to  be  in  posses- 
sion of  the  Principalities,  instead  of  their  being  held  by  a 
weak  Power  like  Turkey,  the  security  of  the  Austrian 
Empire  from  attack  on  its  eastern  frontier  would  be  very 
sensibly  diminished^. 

From  the  time  of  the  first  Russian  incursion  into 
Transylvania  the  question  of  the  violation  of  Turkish 

^  Palmerston  to  Canning,  May  7th,  1849,  quoted  in  Lane- 
Poole,  vol.  II.  pp.  i88-g. 

2  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  March  20th,  1849. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  85 

neutrality  by  the  belligerents  became  of  increasing 
importance.  Already  on  February  14th,  Sir  Stratford 
Canning  had  written  that  the  Porte  had  been 

called  upon  to  take  a  decision  with  respect  to  any 
Hungarians  or  other  Austrian  subjects  who,  in  the  course 
of  their  miUtary  operations  in  Transylvania  may,  from 
choice  or  necessity,  cross  the  frontier  into  Moldavia  or 

Wallachia The  imperial  troops  are  to  be  received  as 

friends,  the  Hungarians  and  other  subjects  in  revolt  to 
be  disarmed,  and,  without  being  given  up,  to  be  pre- 
vented from  doing  further  injury  to  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment^. 

From  that  time  to  the  very  end,  Palmerston  sent 
despatch  after  despatch^  to  Constantinople,  coun- 
selling the  strictest  neutrahty  (or  approving  of 
Canning's  admonitions  to  that  effect),  and  the  avoid- 
ance of  anything  which  might  lead  to  war  between 
Turkey  and  her  two  powerful  neighbours:  it  would 
never  do  to  have  a  war  in  the  Near  East  with  Austria 
and  Russia  fighting  under  the  same  flag.  That  was 
why  he  and  Sir  Stratford  constantly  warned  the 
Porte  not  to  increase  the  number  of  Turkish  troops 
in  the  PrincipaHties,  but  to  have  the  bulk  in  reserve 
in  Bulgaria;  for  the  relations  between  the  Russian 
and  Turkish  armies  of  occupation  were  exceedingly 
delicate,  and  a  general  war  might  easily  result  from 
a  skirmish  between  outposts. 

1  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  14th,  1848,  Correspondence, 
No.  121. 

2  Palmerston  to  Canning:  March  20th.  June  26th,  July  2nd, 
July  7th,  July  26th,  Aug.  27tli.  All  of  these  are  to  be  found 
in  the  Bluebook. 


86  PALME  RSTON  AND  THE 

"The  abstinent  course,"  he  writes,  as  a  diplomatist 
and  not  as  a  declaimer,  "is  the  more  particularly  prudent, 
because,  while  the  sympathies  of  the  Porte  must  obviously 
'  be  on  the  side  of  the  Hungarians,  the  chances  of  success 
{are  in  favour  of  the  Imperialists;  and  there  would  be 
reason  to  fear  that  any  expression  of  the  sentiments  of  the 
Turkish  Government,  while  it  would  have  no  effect  in 
turning  the  balance  between  the  contending  parties, 
would  involve  the  Porte  in  after-dif&culties,  if  the  contest 
should  lead  to  the  result  which  there  seems  reason  to 
anticipate  1." 

Palmerston  in  Downing  Street  had  an  easier  task 
than  Sir  Stratford  Canning  at  Therapia.  On  the  one 
hand  there  was  always  the  danger  that  the  Divan 
would  be  frightened  by  the  Russian  agents  into 
compliance  with  demands  which  must  have  made 
Turkey  an  active  participant  in  the  warfare  in 
Hungary.  The  Russian  diplomatists  at  Constanti- 
nople were  only  less  clever  than  Canning  himself, 
and  their  logic  had  a  perpetual  tendency  to  savour  of 
the  camp  rather  than  of  the  schools.  If  this  was  true 
of  Titoff,  the  Russian  minister  at  the  Porte,  it  was 
V  still  more  so  of  General  Grabbe,  aide-de-camp  of  the 
1  Czar,  who  arrived,  in  April  1849,  ^^  the  special 
mission  of  bullying  the  Turkish  ministers  until  they 
should  grant  all  that  his  imperial  master  demanded 
]f  with  respect  to  the  Principahties.  It  was  an  open 
secret,    also,    that    Russian    intrigue    and    Russian 


*  Palmerston  to  Canning,  July  26th,  1849.  The  despatch, 
in  a  mutilated  form,  is  given  in  the  Bluebook  (No.  244);  but 
not  one  word  of  the  extract  given  above  is  there  printed. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  87 

roubles  were  at  work  night  and  day  striving  to  turn  ' 
out  of  office  the  two  most  powerful  and  most  Liberal 
of  the  Sultan's  advisers,  Reshid  Pasha,  the  Grand 
Vizier,  and  Aali  Pasha,  the  Foreign  Secretary.  The 
Sultan  himself  was  a  Liberal,  and  ever  incHned  to  lend  / 
a  friendly  ear  to  the  words  of  the  English  minister. 
But  he  was,  at  the  same  time,  the  weakest  of  •' 
monarchs.  A  large  Russian  army  was  already  within 
his  frontiers,  while  England  was  distant  by  the 
whole  breadth  of  a  continent ;  and  Canning,  through- 
out the  summer  of  1849,  received  no  word  from 
Palmerston  enabhng  him  to  promise  Turkey  the 
material  support  of  England  in  the  event  of  a  definite 
rupture  between  Russia  and  the  Porte.  The  outcome 
of  this  was  that,  when  the  question  of  the  PrincipaHties 
was  settled,  Russia,  in  spite  of  some  slight  conces- 
sions, carried  most  of  her  points^.  Canning  was 
bitterly  disappointed,  and  his  despatches  for  once 
sound  a  note  of  despair.  Palmerston,  on  the  contrary, 
was  singularly  unmoved.  He  wrote  to  Constanti- 
nople, praising  Canning  for  the  amount  he  had 
accomphshed  with  the  "Hmited  diplomatic  means" 
at  his  disposal,  and  fully  recognised  the  objectionable 
points  in  the  Acte  agreed  upon  by  Russia  and  Turkey. 
Had  the  British  Government  advised  the  Porte  to 
refuse  all  the  Russian  demands,  and  promised  to  bear 
it  "harmless  through  its  refusal,"  the  Porte  would 
doubtless  have  made  good  its  stand  against  those 
demands.  "But  many  circumstances  and  various 
considerations  interfered  to  prevent  Her  Majesty's 
1  Canning  to  Palmerston,  April  28th,  1849. 


88  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Government  from  taking  such  a  course^."  Unques- 
tionably, one  of  the  chief  of  those  various  considera- 
tions was  the  desire  to  see  the  Hungarians  restored 
to  their  proper  allegiance. 

;  On  the  other  hand,  during  the  spring  and  summer 
of  1849  there  was  always  the  danger  that  Russian 
insolence  would  outstrip  itself,  and  drive  the  Turks 

(\  into  the  arms  of  the  Hungarians.  Practically  the 
whole  population  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  Christians 
as  well  as  Mahometans,  were  ardently  pro-Magyar. 
Certainly,  the  two  great  Pashas,  Reshid  and  Aali 
(the  latter  especially),  were  frankly  on  that  side;  as 
was  also  the  Sultan,  when  not  immediately  under 
the  influence  or  fear  of  the  Russian  agents.  This 
sympathy  of  the  Turks  for  the  Hungarians  had,  of 

.;  course,  a  large  admixture  of  egoism  in  it.  A  consti- 
tutional and  independent  Hungary  (which  perhaps 
meant  also  a  constitutional  and  independent  Poland) 
the  chief  maxim  of  whose  foreign  policy  would  be 
resistance  to  Russian  aggrandisement  towards  the 
south-west,  was  a  decidedly  more  desirable  neighbour 
than  that  Austrian  Empire  which  seemed  destined 
to  be  henceforth  the  helpmeet  of  Russia,  and  the 
agent  of  which  at  Constantinople,  Baron  Stiirmer, 
was  simply  the  alter  ego  of  Titoff^. 

Kossuth  had,  from  the  very  first,  recognised  the 

*  Palmerston  to  Canning,  June  ist,  1849. 

*  Canning  lo  Palmerston,  July  5th,  1849.  See  also  Teleki's 
letters  to  Pulszky  at  the  end  of  the  second  volume  of  the 
latter's  autobiography;  and  Rosen,  Geschichte  der  Turkei  vom 
Siege  der  Reform  im  Jahre  1826  bis  zum  Pariser  Traktat  1856, 
vol.  II.  p.  112,  quoted  in  Alter,  p.  126. 


f 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  89 

importance  of  Turkey  as  a  potential  ally  of  the 
Hungarians.  The  goodwill  of  the  Porte  it  was  all  the 
more  necessary  to  obtain,  since  Kossuth,  no  less  than 
Palmerston,  perceived  what  was  the  chief  aim  of  the 
Russian  occupation  of  the  Danubian  Principalities. 
So  early  as  July  15th,  1848,  Count  Fedor  Karacsay 
had  received  instructions  for  a  mission  to  the  Pasha 
of  Belgrade,  the  Government  of  Servia,  the  Governor 
of  Bosnia,  and,  if  need  be,  to  the  Porte  itself.  Whether 
the  mission  was  ever  carried  out  or  not  is  very 
doubtful^.   At  all  events,  after  the  Russian  incursion 

^  Eduard  von  Wertheimer,  Graf  Julius  Andrdssy,  sein  Lehen 
und  seine  Zeit  (3  vols.,  Stuttgart,  1910-13),  vol.  i.  pp.  20 
et  seq.  The  above  sketch  of  Hungarian  diplomacy  at  the 
Porte  rests  mainly  on  the  second  chapter  of  this  work.  Alter 
(pp.  127-8)  says  that  Karacsay's  mission  was  accomplished: 
"Karacsay  did  not  reach  Constantinople  till  the  end  of  Sep- 
tember in  order  to  present  himself  to  Reshid  Pasha  as  the  envoy 
of  Hungary.  But  it  was  not  to  be  his  fate  to  achieve  any  success. 
England,  whose  ambassador,  Sir  Stratford  Canning  exercised 
a  preponderant  influence  over  the  Porte,  was  in  this  year 
anxiously  intent  upon  keeping  the  East  free  from  any  contact 
with  the  Revolution,  and  had  to  regard  it  as  her  chief  task  to 
restrain  the  Grand  Vizier,  who  was  far  too  much  under  the 
influence  of  the  Polish  Emigrants,  from  rash  steps  which 
might  easily  be  followed  by  the  most  dif&cult  complications. 
In  these  circumstances,  it  may  be  conjectured  that  Sir  Stratford 
Canning  played  the  protector  of  the  'wild  diplomacy'  at 
Constantinople  chiefly  with  the  view  of  keeping  in  close  touch 
with  the  Hungarians  in  especial,  in  order  to  be  precisely  in- 
formed as  to  their  plans,  and  to  be  able  to  intervene,  should 
Reshid  Pasha  appear  ready  to  give  way  to  their  insinuations. 
Count  Karacsay,  to  whom  at  first  Reshid  Pasha  had  shown 
himself  very  well  intentioned,  soon  found  himself  restricted 
to  the  role  of  a  'postmaster'  of  the  Hungarian  Government; 
he  was  not  able  to  maintain  the  official  relations  with  Reshid 
Pasha,  notwithstanding  the  undiminished  friendliness  to  the 
Hungarians  maintained  by  the  latter.    Karacsay  had  thence- 


90  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

into  Transylvania,  either  towards  the  end  of  March 
or  the  beginning  of  April,  1849,  Baron  Ludwig 
Splenyi  was  sent  as  ambassador  to  the  Porte^.  He 
had  before  this  been  ambassador  at  Turin ;  but,  after 
Custozza,  his  continued  stay  in  that  capital  was  use- 
less, and  fraught  with  danger  both  for  himself  and 
for  the  monarch  to  whom  he  was  accredited.  He 
perceived  that  Sir  Stratford  Canning's  sympathies 
were  with  the  Hungarians,  and  counselled  Kossuth 
to  win  over  Palmerston  through  the  Enghsh  ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople.  With  him  was  associated  a 
Major  Browne^.    In  the  course  of  April,  the  young 

forth  no  other  task  than  that  of  negotiating  the  epistolary 
correspondence  bet\\'een  the  Hungarian  Government  and 
foreign  countries  which  had  to  be  carried  on  via  Constantinople, 
and  even  to  this  modest  activity  the  first  march  of  the 
Russians  into  Transylvania  in  February,  1849,  put  an  end. 
Thanks  to  the  retarding  influence  of  Sir  Stratford  Canning, 
the  friendliness  of  the  Porte  towards  Hungary  did  not  go  so 
far  as  to  involve  England  in  any  difficulties  with  Russia  on 
behalf  of  Hungary,  while  Russia,  by  the  helpful  intervention 
in  favour  of  tlie  Corps  Pucher,  openly  placed  herself  on  the 
side  of  Austria.  Only  a  single  d^y  after  the  news  of  the  entry 
of  the  Russians  into  Transylvania  Karacsay  was  advised  by  the 
Porte  to  make  himself  scarce."  Alter's  sole  authorities  are  three 
despatches  of  Canning  to  Palmerston,  and  one  of  Palmerston 
to  Canning.  None  of  these  despatches  is  to  be  found  either 
in  the  Bluebook  or  the  F.  O.  records  in  Chancery  Lane. 

^  Reiner,  in  his  articles  on  "Hungarian  Diplomacy  at  Con- 
stantinople "  in  the  NeueFreie  Presse  (Feb.  21st,  22nd  and  26th, 
1890),  speaks  of  Spl6nyi  as  Palmerston's  agent.  This  is  of 
course  absurd.   Wertheimer  notes  the  mistake. 

2  Canning  announced  Major  Browne's  arrival  to  Palmerston 
on  May  19th,  1849.  In  a  postscript  added  to  that  despatch  on 
May  25th,  he  stated  that  the  Major  was  to  have  an  interview 
with  some  one  appointed  by  the  Porte  to  see  him.  At  the  same 
time,  the  arrival  of  Spl6nyi  as  Browne's  secretary  was  an- 
nounced. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  91 

Count  Julius  Andrassy  was  named  ambassador  to 
the  Sultan.  The  journey  from  Hungary  to  Constanti- 
nople was  a  long  and  dangerous  affair  for  a  Hun- 
garian agent  in  the  early  summer  of  1849,  and  the 
Count  did  not  reach  his  destination  until  towards  the 
end  of  June.  Although  the  Hungarians  in  Constanti- 
nople observed  the  greatest  secrecy,  the  Austrian 
and  Russian  diplomats  in  that  city  knew  of  their 
activities^,  and  of  course  directed  the  Porte  to  break 
off  all  intercourse  with  such  "  agitators,"  and,  indeed, 
to  expel  them  beyond  the  Turkish  frontiers.  The 
Turks,  as  usual,  sought  to  navigate  between  Scylla 
and  Charybdis. 

"Influenced  alike  by  their  interests  and  their  fears," 
wrote  Canning,  "  the  Turkish  ministers  continue  to  steer  \ 
a  middle  course,  as  well  as  they  can.  They  have  engaged  f 
Baron  Splenyi,  a  Hungarian  agent,  to  withdraw,  at  the 
requisition  of  the  Russian  and  Austrian  legations,  and 
they  have  consented  with  reluctance  to  announce  publicly 
his  departure,  as  an  act  of  expulsion  from  the  country, 
though   in   reality   he   was   neither   ordered   away   nor 
allowed  to  go  without  marks  of  sympathy  from  the  Porte. 
Two  other  knowing,  though  unrecognised,  agents  from\ 
the  Hungarian  Government — a  Major  Browne  and  Count 
Andrassy — are  allowed  to  remain  here  and  to  communi-  [ 
cate  secretly  with  persons  in  the  employment  of  the 
Porte.    If  I  am  rightly  informed,  even  the  purchase  of 
firearms  for  exportation  to  Hungary  is  not  interdicted, 

1  Sturmer  announced  Andrassy's  arrival  in  a  despatch  to 
Schwarzenberg,  dated  July  4th,  Wertheimer,  loc.  cit.  The  Hun- 
garian told  the  Porte  in  so  many  words  that  he  would  not 
accede  to  a  request  for  his  departure,  especially  if  it  emanated 
from  the  Austrian  Internuncio. 


92  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

and  the  means  of  conveying  them  to  that  country  are 
already  provided  by  merchants  engaged  in  trading  to 
the  Danubei." 

Andrassy,  no  less  than  Splenyi,  knew  that  Canning 
was  friendly  to  the  Hungarians,  and  accordingly 
called  upon  him;  but  the  ambassador,  though 
receiving  Andrassy  and  his  companions  with  civility, 
told  them  that  he  could  not  hold  any  intercourse 
with  them  except  as  private  individuals  2.  To  have 
deahngs  with  the  Hungarians  at  Constantinople  was 
indeed  to  play  with  fire,  for  Andrassy's  object  was  to 
bring  about  a  colhsion  between  the  Turkish  and 
Russian  troops  in  the  Principahties,  and  so  to  precipi- 
tate that  general  European  conflict  from  behind  the 
smoke  of  which  the  Magyars  were  to  emerge  into 
freedom.  Whatever  Canning's  sentiments  on  the 
matter  might  have  been — and  he  would  most 
assuredly  have  faced  calmly  a  general  war  on  the 
question  of  the  Principahties — he  was  resolved 
loyalty  to  serve  his  chiefs.  Thus,  day  after  day  he 
offered  the  invariable  advice — Palmerston's  advice — 
to  his  Turkish  friends :  preserve  your  neutrahty .  In 
Hungary  itself,  this  advice  from  England  was  seen 

1  Canning  to  Palmerston,  July  5th,  1849. 

"^  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  4th,  1849. 

'  As  already  mentioned,  Kasimir  Batthydnyi  believed  that 
the  plan  of  a  Balkan  Confederation  which  should  include 
Hungary  in  a  subordinate  position  was  Canning's.  This  is  not 
at  all  improbable;  but  there  is  nothing  on  the  subject  in  his 
official  despatches  to  Palmerston,  or  in  the  private  letters 
preserved  at  the  Public  Kecord  Office.  What  he  thought  about 
the  reduction  of  Hungary  by  Russian  arms  is  seen  in  a  despatch 
of  his,  dated  Aug.  23th,  1849. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  93 

to  mean,  in  fact,  that  the  Russians  might  continue 
to  use  the  Principahties  as  the  stepping-stone  to 
Transylvania,  while  the  Hungarians  could  hope  for 
nothing  from  the  Balkans.  Is  it  true,  wrote  Kasimir 
Batthyanyi  to  Pulszky,  that,  although  Canning  him- 
self is  favourable  to  us,  he  has  received  despatches  , 
from  home  not  favourable  to  Hungary^?  It  was  true;  * 
but  those  despatches  contained  outwardly  no  single 
word  which  could  be  characterised  as  inimical  to  the 
Magyar  cause. 

Canning,  however,  was  able  to  render  one  not 
inconsiderable  service  to  his  friends.  By  sea,  the 
Austrians  were,  practically,  powerless;  and  this,  in 
view  of  the  close  relations  which  existed  between 
Turin  and  Pest,  meant  that  the  Adriatic  was  Hable 
to  be  used  as  a  highway  of  revolution.  In  February 
1849,  therefore,  two  Austrian  officers  arrived  at 
Constantinople  for  the  purchase  of  vessels  of  war 
from  the  Sultan,  who,  in  his  desire  to  placate  his 
neighbours  of  Vienna  and  St  Petersburg,  showed 
himself  at  first  not  unfavourable  to  their  proposal — 
and  even  entertained  the  idea  of  a  gift  of  several 
vessels  from  the  Egyptian  fleet.  The  negotiations 
were  carried  on  for  some  weeks;  but  ultimately 
the  emphatic  protests  of  the  English,  French  and 
Sardinian  representatives  were  successful,  and  the 
Austrians  relinquished  the  idea^. 

^  Teleki  to  Pulszky,  June  21st  and  July  14th,  1849. 

2  Series  of  despatches.  Canning  to  Palmerston,  from  Feb.  4th 
to  March  14th,  1849;  and  the  Note  of  the  Sardinian  Foreign 
Minister  De  Ferrari  to  the  French  and  English  Governments  (in 
a  despatch  of  Abercromby  to  Palmerston,  March  12th,  1849), 


94  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Palnierston's  speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons 
fully  bear  out  what  has  been  said  concerning  his 
policy,  and  the  illustrations  already  cited  from  his 
diplomatic  correspondence.  On  May  nth,  1849, 
Pulszky's  friend  Bernal  Osborne  asked  whether  the 
Cabinet  had  any  intention  of  offering  their  mediation 
"between  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  victorious 
people  of  Hungary"?  Palmerston  rephed  that  the 
Government "  had  taken  steps  to  offer  their  mediation 
between  Austria  and  Hungary,  and  the  Austrian 
Government  had  intimated  no  desire  for  such 
mediation^."  These  few  unvarnished  words  of 
response  made  it  painfully  clear  to  all  friends  of 
^Hungary  in  the  West,  that  even  after  the  Russian 
intervention  had  been  announced — Palmerston  had 
that  day  received  a  despatch  from  Vienna  on  the 
subject — the  pohcy  of  the  Government  would  be 
^ unchanged:  for  them  there  still  existed  no  "Govern- 
ment of  Hungary,"  and  they  would  not  arrogate  to 
themselves  any  right  of  interfering  in  what  was  plainly 
a  Viennese  family  affair.  But  the  friends  of  Hungary 
were  now  legion,  and  the  Russian  intervention  had 
created  a  profounder  stir  than  anything  that  had 

^  Hansard,  cv.  p.  326:  "  In  the  earlier  part  of  the  year  Lord 
Palmerston  had  vainly  attempted  to  mediate  between  the 
contending  parties  in  Hungary,  so  as  to  avert  the  Russian 
intervention."  Ashley,  vol.  11.  p.  104.  This  is  the  reverse  of 
true.  The  Radicals  in  the  country  murmured  that,  although 
the  Foreign  Secretary  might  with  truth  say  that  the  Austrians 
had  no  wish  for  his  mediation,  he  was  silent  about  the  Hun- 
garians, who  did  "earnestly  desire  such  mediation,  and  had 
been  coldly  repulsed."  See  the  pamphlet  of  the  indignant 
Washington  Wilks,  Palmerston  in  Three  Epochs  (London,  1854). 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  95 

happened  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  In  addition 
to  this,  the  journaHstic  campaign  of  Pulszky  and  his 
friends  was  beginning  to  tell  in  every  corner  of  the 
kingdom.    As  July  passed  away  and  the  Magyars 
still,  with  real  heroism  and  some  success,  contended 
against    the    Fieldmarshals    of    two    Empires,    the 
genuine   British   hatred   towards   the   unrepentant 
successors  of  the  Holy  Alhance,  indignation  at  the 
atrocities  daily  reported,  and  the  customary  sym- 
pathy with  the  little  battaUons,  asserted  themselves. 
Industrial  centres  without  a  grain  of  romance  in  them, 
fashionable  watering-places  and  remote  hamlets  in 
the  Highlands,  were  at  one  in  their  enthusiasm  for 
the  revolution  and  their  detestation  of  the  perjured 
Habsburgs.    Government  woke  up  and  found  the 
land  Magyar.    Palmerston's  popularity  was  gravely 
menaced,  and  the  only  Radical  who  had  ever  held  a 
Foreign  portfoHo  was  accused  of  covenanting  away 
the  Hberties  of  Europe  to  the  reactionaries  of  the 
Northern   Courts.     "Saul   did   not   stone   Stephen, 
but  Stephen's  murderers  laid  down  their  clothes  at 
Saul's  feet,"  wrote  one  correspondent  towards  the 
end  of  July.    That  Palmerston's  popularity  did  not 
suffer  more  was  due  to  the  readiness  of  the  pubHc  to 
believe  in  the  incorrigible  timidity  of  his  colleagues, 
and  the  insidious  manoeuvres  of  the  German  cama- 
rilla at  St.  James'.    "Rumour  says  that  you   are 
impeded  by  your  colleagues,"  continues  the  corre- 
spondent just  quoted.  "  Whether  or  not,  would  to  God 
that  we  had  a  Cabinet  that  represented  England!  " 
Another  correspondent  was  still  more  outspoken : 


96  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

When  this  Power,  incompetent  in  itself  to  perpetuate 
the  spirit  of  absolutism,  calls  on  its  remote  archetype 
for  help,  it  is  time  that  we  forego  our  German  sympathies 
and  cousinage,  and  resume,  with  the  memory  of  Lord 
Chatham,  that "  English  sentiment "  which  deprecated  the 
ruinous  practice  of  subsidizing  and  amalgamating  with 
foreigners  ^ 

And,  on  July  26th,  Lord  Beaumont  presented  in  the 
Upper  House  a  petition  from  the  City  of  London 
itself,  praying  for  the  immediate  recognition  of  the 
existence,  de  facto,  of  the  kingdom  of  Hungary,  for 
reasons  of  justice,  pohcy,  commerce  and  humanity 2. 
Palmerston,  hke  Henry  VIII,  kept  a  perpetual 
finger  on  the  pubHc  pulse,  and  took  his  measures 
according  to  the  registration.  His  speech  on  July  21st, 
in  the  full-dress  debate  on  the  Russian  intervention, 
is  in  reality  a  much  finer  piece  of  artistry  than  the 
more  celebrated  Civis  Romanus  speech  of  eleven 
months  later,  and,  since  its  aim  was  to  restore  the 
wavering  Liberals  to  their  allegiance,  it  was  equally 
successful ; 

"this  speech  made  him  in  a  few  days,"  said  Bunsen, 
"the  idol  of  the  Radicals  in  England,  and  the  most 
popular  and  most  powerful  Minister  in  Europe." 

"The  House,"  he  said,  "will  not  expect  me  to  follow 
those  who  have  spoken  to-day  by  endeavouring  to  pass 
judgment  either  way  between  the  Austrian  Government 
and  the  Hungarian  nation.  I  say  the  Hungarian  nation, 
because,  in  spite  of  what  has  fallen  from  the  noble  Lord, 
the  Member  for  Tyrone^,  I  do  believe  from  the  informa- 

^  Liverpool  Mercury,  July  24th,  1849. 

2  Hansard,  cvii.  p.  962. 

'  Lord  Claud  Hamilton,  who  had  just  sat  down. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  97 

tion  I  have  received — and  I  do  not  pretend  I  may  not 
be  mistaken — but  I  firmly  believe  that  in  this  war  between 
Austria  and  Hungary,  there  are  enlisted  on  the  side  of 
Hungary  the  hearts  and  the  souls  of  the  whole  people  of 
that  country.  I  believe  that  the  other  races  distinct 
from  the  Magyars  have  forgotten  the  former  feuds  that 
existed  between  them  and  the  Magyar  population,  and 
that  the  greater  portion  of  the  people  have  engaged  in 
what  they,  consider  a  great  national  contest. . .  . 

"  I  take  the  question  that  is  now  to  be  fought  for  on  the 
plains  of  Hungary  to  be  this — whether  Hungary  shall 
continue  to  maintain  its  separate  nationality  as  a  distinct 
kingdom,  and  with  a  constitution  of  its  own;  or  whether 
it  is  to  be  incorporated  more  or  less  in  the  aggregate 
constitution  that  is  to  be  given  to  the  Austrian  Empire? 
It  is  a  most  painful  sight  to  see  such  forces  as  are  now 
arrayed  against  Hungary  proceeding  to  a  war  fraught 
with  such  tremendous  consequences  on  a  question  that 
it  might  have  been  hoped  would  be  settled  peacefully. 
It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  Europe  that  Austria  ] 
should  remain  great  and  powerful ;  but  it  is  impossible  to 
disguise  from  ourselves  that,  if  the  war  is  to  be  fought 
out,  Austria  must  thereby  be  weakened ;  because,  on  the 
one  hand,  if  the  Hungarians  should  be  successful,  and 
their  success  should  end  in  the  entire  separation  of 
Hungary  from  Austria,  it  will  be  impossible  not  to  see 
that  this  will  be  such  a  dismemberment  of  the  Austrian 
Empire  as  will  prevent  Austria  from  continuing  to  occupy 
the  great  position  she  has  hitherto  held  among  European 
Powers.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  war  being  fought  out 
to  the  uttermost,  Hungary  should  by  superior  forces  be 
entirely  crushed,  Austria  in  that  battle  will  have  crushed 
her  own  right  arm.  Every  field  that  is  laid  waste,  is  an 
Austrian  resource  destroyed,  every  man  that  perishes 
upon  the  field  among  the  Hungarian  ranks,  is  an  Austrian 
soldier  deducted  from  the  defensive  forces  of  the  Empire. . . 

s.  P.  7 


qS  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

jj  "It  is,  I  say,  devoutly  to  be  wished  that  this  great 
/contest  may  be  brought  to  a  termination  by  some  amicable 
j  arrangement  between  the  contending  parties,  which  shall 
I  on  the  one  hand  satisfy  the  national  feeling  of  the  Hun- 
garians, and  on  the  other  hand  not  leave  to  Austria 
another  and  a  larger  Poland  within  her  Empire.  Her 
Majesty's  Government  have  not,  in  the  present  state  of 
the  matter,  thought  that  any  opportunity  has  a^  yet 
presented  itself  that  would  enable  them,  with  any  pros- 
pect of  advantage,  to  make  any  official  communication 
of  those  opinions  which  they  entertain  on  this  subject. 
I  say  official,  as  contradistinguished  from  opinions 
expressed  in  a  more  private  and  confidential  manner; 
but,  undoubtedly,  if  any  occasion  were  to  occur  that 
should  lead  them  to  think  the  expression  of  such  opinions 
would  tend  to  a  favourable  result,  it  would  be  the  duty  of 
the  Government  not  to  let  such  an  opportunity  pass  by^." 

He  had  said  kind  things  of  the  Hungarians,  and 
other  speakers  were  saying  kind  things  of  the 
Hungarians  and  bitter  things  of  the  Austrians  on  a 
hundred  platforms  up  and  down  the  country — but 
there  was  to  be  no  sHghtest  change  in  his  foreign 
pohcy.  He  could  truthfully  say  that  there  were  no 
official  papers,  because  there  had  been  no  protest  on 

1  Hansard,  cvii.  pp.  786-817.  Bernal  Osborne,  seconded 
by  Monckton  Milnes,  moved  that  copies  of  papers  respecting 
the  Russian  invasion  of  Hungary  and  of  "any  communications 
wliich  have  passed  involving  naval  or  military  aid  or  inter- 
ference on  the  part  of  this  country"  be  laid  before  the  House. 
The  portion  of  the  speech  dealing  with  the  importance  of 
Austria  to  the  Balance  of  Power  has  already  been  quoted. 
Palmerston  spoke  seventh  in  the  debate.  In  the  course  of  the 
speech  he  stated  that  there  were  no  official  papers  to  produce; 
in  consequence  of  which  Bernal  Osborne  finally  withdrew  his 
motion.  The  extracts  given  above  are  a  small  part  only  of 
the  speech,  and  not  the  best  part. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  99 

his  part  to  St  Petersburg,  and  because  he  would  not 
take  cognisance  of  the  Hungarian  offers  and  appeals. 
He  could  safely  promise  not  to  let  an  opportunity 
of  fruitful  mediation  pass  by,  because  he  knew  that 
the  time  for  fruitful  mediation  had  long  gone  by,' 
and  that,  probably,  before  a  despatch  could  reach 
Vienna  "free  and  independent"  Hungary  would  be 
matter  for  diplomatic  historians,  but  not  for  diplo- 
matists, to  wrangle  over.  On  August  ist  Parhament 
was  prorogued,  and  it  did  not  meet  again  until 
January  31st,  1850. 

It  has  been  asserted  in  various  quarters  that 
Palmerston  not  only  by  his  passive  attitude  through- 
out, but  on  one  occasion  at  least  actively,  proved 
himself  the  enemy  of  Hungarian  independence. 
According  to  this  view,  the  French  Cabinet  asked 
the  Foreign  Office  whether  they  intended  to  take 
diplomatic  steps  against  the  Russian  intervention; 
if  this  were  the  case,  and  such  steps  were  of  a  friendly 
nature,  "France  was  wilHng  to  associate  herself  with 
England.  To  this  question  the  French  Foreign 
Minister,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  received  the  reply  that 
England  for  the  present  did  not  feel  herself  called 
upon  to  adopt  any  sort  of  position  in  the  matter^. 

1  Alter,  p.  157.  His  authority  ("official  correspondence 
between  Palmerston  and  Lord  Normanby,  undated")  I  have 
not  been  able  to  discover.  Teleki  beUeved  the  statement. 
See  his  letter  to  Pulszky,  dated  June  30th,  1849.  Alter,  of 
course,  knew  the  contents  of  the  letter;  but  his  book  claims 
to  be  based  on  "new  authorities,"  and  he  therefore  documents 
this  portion  of  it  with  non-existent  official  despatches. 


1. 


loo  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

But  for  this  answer  of  Palmerston's,  we  are  told, 
Hungary  might  have  been  saved.  Such  an  assertion 
displays  woeful  ignorance  of  French  official  circles  in 
the  summer  months  of  1849.  ^^  Palmerston,  on  general 
grounds  of  good  statesmanship,  could  not  afford  to 
let  the  Magyars  wrest  their  ancient  freedom  from 
the  only  Government  which  had  bombarded  every 
important  city  in  its  dominions,  there  were  a  dozen 
immediate  and  special  reasons  why  Louis  Napoleon 
should  not  do  so.  In  his  heart  of  hearts,  he  wished 
to  roll  up  the  map  of  1815;  but  this  was  only  to 
be  done  with  the  consent  and  cooperation  of  the 
Northern  Courts.  The  Czar  must  be  made  to  see  that 
the  Parisians  had  definitely  done  with  barricades, 
and  would  henceforth  conduct  their  poHtics  after  a 
more  reasonable  fashion;  Schwarzenberg  must  be 
set  at  rest  respecting  the  imminent  expedition  to 
Civita  Vecchia.  Madame  de  Tocqueville  told  Teleki 
and  Pulszky  that  Louis  Napoleon  had  made  only  one 
condition  when  her  husband  took  over  the  Foreign 
portfolio  at  the  beginning  of  June:  he  was  not  to 
interfere  in  the  Roman  expedition  which  had  already 
set  out.  De  Tocqueville  remembered  the  condition. 
"  I  especially  kept  up  friendly  relations  with  Austria," 
he  writes,  "whose  concurrence  was  necessary  to  us 
in  the  Roman  business^."  During  the  autumn 
months,  the  French  agent  Persigny  was  at  work 
stealthily  among  the  German  Courts,  trying  to 
discover  how  these  would  receive  the  news  of  a 
coup  d'etat  beyond  the  Rhine  which  should  beget  an 

1  Recollections,  p.  355. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  loi 

Empire    that    was    Napoleonic    but    not   revolu- 
tionary ^. 

On  the  very  eve  of  the  Russian  invasion  of  Hun- 
gary, Nicholas  declared  that  he  would  recognise  the 
French  Repubhc^;  and  they  were  not  so  simple  at 
the  Quai  d'Orsay  as  to  beheve  that  this  was  a  piece 
of  sheer  imperial  benevolence.  De  Tocqueville's  in- 
structions to  Lamoriciere  at  St  Petersburg  on  that 
invasion  prove  the  contrary: 

1  need  not  tell  you  ^ith  what  keen  and  melancholy 
interest  we  follow  events  in  Hungary.  Unfortunately, 
for  the  present,  we  can  only  take  a  passive  part  in  this 
question.  The  letter  and  spirit  of  the  treaties  open  out 
to  us  no  right  of  intervention.  Besides,  our  distance  from 
the  seat  of  war  must  impose  upon  us,  in  the  present  state 
of  affairs  and  of  those  of  Europe,  a  certain  reserve.  Since 
we  are  not  able  to  speak  or  act  to  good  purpose,  it  is  due 
to  our  dignity  not  to  display,  in  respect  of  this  question, 
any  sterile  excitement  or  impotent  good  feeling.  Our 
duty  with  regard  to  Hungarian  events  is  to  limit  ourselves 
to  carefully  observing  what  happens,  and  seeking  to 
discover  what  is  likely  to  take  place  3. 

Even  the  optimist  Teleki,  who  had  once  imagined 
that  his  word  carried  weight  with  Tocqueville,  per- 
ceived at  last  that  reaction  reigned  in  Paris,  and  that! 
nothing  was  to  be  expected  from  the  French  Govern- 
ment.  His  avowed  readiness,  for  the  rest,  to  put  on 

^  Keller,  Le  General  de  Lamoriciere  (2  vols.,  Parte,  1880), 
vol.  II.  p.  221.  Persigny's  presence  was  also  known  to  the 
English  representatives  at  Vienna  and  St  Petersburg. 

2  Buchanan  to  Palmerston,  May  8th,  1849. 

*  De  Tocqueville  to  Lamoriciere,  undated.  Printed  in  Recol- 
lections, p.  359. 


I02  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

the  reddest  of  cockades  if  it  would  help  the  Hun- 
garian cause,  was  not  behaviour  adapted  to  win 
over  a  country  long  since  shamed  of  the  February 
journees. 

The  rumour  that  France  was  wiUing  to  save  the 
Hungarians  from  the  hordes  of  Russia  doubtless 
takes  its  origin  from  the  proceedings  in  the  French 
Chamber  on  May  12th.  On  that  date,  M.  Flocon 
interpellated  the  Government  on  their  intentions 
with  respect  to  the  Russian  intervention  in  Hungary. 
The  Chamber  was  in  a  democratic  mood,  and  very 
suspicious  of  the  reactionary  policy  of  the  President ; 
but  the  elections  were  at  hand,  and  its  days  were  •. 

numbered.  It  would  have  been  bad  statesmanship 
to  inflame  the  passions  of  the  Assembly  at  the  eleventh 
hour,  and  consequently  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  the 
Foreign  Minister,  made  an  untruthful  answer,  which 
was  prodigally  garnished  with  circumstantial  detail 
intended  to  give  verisimihtude  to  the  narrative : 

As  soon  as  the  French  Government  received  knowledge 
of  the  intention  which  the  Russian  Government  appeared 
to  have  of  intervening  in  the  affairs  of  Hungary,  it 
realised  the  gravity  of  such  a  step.  It  announced  at 
St  Petersburg,  Berhn,  Vienna  and  Lgndon  that  so  serious 
a  complication  could  not  pass  unnoticed,  and  that  it 
awakened  the  lively  sohcitude  of  the  French  Government.  f. 

France  is  setting  to  work  by  diplomacy  to  prevent  an  ? 

action  calculated,  I  repeat,  seriously  to  disturb  the  state 
of  affairs  in  the  Near  East,  in  Germany  and  in  every 
region  of  Europe. 

In  this  respect  the  Cabinet  has  done  all  that  a  prudent 
Government  should  do;  it  has  striven  to  hinder,  by  the 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  103 

way  of  diplomacy,  an  affair  which  appeared  to  it  very 
regrettable. 

You  ask  what  it  will  do;  it  will  persist  in  this  course  of 
action,  and  if  it  were  forced  to  have  recourse  to  measures 
other  than  those  which  it  has  employed  thus  far,  it 
would  consult  the  Assembly  concerning  its  new  resolu- 
tions. 

But  both  to  Normanby  and  Kisseleff,  the  English 
and  Russian  representatives  at  Paris,  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys  explained  away  the  last  paragraph^. 

On  May  22nd  and  23rd  the"  Cabinet  v/as  again 
attacked  on  its  poHcy  at  Rome  and  in  Hungary. 
Drouyn  repHed  that  he  had  already  mentioned  the 
Government's  representations  at  St  Petersburg, 
London,  Berlin  and  Vienna.  "  Si  Von  veut  autre  chose, 
si  Von  veut  la  guerre,  qu'on  en  apporte  la  proposition  a 
la  tribune  !"  Finally  an  order  of  the  day  was  passed, 
so  amended,  and  couched  in  such  general  terms,  that 
it  might  mean  anything.  The  Extreme  Left  asserted 
that  its  adoption  was  equivalent  to  giving  carte 
blanche  to  Russia;  the  English  Charge  d' Affaires,  on 
the  contrary,  wrote  to  Palmerston  that  it  was  a  nasty 
business,  and  smelt  of  powder  2.  Fortunately,  he 
added,  the  Assembly  was  dying,  and  the  elections 
were  already  being  held. 

How  much  importance  was  to  be  attached  to  what 
the  French  Minister  said,  and  repeated,  concerning 

1  Lord  Normanby  to  Palmerston,  May  13th  and  15th,  1849. 
Drouyn's  reply  is  translated  from  the  report  in  the  Moniteur 
of  Sunday,  May  15th. 

2  May  23rd,   1849.    See  also  Irdnyi  and  Chassin,  vol.  11. 

pp.  465-70- 


I04  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

the  representations  at  the  various  capitals,  is  best 
learnt  from  the  mouths  of  the  French  agents  abroad: 

"I  learn  from  the  French  Charge  d'Affaires,"  wrote 
Magenis  at  Vienna,  "  that  he  has  not  as  yet  received  any 
instructions  from  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  to  make  any 
representations  to  this  Government  on  the  subject  of  the 
Russian  intervention  in  Hungary.  M.  de  Lacour  appeared 
to  me  not  to  attach  much  importance  to  the  declaration 
of  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Chamber 
on  that  subject ^" 

Our  agent  at  St  Petersburg  was  still  more  explicit. 
So  far  as  he  knew,  the  only  despatch  which  had  been 
received  at  the  French  legation  there  was  one 
instructing  the  French  Charge  d'Affaires  to  make 
some  general  observations  "on  the  importance  of  the 
measure,  should  it  really  be  adopted  by  Russia." 
But  there  was 

nothing  in  the  communication  which  gave  it  the 
character  of  a  diplomatic  step;  and  indeed  M.  Seniavine 
— Count  Nesselrode  was  with  the  Czar  at  Warsaw  at  the 
time — has  since  remarked  to  me  that  M.  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys  would  have  been  much  embarrassed  if  he  had  been 
called  upon  by  the  Assembly  to  produce  the  communica- 
tions to  which  he  referred. 

It  does  not  appear  to  me  that  much  importance  was 
attached  here  to  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys'  answer  to  M. 
Flocon;  and  I  have  found  those  persons  with  whom  I 
have  spoken  on  the  subject  ready  to  accept  what  had 
passed  in  the  debate  on  the  expedition  to  Italy  as  a  good 
reason  for  the  French  Government  endeavouring  to  pre- 
vent, by  a  few  phrases,  a  discussion  on  the  Hungarian 

^  Magenis  to  Pahnerston,  May  22nd,  1849. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  105 

question  with  the  late  Assembly  on  the  eve  of  its  dis- 
solution; and,  had  the  matter  been  looked  at  more 
seriously  by  the  Emperor  and  Count  Nesselrode,  I  think 
we  should  have  heard  of  it  by  this  time^. 

At  Warsaw  Colonel  du  Plat  had  a  conversation  on 
the  subject  with  the  Russian  Chancellor  himself. 
The  Chancellor  declared  that  he  was  "much  aston- 
ished" at  the  statement  that  representations  had 
been  made  by  the  French  Government  against  the 
Russian  intervention  in  Hungary : 

"  I  know  nothing  about  it,"  he  added,  "  neither  directly 
nor  indirectly,  either  from  the  French  Charge  d'Affaires 
at  St  Petersburg,  or  from  the  Russian  Minister  at  Paris; 
and  I  am  not  aware  that  the  Austrian  Government  has 
received  any  such  representations^." 

The  new  Chamber,  apparently,  needed  less  manage- 
ment, and  Ministers  could  safely  adhere  to  the  truth. 
There  were  still  interpellations  whereby  Ledru-Rollin 
and  Teleki's  other  friends  tried  to  force  the  Govern- 
ment into  a  war;  but  nothing  came  of  it,  and,  when 
eighty-five  members  of  the  Mountain  signed  a  pro- 
position to  recognise  the  independence  and  nation- 
ality of  Hungary,  it  was  unanimously  rejected  by  the 
Commission  de  V initiative  parlementaire.  De  Tocque- 
ville,  the  new  Foreign  Minister,  was  politeness  itself 
when  Teleki  called  upon  him,  but  would  not,  of 
course,  do  anything^. 

^  Buchanan  to  Palmerston,  June  ist,  1849  (Confidential). 

2  Du  Plat  to  Palmerston,  June  15th,  1849. 

3  Teleki  to  Pulszky,  June  25th-26th,  July  8th,  Aug.  13th. 
Lord  Normanby  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  12th,  1849. 


io6  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

On  the  very  day  on  which  Parhament  was  pro- 
rogued, Palmerston  sent  off  two  despatches  to 
Ponsonby.  The  first  of  these,  written  with  character- 
istic care,  and  more  than  characteristically  didactic, 
contained  reflections  on  the  awful  character  of  a 
"conflict  between  an  entire  nation  and  the  armies  of 
two  great  empires,"  between  an  "organised  and 
well-equipped"  army  of  150,000  Hungarians  and 
the  Austrian  force,  "acknowledged  to  be  by  itself 
unable  to  make  head  against  the  Hungarians" — 
together  with  the  "whole  disposable  force  of  the 
Russian  Empire."  It  admitted  that  the  ImperiaHsts 
surely  must  be  the  victors  sooner  or  later,  but  ad- 
mitted, also,  the  remote  probabihty  of  the  Hungarian 
resistance  being  so  obstinate  and  so  prolonged,  that 
the  Austrians  might  ultimately  deem  it  better  pohcy 
to  grant  their  antagonists  peace  on  their  own  terms : 

•  In  such  a  case  the  separation  of  Hungary  from  the 
Austrian  Crown  would  so  weaken  the  Austrian  Empire 
as  an  element  in  the  balance  of  power,  as  to  produce  very 
unfortunate  effects  upon  the  general  interests  of  Europe ; 
and  for  that  reason,  as  well  as  from  the  sincere  and  long- 
standing regard  which  the  British  Government  and 
Nation  entertain  for  Austria,  such  a  dismemberment  of 
the  Austrian  Empire  would  be  regarded  by  Her  Majesty's 
Government  as  a  great  political  calamity. 

But,  admitting  the  inevitable  superiority  of  numbers, 
would  Austria  obtain  any  permanent  advantage 
from  an  ascendancy  obtained  and  continued  by  force? 
"The  discontent  of  the  heart  will  not  be  extinguished 
merely    because    the    hand    has    been    disarmed." 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  107 

Hungary  so  subdued  would  be  a  veritable  "political 
cancer,  corroding  the  vital  elements  of  that  empire's 
existence."    And  what  would  be  the  price  paid  to 
that    ally    "by    whose    gigantic    exertions    alone'" 
Austria  could  conquer?     The  British  Government 
had  a  right  to  enquire  whether  any  arrangements 
were  being  contemplated  at  variance  with  the  letter 
or  spirit  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna.   But  Great  Britain 
wished  earnestly  for  an  arrangement  between  the 
combatants,  made,  on  the  one  hand,  with  the  good- 
will  of   the   Hungarian   people,    and   calculated   to 
satisfy  their  national  feeHngs;  but  which  would,  on 
the  other  hand,  "maintain  unimpaired  the  bond  of 
union  which  has  so  long  connected  Hungary  with  the 
Austrian  Crown."    It  is  the  old  tale:  bitter  food  for 
Austrian  digestion,  but  no  independent  Hungary^. 

The  second  despatch  of  that  day  contained  an  offer 
of  mediation: 

If  Your  Excellency  should  at  any  time  see  a  disposition 
on  the  part  of  the  Austrian  Government  to  enter  into 
negotiations  with  the  Hungarians,  and  if  you  should  have 
reason  to  think  that  the  friendly  intervention  of  a  third 
party  might  in  any  respect  be  acceptable  to  the  Austrian 
Government,  as  removing  difficulties  of  any  kind.  Your 
Excellency  is  authorised  to  give  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment  to  understand  that  H.M.  Government  would  feel 
great  pleasure  in  attending  without  the  least  delay  to 
any  intimation  which  they  might  receive  of  the  wishes  of 
the  Austrian  Government  to  that  effect^. 

1  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Aug.  ist,  1849,  Correspondence, 
No.  254.   The  despatch  was  to  be  read  to  Schwarzenberg. 

2  Palmerston    to    Ponsonby,    same    date.    Correspondence, 


io8  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Palmerston  must  have  known  that,  so  late  in  the  day, 
such  an  offer  would  be  rejected,  even  if  the  Austrians 
and  Queen  Victoria  had  not  alread}^  had  enough  of 
his  mediation  in  Italy.  And,  indeed,  a  despatch  of 
Ponsonby's  was  already  on  its  way  to  England, 
stating  that  such  a  proceeding  could  but  raise 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  what  might  be  attempted 
hereafter^.  Schwarzenberg  refused  to  accept  a  copy 
of  the  first  of  the  two  despatches,  and  would  have 
nothing  to  say  to  the  offer  of  mediation : 

"I  was  well  prepared  for  the  reception  that  subject 
would  meet  with,"  wrote  Ponsonby,  "I  have  already 
told  Your  Lordship  that  I  thought  the  time  was  still 
to  come,  when  it  could  be  hoped  that  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment would  listen  to  it.  I  can  see  no  good,"  he  continues, 
angrily  but  logically,  "in  continuing  to  urge  on  this 
Government  things  which  it  is  determined  not  to  do,  for 
I  see  no  means  by  which  it  can  be  forced  to  change  its 
conduct." 

Ponsonby  was  constrained  to  leave  the  copy  on  the 
Minister's  table,  and  three  weeks  later  it  still  remained 
unread.  But  Schwarzenberg — a  "Palmerston  in 
white" — was  not  less  skilful  than  the  British  states- 
man in  composing  despatches  innocent  of  the 
daintier  diplomatic  amenities;  and  on  September  19th 
sent  a  reply  in  kind  to  Count  Colloredo,  the  Austrian 
Minister  in  London : 

No.  253;  see  also  Blackwellto  Lord  Eddisbury,  Oct.  5th,  1849. 
Ponsonby  had  told  Blackwell  that  he  had  received  instructions 
to  employ  the  latter  in  negotiations  with  the  Hungarians, 
if  the  Austrian  Ministers  were  willing. 

^  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  July  29th,  iS^g,  Correspondence, 
No.  259. 


^^ 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  109 

Events  have  taken  upon  themselves  to  reply  to  these 
communications  of  the  Principal  Secretary  of  State  of 
Her  Britannic  Majesty,  better  than  I  could  have  done. 
There  is  no  cause  for  surprise  if  the  results  to  which  the 
Hungarian  insurrection  has  led  are  different  from  those 
which  Lord  Palmerston  had  anticipated,  inasmuch  as, 
destitute  of  the  necessary  elements  on  which  he  could 
form  a  competent  opinion  on  this  matter,  he  was  reduced 
to  information  such  as  that  promulgated  in  England  by 
the  agents  of  the  Hungarian  insurrection,  whose  interest 
it  was  to  represent  the  events  of  which  their  country  was 
the  theatre  in  the  falsest  light,  and  to  give  the  colouring 
of  a  generous  and  heroic  impulse  to  an  attempt  which 
the  English  law  qualifies  as  high  treason,  and  which  it 
punishes  without  fail  with  death  or  transportation.  The 
world  is  agitated  by  a  spirit  of  general  subversion. 
England  herself  is  not  exempt  from  the  influence  of  this 
spirit;  witness  Canada,  the  Island  of  Cefalonia,  and 
finally,  unhappy  Ireland.  .But  wherever  revolt  breaks 
out  within  the  vast  limits  of  the  British  Empire,  the 
English  Government  always  knows  how  to  maintain  the 
authority  of  the  law,  were  it  even  at  the  price  of  torrents 
of  blood.  It  is  not  for  us  to  blame  her.  Wtiatever  may, 
moreover,  be  the  opinion  which  we  form  as  to  the  causes 
of  these  insurrectionary  movements,  as  well  as  of  the 
measures  of  repression  employed  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  order  to  stifle  them,  we  consider  it  our  duty  to 
abstain  from  expressing  that  opinion,  persuaded  as  we 
are  that  persons  are  apt  to  fall  into  gross  errors,  in  making 
themselves  judges  of  the  often  so  complicated  position 
of  foreign  countries.  By  this  conduct  we  consider  we 
have  acquired  the  right  to  expect  that  Lord  Palmerston 
will  practise  with  respect  to  us  a  perfect  reciprocity^. 

1  Schwarzenberg  to  Colloredo,  Sept.  26th,  1849,  Correspon- 
dence, No.  326.  Friedjung,  vol.  11.  part  i.  p.  136.  The  French 


V, 


no  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

On  August  22nd  the  telegraphic  report  of  Gorgei's 
surrender  reached  England,  and  six  days  later 
Palmerston  wrote  to  Vienna  expressing  satisfaction 
at  the  successful  termination  of  the  war: 

"The  eyes  of  all  Europe,"  he  continues,  in  his  loftiest 
moral  tone,  "will  of  course  now  be  directed  to  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Austrian  Government  in  a  matter  which 
has  excited  so  deep  and  general  an  interest;  and  H.M. 
Government  would  fail  in  the  performance  of  their  duty 
if  they  were  not  to  instruct  you  to  express  the  anxious 
hope  which  they  feel,  in  common  with  the  people  of  this 
\  country,  that  the  Austrian  Government  would  make  a 
;  generous  use  of  the  successes  which  it  has  obtained,  and 
/  that  in  the  arrangements  which  may  be  made  between 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  Hungarian  nation,  due 
regard  will  be  had  to  the  ancient  constitutional  rights  of 
Hungary.  A  settlement  founded  on  such  a  basis,  with 
such  improvements  as  the  altered  circumstances  of  the 
present  time  may  require,  will  be  the  best  security  not 
only  for  the  welfare  and  contentment  of  Hungary,  but 
also  for  the  future  strength  and  prosperity  of  the  Austrian 
Empire^" 

Government  was  prevailed  upon  by  Palmerston  to  express 
similar  sentiments  at  Vienna.  Palmerston  to  Normanby, 
Aug.  loth,  1849.  The  Canadian  Rebellion  was  a  source  of 
great  edification  to  the  Austrians  at  that  time.  "The  fire  in 
his  own  house  will  in  the  future  spoil  Lord  Firebrand's  game 
of  setting  in  flames  the  houses  of  his  neighbours.  The  policy 
of  the  English  Cabinet  has  been  such  as  to  oblige  Europe  to 
regard  as  a  piece  of  good  fortune  for  herself  any  evil  fortune 
which  may  befal  England."  Leading  Article  of  the  official 
Vienna  Lloyd  of  Aug.  nth. 

^  Palmerston  to  Ponsonb)',  Aug.  28th,  1840,  Correspondence, 
No.  301.  The  French  Government  made  similar  representa- 
tions, see  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Aug.  31st,  1849. 


t 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  in 

At  home,  meanwhile,  the  newspapers  were  flooded 
with  reports  of  the  savage  and  degrading  punishments 
which  the  conquerors  were  meting  out  to  the  con- 
quered. The  lost  Magyar  cause  was  gaining  converts 
by  thousands,  and  every  post  brought  Palmerston  a 
budget  of  memorials  praying  that  the  Queen  and 
Government  should  do  something  for  the  Hungarians.*, 
The  Foreign  Secretary  kept  pace  with  his  public,  and 
the  memorials  were  duly  despatched  to  Vienna — 
for  the  conversion  of  the  erring  Ponsonby,  apparently,'! 
since  it  could  scarcely  be  expected  that  Schwarzen-^ 
berg  would  read  and  profit  by  them.  The  Ambassador 
was  also  instructed  to  find  out  the  truth  about  the 
alleged  barbarities;  the  public  flogging  of  ladies,  the 
shooting  of  prisoners  in  cold  blood  and  the  hanging 
of  priests  for  the  mere  expression  of  political  opinions. 
His  replies  were  always  favourable  to  the  Austrians, 
and  usually  betrayed  both  exasperation  and  scorn 
at  Palmerston's  faith  in  mere  journaHsts^.  Such  of 
the  series  as  were  laid  before  the  Houses  of  Parliament 
were  drastically  mutilated  and  softened  down  before 
they  were  considered  m.eet  for  public  perusal.  The 
newspaper  reporters,  and  not  Ponsonb}^  won  the 
day  with  Palmerston,  as  the  following  letter  shows: 

The  Austrians  are  really  the  greatest  brutes  that  ever 
called  themselves  by  the  undeserved  name  of  civilised 
men.  Their  atrocities  in  Galicia,  in  Italy,  in  Hungary, 
in  Transylvania,  are  only  to  be  equalled  by  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  negro  race  in  Africa  and  Haiti.    Their 

^  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby,  Aug.  2nd,  Sept.  22nd,  Oct.  5th; 
Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Aug.  7th,  Oct.  2nd,  Oct.  30th. 


i, 


TI2  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

late  exploit  of  flogging  forty  odd  people,  including  two 
women  at  Milan,  some  of  the  victims  being  gentlemen, 
is  really  too  blackguard  and  disgusting  a  proceeding.  As 
to  working  upon  their  feelings  of  generosity  and  gentle- 
manlikeness,  that  is  out  of  the  question,  because  such 
feelings  exist  not  in  a  set  of  officials  who  have  been 
trained  up  in  the  school  of  Metternich,  and  the  men  in 
whose  minds  such  inborn  feelings  have  not  been  crushed 
by  Court  and  office  power,  have  been  studiously'  excluded 
from  public  affairs,  and  can  only  blush  in  private  for  the 
disgrace  which  such  things  throw  upon  their  countr^\ 
But  I  do  hope  that  you  will  not  fail  constantly  to  bear  in 
mind  the  country  and  the  Government  which  you  repre- 
sent, and  that  you  will  maintain  the  dignity  and  honour 
of  England  by  expressing  openly  and  decidedly  the  disgust 
which  such  proceedings  excite  in  the  public  mind  in  this 
country;  and  that  you  will  not  allow  the  Austrians  to 
imagine  that  the  public  opinion  of  England  is  to  be 
gathered  from  articles  put  into  the  Times  by  Austrian 
agents  in  London,  or  from  the  purchased  support  of  the 
Chronicle,  or  from  the  servile  language  of  Tory  lords  and 
ladies  in  London,  or  from  the  courtly  notions  of  royal 
dukes  and  duchesses. . .  .The  rulers  of  Austria  (I  call  them 
not  statesmen  or  stateswomen)  have  now  brought  their 
country  to  this  remarkable  condition,  that  the  Emperor 
holds  his  various  territories  at  the  goodwill  and  pleasure 
of  three  external  Powers.  He  holds  Italy  just  as  long  as, 
and  no  longer  than,  France  chooses  to  let  him  have  it. 
The  first  quarrel  between  Austria  and  France  will  drive 
the  Austrians  out  of  Lombardy  and  Venice.  He  holds 
Hungary  and  Galicia  just  as  long  as,  and  no  longer  than, 
Russia  chooses  to  let  him  have  them.  The  first  quarrel 
with  Russia  will  detach  those  countries  from  the  Austrian 
Crown.  He  holds  his  German  provinces  by  a  tenure 
dependent,  in  a  great  degree,  upon  feelings  and  opinions 


.  • 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  113 

which  it  will  be  very  difficult  for  him  and  his  ministers 
either  to  combine  or  to  stand  out  against.  The  remedy 
against  these  various  dangers,  which  are  rapidly  under- 
mining the  Austrian  Empire,  would  be  generous  con- 
cihation;  but,  instead  of  that,  the  Austrian  Government 
know  no  method  of  administration  but  what  consists 
in  flogging,  imprisoning  and  shooting.  "The  Austrians 
know  no  argument  but  force !  "^ 

During  the  course  of  the  war,  a  considerable 
number  of  Enghsh  subjects  incurred  the  wrath  of 
the  Austrian  Government  for  real  or  alleged  impHca- 
tion  with  the  Revolution.  The  woes  and  injuries  of  the 
itinerant  British  citizen  ever  roused  the  fighting  spirit 
in  Palmerston,  and  some  of  the  sharpest  words  that 
ever  passed  between  the  two  Governments  concerned 
themselves  only  indirectly  with  foreign  policy  pro- 
perly so-called.  Palmerston  and  Ponsonby  were  still 
bandying  words  with  each  other  about  the  mistakes 
of  English  journaHsts  and  the  misdeeds  of  Austrian 
officials,  when  there  occurred  an  event  so  serious 
that  their  correspondence  was  suddenly  diverted  into 
an  altogether  different  channel,  and  for  several  days 
it  seemed  not  improbable  that  there  would  soon  be 
no  longer  any  Enghsh  Ambassador  at  Vienna.  The  ' 
two  Imperial  Courts  had  demanded  the  extradition 
of  the  Hungarian  and  PoHsh  refugees  in  Turkey.         \ 

Within  a  few  days  of  Gorgei's  surrender,  about 
5000  Hungarians  and  Poles  had  sought  safety  by 
crossing  the  Danube  into  Turkish  territory.   Among 

1  Ashley,  vol.  11.  pp.  105-7.  Alter  speaks  as  though  this 
private  letter  had  been  an  official  despatch. 

s.  P.  8 


114  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Ithese  refugees  were  Kossuth,  five  Cabinet  Ministers,  * 
land  some  of  the  chief  leaders  of  the  late  Hungarian 
I  army.  Of  the  Poles,  the  chief  were  the  old  Napoleonic 
campaigner  Dembinski,  Bern,  most  brilHant  of  all 
,  Sarmatian  warriors,  Count  Ladislaus  Zamoyski,  who 
\had  acquired  French  nationality,  and  General  | 
[Wyzocki.  It  was  not  for  a  moment  to  be  hoped  that  * 
the  imperial  hunt  would  allow  much  of  the  most 
desirable  quarry  to  escape;  that  Austria  would 
relinquish  without  an  effort  the  man  "who  was  the 
Hungarian  Revolution";  or  that  the  Czar  would 
calmly  see  so  many  seeds  of  revolt  scattered  without 
let  or  hindrance  over  the  face  of  Europe.  Schwarzen- 
berg  and  Nesselrode  were  able  to  base  their  demands 
of  extradition  upon  certain  definite  treaty  stipula- 
tions; applying  to  Austrian  subjects  the  Treaties  of 
Belgrade  (Art.  xviii)  and  Passarowitz  (Art.  xiv), 
and  to  Russian  subjects  the  Treaty  of  Kainardji 
(Art.  ii).  The  friends  of  humanity  and  Turkish 
independence  were  quick  to  see  ttie  legal  flaws  in  the 
Austrian  and  Russian  demands;  for  the  Austrian 
treaties  make  no  mention  whatever  of  mutual  sur- 
render of  refugees,  while  the  treaty  with  Russia  left 
it  optional  for  each  party  either  to  deliver  up  refugees 
or  to  expel  them  from  its  territory^.    The  two  first-  ^ 

mentioned  treaties,  certainty,  imposed  the  obhgation 
of  punishing  "  sttjets  rcbelles  et  mecontcnts  "  upon  both 
contracting  parties.   The  meaning  and  extent  of  this  % 

^  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Oct.  6th,  1849,  Correspondence 
respecting  Refugees  from  Hungary  within  the  Turkish  Dominions 
(presented  to  both  Houses  of  Parliament  by  Command  of 
Her  Majesty.  Feb.  28th,  1851),  No.  18.  _^ 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  115 

stipulation  were  the  real  crux.  The  statesmen  of 
Turkey  and  the  Western  Powers  agreed  that  the  ^ 
clauses  in  question  applied  to  offenders  in  time  of 
peace,  but  contended  that  they  could  not  be  stretched 
to  include  a  whole  nation  become  fugitive  because  it 
had  been  fighting  for  its  constitutional  rights.  All 
the  chanceries,  however,  knew  perfectly  well  that 
the  clumsy  official  French  of  a  hundred  years  and 
m.ore  ago  would  not  decide  the  fate  of  Kossuth  and 
his  companions ;  this  would  be  decided  by  the  amount 
of  support  which  the  Sultan  could  expect  from  his 
distant  friends  at  London  and  Paris.  This,  again, 
would  depend  largely  on  the  opinions  entertained  by 
the  English  and  French  representatives  on  the  spot. 
Sir  Stratford  Canning  and  his  French  colleague — 
"Men  endoctrine  par  Sir  Stratford" — never  hesitated 
from  the  first;  for  them  it  was  not  a  question  of 
solving  the  grammatical  ambiguities  of  a  forgotten 
generation,  but  a  question  of  living  interests,  of  the 
maintenance  of  the  Balance  of  Power.  Enough  has 
already  been  said  of  what  Sir  Stratford  Canning 
thought  of  St  Petersburg  diplomacy,  and  of  the  goal 
of  that  diplomacy.  The  despatch  in  which  he  an- 
nounces the  demands  of  the  Russian  and  Austrian 
agents  for  extradition  of  the  whole  number  of 
refugees,  and  the  decision  of  the  Porte,  if  those 
demands  were  pressed  and  reiterated,  to  appeal 
ultimately  to  the  leading  Powers,  contains  also  his 
view  of  what  lay  behind  Vilagos : 

On  the  whole  it  is  but  reasonable  to  expect  that  the 
present  successes   will  be  used   to  promote  the  great  ] 

8—2 


ii6  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 


V 


)  objects  of  Russian  policy  throughout  the  East,  and  that 
endeavours  will  be  made  under  the  impressions  created 

f  by  victory  to  draw  the  Turkish  Government  into  a  more 
complete  subserviency  to  the  political  views  of  that 
Power.  How  far  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  may  be  disposed 
or  obliged  to  act  as  an  auxiliary  to  Russia  in  carrying 
out  these  views,  whether,  as  some  believe,  the  question 
of  extradition  has  been  raised  for  sinister  purposes,  and 
what  measures  of  intimidation  or  aggression  may  follow 
upon  the  Porte's  continued  refusal  to  give  up  the  refugees, 
the  course  of  events  will  best  serve  to  show.  But  I  should 
fail  in  my  duty  if  I  did  not  again  solicit  Your  Lordship's 
attention  pointedly  to  this  subject,  and  declare  my  con- 
viction that,  with  every  exertion  on  the  part  of  Her 
;  Majesty's  Government  and  Embassy,  it  will  henceforward 
be  more  difficult  than  ever  to  keep  the  Sultan  and  his 
Ministers  in  that  course  of  policy  which  they  have  lately 
pursued  with  tolerable  pretensions  to  steadiness  in  their 
way ;  and  further,  that,  without  stronger  guarantees  than 
any  I  have  heard  of  as  already  existing,  it  will  hardly  be  safe 
to  overlook  the  inducements  which,  naturally  enough  in 
the  present  state  of  Europe,  may  prevail  with  the  Russian 
Cabinet  to  bring  the  Porte  into  its  views  by  force,  if 
persuasion  fails,  even  in  defiance  of  public  opinion 
elsewhere^. 

It  has  already  been  said  also  that  Canning  regarded 
the  Russian  incursion  into  Hungary  as  a  milestone 
i  on  the  road  from  St  Petersburg  to  Constantinople; 
in  August  1849  that  milestone  was  safely  passed,  and 
the  next  along  the  route  was  the  affair  of  the  refugees. 
Here,  at  least,  the  Russians  should  find  a  check. 

*  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  3rd,  1849.   Refugees,  No.  3. 
But  the  whole  of  the  extract  given  above  is  there  omitted. 


* 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  117 

"Is  Kossuth's  skin  worth  a  European  war?"  asked 
de  Tocqueville,  when  he  heard  of  the  demand  for 
extradition.  "Perhaps  not,"  Canning  would  have 
repHed;  "but,  my  friend,  this  is  a  question,  not  of 
Kossuth's  skin,  but  of  the  balance  of  power. ' '  Already ; 
on  August  30th,  the  Council  of  the  Porte  decided 
that  they  could  not  without  dishonour  give  up  the 
refugees,  though  the  bitterness  of  refusal  was  to  be  ' 
softened  down  by  a  skilful  use  of  those  blandishments  ■ 
and  that  sweet  reasonableness  which  still  character- 
ises Ottoman  diplomacy  vis-a-vis  of  its  Christian 
neighbours.  And,  in  fact,  the  Turkish  reply  to 
Titoff's  note  contained  so  much  that  was  blandish- 
ment, and  so  little  that  was  refusal,  that  Canning,  to 
whom,  of  course,  it  was  shown  before  being  sent  off, 
amended  it  drastically^.  The  Sultan  undertook  to 
perform  all  that  could  be  claimed  on  the  score  of 
friendship  and  neighbourliness;  the  refugees  should 
be  removed  from  the  frontier  and  they  should  be 
prevented  from  hatching  plots  against  the  two 
Emperors  on  Turkish  soil.  Meanwhile,  in  Russia  the 
Government  had  divined  that  their  demands  might 
not  receive  that  immediate  and  unqualified  compli- 
ance which  they  desired — they  knew  Canning  of 
old — and  had  recourse  to  the  step  which  they  were 
wont  to  take  at  such  conjunctures.  They  sent  Prince 
Michael  Radzivil — himself  of  Pohsh  extraction,  and 
inspired  with  the  renegade's  zeal  against  his  former 

^  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  3rd,  1849.  "Most  Confiden- 
tial," and  of  course  not  printed  in  the  Whitebook  on  the 
Refugees. 


ii8  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

.  brethren — with  an  autograph  letter  from  the  Czar 
to  the  Sultan,  peremptorily  demanding  the  extra- 

[  dition  of  the  refugees.  When  the  letter  was  dehvered 
to  the  Sultan,  its  bearer  hinted  plainly  enough  that 
50,000  Russians  were  ready  to  march  into  Turkey 
at  a  word  from  the  Czar^.  The  letter  was  supple- 
mented by  Nesselrode's  equally  imperative  instruc- 
tions to  Titoff:  what  Russia  expected  froni  the 
Porte  was  not  a  thesis  in  false  philanthropy,  but  a 
categorical  "yes"  or  "no" !    The  future  relations  of 

!  the  two  empires  would,  Nesselrode  declared,  depend 
on  the  purport  of  this  answer.  As  though  this  were 
not  enough,  Titoff  and  Stiirmer  went  yet  a  step 
further,  and  declared  that  the  escape  of  a  single 
refugee  would  be  regarded  by  their  masters  as  a 
declaration  of  war. 

The  steamer  bearing  Radzivil  had  arrived  in  the 
Bosphorus  in  the  early  hours  of  September  4th,  and 
Canning,  on  hearing  of  the  Prince's  mission,  saw  at 
once  how  uncertain  the  future  was.  When  it  came 
to  a  real  trial  of  strength  between  Russia  and  the 
Porte,  the  latter  was  not  likely  to  hold  its  ground  for 
long.  Already  before  the  Czar's  letter  had  been 
handed  in,  the  Porte  had  shown  its  wilHngness  to 
yield  much  more  than  Canning  could  honestly 
counsel,  and  now  Radzivil's  advent  might  easily 
frustrate  all  his  endeavours  in  the  direction  of  honour 
and  independence.  The  despatch  announcing  the 
momentous  event  of  September  4th,  and  its  possible 

^  Andrdssy  to  Kossuth,  Sept.  nth,  1849,  in  Wcrtheimer, 
op.  cit,  p.  42. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  119 

consequences,  closes  on  the  old  note:  "The  resource 
of  an  appeal  to  Europe  may  sustain  its  courage  for 
the  present;  but  the  ultimate  issue  will  naturally 
depend  upon  the  prospect  of  support  from  England 
and  France^."  In  a  private  letter  to  Palmerston,  of 
the  same  date,  Canning  was  still  more  urgent:  "I 
hope  you  will  feel  yourself  at  hberty  to  support  us, 
and  that  speedily."  For  a  time,  everything  was 
doubtful,  and  then  the  Porte  took  a  step  character- 
istically Turkish:  on  September  loth  it  decided  to 
say  neither  "yes"  nor  "no,"  but  to  make  a  direct 
representation  to  the  Czar  at  Warsaw,  whose  heart 
might  perhaps  prove  not  to  be  adamant  like  that 
of  his  stewards,  while,  at  any  rate,  time  would  be 
gained.  Fuad  Effendi,  one  of  the  cleverest  of  Turkish 
diplomats,  and  persona  grata  at  St  Petersburg,  was 
entrusted  with  this  mission,  and  was  to  be  the  bearer 
of  the  Sultan's  autograph  reply  to  the  letter  brought 
by  Prince  Radzivil.  His  departure  took  place  in  the 
greatest  secrecy,  and  he  was  over  the  Russian  frontier 
before  Stiirmer  and  Titoff  knew  that  he  had  been 
selected  for  the  mission.  When  they  were  aware  of 
the  fact,  on  September  15th,  they  threatened  to 
suspend  diplomatic  relations  from  the  next  day, 
unless  they  received  a  categorical  and  satisfactory 
answer  to  their  demands.  Three  empires  were  on  the 

^  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  5th,  1849.  Refugees,  No,  5. 
(Extract  only.)  Many  of  the  omissions  in  the  Whitebook 
serve  to  hide  the  intimacy  of  Canning's  relations  with  Aali 
and  Reshid.  Not  a  note  was  sent,  not  a  Conference  held, 
during  the  crisis,  in  which,  or  at  which,  the  Turks  did  not 
write  or  say  what  Canning  told  them. 


120  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

brink  of  war;  but  Canning  was  firm  in  his  advice. 
He  was  emboldened  by  the  suspicion  that  Titoff  and 
the  Internuncio  were  acting  without  instructions. 

Nevertheless,  "it  is  at  all  events  manifest,"  he  wrote, 
"  that  the  demand  of  the  allied  Courts,  whatever  may  be 
its  real  motive,  or  eventual  hmitation,  is  too  seriously 
entertained  to  warrant  any  line  of  conduct  in  resistance 
to  it,  not  formed  in  contemplation  of  the  worst." 

In  face  of  the  new  danger  the  Council  was  again 

divided,  and  that  night  AaH,  the  Foreign  Minister, 

sent  Canning  and  General  Aupick  a  paper  containing 

half-a-dozen   questions.     The   independence   of   the 

Ottoman  Empire  depended  upon  the  answer  given 

I  to  the  fourth  of  those  questions.    If  Russia  were  to 

i  declare  war,  asked  Aali,  could  the  Porte  count  upon 

;  the   effective  cooperation — un   concours   efficace — of 

'  England  and  France?  "It  is  plainly  to  be  presumed," 

answered  Canning  and  Aupick,  "  that  the  two  Govern- 

.    ments. .  .would  not  leave  the  Porte  without  support, 

i,  should  it  be  necessary^."    Early  on  the  i6th,  the 

Sultan  got  the  answers,  and  Canning  was  able  to 

write  home  that  the  Porte  intended  to  adhere  to  its 

previous  intention  2.    On  the  next  day,  the  Austrian 

*  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  i6th,  1849,  Refugees,  No.  11. 

2  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  i6th,  1849,  Refugees,  No.  12; 
and  Edmond  Bapst,  L' Empereur  Nicholas  I"*'  et  la  dettxidme 
Republique  franfaise  {Psivis,  1898;  privately  printed),  pp.  87  flf. 
Bapst's  in  French,  and  Lane-Poole's  in  English,  Life  of  Strat- 
ford Canning,  vol.  ii,  are  the  only  two  accounts  of  the  Affair 
of  the  Refugees  which  can  be  trusted.  Alter  apparently  knew 
neither,  and  his  narrative  certainly  does  not  improve  upon 
them. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  121 

and  Russian  embassies  hauled  down  their  flags,  and 
Radzivil  sailed  northwards  with  his  purpose  un- 
accompHshed,  but  bearing  a  letter  which  contained 
what  was  neither  categorical  nor  satisfactory.  Can- 
ning had  triumphed  so  far;  but  the  drama  was  merely 
at  the  end  of  the  first  act. 

"  If  the  Porte  be  left  in  this  strait  to  its  own  resources," 
he  wrote,  "there  will  be  a  complete  and  perhaps  an 
unavoidable  breakdown  of  all  that  it  has  been  hitherto 
the  object  of  British  policy  to  maintain,  beyond  its 
ordinary  relations,  with  this  Empire  1." 

The  same  day  he  wrote  to  Vice-Admiral  Sir  William 
Parker,  Commander  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  I 
apprising  the  sailor  of  what  was  happening  at 
Constantinople,  and  requesting  that  "  a  part  at  least 
of  Her  Majesty's  Mediterranean  squadron  might  be 
available  for  any  purposes  of  demonstration  in  the 
Archipelago 2."  After  that,  there  was  nothing  to  do 
save  to  await  the  arrival  of  messengers  from  Downing 
Street,  and  encourage  the  Porte  to  hold  fast  to  the 
decision  it  had  so  courageously  taken.  On  October 
3rd  arrived  the  Odin  frigate,  with  despatches  from 
Parker,  who  intended  to  cruise  between  the  Ionian 
waters  and  Athens  until  he  should  hear  more  from 
the  Admiralty — for  he  too,  of  course,  was  acting 
without  instructions  from  home.  The  Turks  were 
much  gratified  by  the  news,  unofficial  though  it  was, 
and  Canning  must  have  been  not  a  little  cheered  at  so 

1  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Sept.  17th,  1849,  Refugees,  No.  13. 

2  Canning  to  Sir  William  Parker,  Sept.  17th,  1849,  Refugees, 
No.  14. 


122  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

slight  an  incident;  anything  which  gave  heart  to  the 
Turks  was  welcome  to  him  just  then.  It  was  about 
this  time  that  he  heard  of  the  attempt  to  convert 
the  refugees  at  Widdin  to  Islamism,  and  of  the  dis- 
satisfaction which  this  attempt  had  raised;  the  way 
of  honour  did  not  he  in  that  direction,  and  Canning 
told  the  Turkish  Ministers,  with  characteristic  can- 
dour, what  he  thought  about  it^. 

The  extremely  serious  nature  of  affairs  on  the 
Bosphorus,  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  and 
the  unceremonious  departure  of  Prince  Radzivil, 
were  known  in  London  in  the  closing  days  of  Sep- 
tember. ParHament  was  not  sitting,  and  most  people 
were  out  of  town  at  the  time.  Before  the  Cabinet 
had  an  opportunity  of  meeting,  Palmerston  person- 
ally decided  to  support  the  Sultan.  On  September 
-  29th,  he  wrote  a  private  letter  to  the  Ambassador  at 
Paris: 

I  received  yesterday  afternoon,  at  Brocket,  by  a  letter 
from  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  the  telegraphic  message  an- 
nouncing the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  by  the 
Austrian  and  Russian  Ministers  at  Constantinople.  I  am 
unable  at  present  to  send  you  anything  but  my  own 
opinion  of  the  matter.  I  am  much  inclined  to  think  that 
this  step  of  the  two  Imperialist  Ministers  is  only  an 
attempt  to  bully,  and  that,  if  it  fails,  as  it  seems  hitherto 
to  have  done,  it  will  be  disavowed  or  retracted  by  their 
Governments.  But  then  it  seems  to  me  that  the  only  way 

1  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  5th,  1849.  Art.  11  of  the 
Treaty  of  Kainardji  expressly  excepts  from  its  reach  "  ceux 
qui  dans  I'Empire  de  Russie  auront  embrassS  la  religion 
Chr&tienne,  et  dans  I'Empire  Ottoman  la  religion  Mahomitane." 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  123 

of  bringing  about  that  result  is  to  give  the  Sultan  the 
cordial  and  firm  support  of  England  and  France,  and 
to  let  the  two  Governments  of  Russia  and  Austria  see 
that  the  Turk  has  friends  who  will  back  him  and  defend 
him  in  time  of  need.  This  might  be  done,  first,  by  firm> 
though  friendly  representations  at  Vienna  and  St  Peters- 
burg, pointing  out  that  the  Sultan  is  not  bound  by  treaty 
to  do  what  has  been  required,  and  that,  not  being  so 
bound,  he  could  not  have  done  it  without  dishonour. 
Secondly,  we  might  order  our  respective  squadrons  in 
the  Mediterranean  to  take  post  at  the  Dardanelles,  and 
to  be  ready  to  go  up  to  Constantinople  if  invited  by  the 
Sultan,  either  to  defend  Constantinople  from  actual  or 
threatened  attack,  or  to  give  him  that  moral  support^ 
which  their  presence  in  the  Bosphorus  would  afford.  I 
feel  the  most  perfect  conviction  that  Austria  and  Russia 
would  not,  in  the  present  state  of  Germany,  Poland,  and 
Northern  Italy,  to  say  nothing  of  only  half-pacified 
Hungary,  venture  upon  a  rupture  with  England,  France 
and  Turkey  upon  such  a  question  as  this.  But  all  this 
is  only  my  own  personal  opinion,  and  I  cannot  answer 
for  the  Broadbrims  of  the  Cabinet;  therefore  do  not, 
before  you  hear  from  me  again,  commit  the  Government 
to  any  opinion  or  to  any  course  of  action^. 

Canning's  despatches  arrived  on  October  ist,  on 
which  day  also  Palmerston  received  from  Mehmed 
Pasha,  Turkish  Minister  at  St  James',  the  official 
request  of  the  Porte  for  moral  and  material  aid  from 
England  in  case  of  necessity^.  Within  twenty-four 
hours,  the  Cabinet  had  taken  its  decision  (we  hear 

^  Palmerston  to  Normanby,  Sept.  29th,  1849,  in  Ashley, 
vol.  II.  pp.  107-8. 

2  Mehmed  Pasha  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  ist,  1849.  Refugees, 
No.  15. 


124  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

no  more  of  the  "Broadbrims")  and  a  private  letter 
was  immediately  despatched  to  Canning:  England 
had  decided  to  support  Turkey  morally  and  materi- 
ally, and  to  induce  France  to  cooperate  in  whatever 
measures  might  be  taken.  Friendly  and  courteous 
representations  were  to  be  made  at  Vienna  and  St 
Petersburg  in  support  of  the  Sultan's  decision  with 
respect  to  the  refugees;  and,  at  the  same  time,  the 
French  and  Enghsh  Mediterranean  squadrons  were 
to  proceed  to  the  Dardanelles  with  orders  to  go  up 
to  Constantinople  if  invited  to  do  so  by  the  Sultan, 
either  to  defend  his  capital  from  attack  or  to  give 
him  the  moral  support  which  their  presence  would 
afford. 

"I  think  it,  however,  much  better,"  Palmerston  con- 
tinues, "that  the  Porte  should  be  advised  not  to  send 
for  the  squadron  to  enter  the  Dardanelles  without  real 
necessity.  The  example  might  be  turned  to  bad  account 
by  the  Russians  hereafter;  and  it  would  be  too  much  of 
an  open  menace,  and  the  way  to  deal  with  the  Emperor 
is  not  to  put  him  on  his  mettle  by  open  and  public 
menace.  The  presence  of  the  squadrons  at  the  outside 
of  the  Dardanelles  or  in  their  neighbourhood  would  pro- 
bably be  quite  sufficient  to  keep  the  Sevastopol  squadron 
at  anchor  in  port.  .  .what  I  wish  you  to  impress  upon  the 
Turks  is  that  this  communication  is  confidential,  tc  keep 
up  their  spirits  and  courage;  but  that  they  must  not 
swagger  upon  it,  nor  make  it  public  till  they  hear  it 
officially!." 

On  October  6th  the  official  despatches  were  written. 

1  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Oct.  2nd,  1849,  in  Lane-Poole, 
op.  cit.  vol.  II.  p.  197. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION 


125 


Once  again,  Palmerston  urged  great  caution,  and 
stated  that  the  Porte  must  not  be  led  out  of  the  paths 
of  prudence  by  the  appearance  of  support : 

It  is  essentially  necessary  that,  in  order  to  continue  to 
receive  the  support  of  Great  Britain,  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment should  continue  throughout,  to  be,  as  it  has  hitherto 
been,  in  the  right  in  these  affairs. 

Once  again,  also,  the  Foreign  Secretary  sent  an 
admonition  that  the  squadrons  should  not  appear 
within  the  Dardanelles  without  a  real  necessity;  but 
the  decision  must  of  course  rest  with  those  who  were 
on  the  spot^.  On  the  i8th  Canning  received  the 
confidential  letter,  and  on  the  24th  the  official 
despatch.  On  October  6th,  too,  Palmerston  had 
written  to  Ponsonby  at  Vienna,  to  Bloomfield  at 
St  Petersburg  and,  also,  to  the  Admiralty,  instructing 
the  Lords  Commissioners  to  send  the  necessary  orders 
to  Sir  WilHam  Parker.  The  latter  was  to  take  his 
squadron  to  the  Black  Sea,  if  necessary,  but  was  to 
bear  in  mind  that  his  task  was  defensive  and  not 
offensive,  and  that  "consequently,  wherever  he  may 
be,  he  should  confine  himself  to  the  defence  of  Turkey, 
and  should  not  undertake  any  offensive  operations 
against  the  Russian  territory  or  fleet."  He  was 
empowered  to  lend  EngHsh  officers,  if  Turkey 
requested,  to  assist  in  organising  and  manoeuvring 
the  Turkish  fleet.  Should  the  Turkish  Government 
try  to  evade  a  crisis  by  assisting  the  chief  refugees 
to  leave  its  territory — which  Palmerston  personally' 

1  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Oct.  6th,  1849,  Refugees,  No.  18 
(extract). 


\ 


126  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

'  believed  would  be  the  best  solution  of  the  question — 
Sir  WilHam  was  authorised  to  offer  the  ships  under 
his  command  for  the  purpose.  The  Vice-Admiral 
received  these  orders  on  October  17th,  and  on  October 
28th  cast  anchor  in  Besika  Bay,  outside  the  Straits 
of  the  Dardanelles^. 

The  state  of  affairs  in  the  early  days  of  October  is 
best  seen  in  Palmerston's  private  letter  to  Bloomfield, 
which  accompanied  the  official  despatch: 

We  have  endeavoured  to  make  our  despatch  about  the 
Poles  as  civil  as  possible^  in  order  not  to  afford  the  Russian 
Government  any  pretext  for  saying  that  they  have  been 
•threatened,  and  cannot  in  honour  give  way;  and  in  my 
conversation  with  Brunnow  and  CoUoredo^  I  have  care- 
fully abstained  from  saying  anything  about  our  squadron 
being  ordered  to  the  Dardanelles,  or  as  to  what  we  should 
do,  if  the  Emperor  persisted  in  his  demand,  and  took 
hostile  measures  against  Turkey  to  enforce  it.    But  we 

1  have  taken  our  resolution  to  support  Turkey  "  mater ielle- 
ment"  as  well  as  "  moralement."  I  hope,  however,  that  the 
good  sense  of  the  Russian  Government  will  save  us  from 
the   very   unpleasant   task   which   would   in   that   case 

'  devolve  upon  us. — The  Sultan  has  clearly  right  upon  his 

^  Palmerston  to  Bloomfield,  Ponsonby  and  the  Lords 
Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty,  Oct.  6th,  1849,  Refugees, 
Nos.  IQ,  20,  and  22.  For  a  fuller  text  of  the  instructions  to  the 
Admiralty  (which  has  been  utihsed  above),  see  Vice-Admiral 
Augustus  PhilUmore,  Life  oj  Sir  William  Parker  (London, 
1876-80,  3  vols.),  vol.  III.  pp.  564-5.  This  l.ije  is  a  labour  of 
love,  extending  over  something  upwards  of  2000  pages;  but 
Parker  is  a  pleasant  subject  to  read  about  even  at  such  length. 
He  was  the  last  Unk  with  Nelson,  and,  hke  Sir  Stratford, 
whatever  he  might  be  at  home,  was  a  good  Radical  abroad. 

^  The  Russian  and  Austrian  representatives  in  London. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  127 

side.  That  is  the  universal  opinion  of  all  men  of  all 
parties,  and  of  all  newspapers  in  this  country.  There  is 
perfect  unanimity  on  this  point;  and  Brunnow  and 
Colloredo  form  no  exception  to  this,  for,  though  I  beg 
they  may  not  be  quoted,  they  both  acknowledge  that 
the  Sultan  is  not  bound  to  give  up  the  refugees.  Colloredo 
admits  that  the  Austrian  Treaty  contains  no  stipulation 
for  surrender  of  refugees ;  and  Brunnow  says  not  only 
that  the  Russian  Treaty  gives  each  party  the  choice  of 
expulsion  instead  of  surrender,  but  he  contends  that  this 
choice  was  inserted  by  the  Russian  negotiators,  expressly 
because  at  that  time  more  Turks  fled  to  Russia  than 
Russians  to  Turkey,  and  the  Russians  did  not  wish  to  be 
obhged  to  hand  such  refugees  over  to  the  certainty  of 
the  bowstring.  He  told  me  he  should  write  to  Nesselrode 
by  last  Friday's  (yesterday's)  post  to  this  effect. — We 
hope  and  trust  that  no  war  will  come  out  of  this  question; 
but  if  they  hold  high  language  to  you  and  talk  big  about 
war,  bear  in  mind  that  we  have  made  up  our  minds  to 
support  Turkey  by  arms  as  well  as  by  the  pen.  But  keep 
this  in  the  background,  unless  absolutely  forced  to  allude 
to  it. — You  will  of  course  give  us  the  earliest  information 
of  the  course  hkely  to  be  taken  by  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, and  of  any  military  or  naval  measures  which  they 
may  contemplate.  I  do  not  myself  think  that  they  would 
in  any  case  make  an  attempt  on  Constantinople.  It  is 
more  likely  that  they  would  try  to  hold  the  Danube 
Provinces  as  hostages  for  the  Poles;  but  that  could  not 
be  allowed,  and  Austria  would  probably  soon  come  over 
to  our  side  on  such  a  question  as  that — at  least  unless 
she  has  quite  forgotten  her  traditionary  policy  in  regard 
to  Turkey,  blinded  by  furious  rancour  against  the  Hun- 
garians^. 

1  Palmerston  to  Bloomfield,  Oct.  6th,  1849.   Private  letter. 
Bloomfield  Papers  (in  F.  O.  records  at  Chancery  Lane). 


128  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

Never  before  had  there  been  stich  unanimity  in 
England  on  a  question  only  indirect^  affecting  this 
island;  no  Cabinet,  whatever  its  pohtics,  could  have 
afforded  for  a  single  hour  to  leave  its  decision  in 
doubt.  Nor  did  Palmerston — although  making  every 
preparation  for  a  European  war — beheve  that  the 
Czar  would  drive  matters  to  an  extremity.  The  latter 
was  very  much  out  of  humour  at  what  had  been 
passing  in  Hungary  since  Vilagos,  and  the  treatment 
meted  out  by  the  Austrians  to  his  prisoners  in  that 
land.    The  war  he   had  just   finished   had  proved 
(English  and  French  agents  in  Russia  speak  as  one 
man  on  the  point)  very  unpopular  with  his  subjects. 
It  had  cost  84  milhons  of  francs,  and  had  brought 
in  nothing.    He  might  indeed  order  a  levy  of  twelve 
men  in  every  thousand — larger  than  any  that  had 
been    seen    since    the    Grande    Arme'e   invaded   the 
Russian  dominions,  and  the  fleet  at  Sevastopol  might 
have  steam  up  night  and  day;  but,  as  usual,  the 
Russians  were  playing  a  game  of  bluff,  and  most  of 
their    boasted   reserv^es    of   bulhon    were    fabulous. 
Nicholas,   although  never  tired  of  reiterating  that 
the  Turkish  Empire  was  dead,  was  not  prepared  to 
hold  storm}^  obituar^^  rites  in  the  autumn  of  1849, 
and  told  the  Princess  of  Wiirtemberg  as  much  in  so 
many  words.    The  story  reached  the  ears  of  Lord 
Cowley,  Enghsh  Minister  at  Frankfort,  who  promptly 
despatched  it  to  Downing  Street^    Austria  might 

*  Lord  Cowley  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  9th,  1849  (private),  also 
Colonel  du  Plat  to  Sir  Stratford  Canning,  enclosed  in  a  despatch 
of  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  2rst  (private  and  confidential). 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  129 

wish  to  go  further;  but  then  Austria  did  not  matter 
if  one  could  be  sure  of  Russia.  So  early  as  October 
2nd  Ponsonby  had  written  that,  on  the  part  of 
Austria,  nothing  worse  would  happen  than  expres- 
sions of  dissatisfaction;  that  no  strong  measures 
would  be  taken,  and  that  the  conduct  of  Titoff  and 
the  Internuncio  was  already  being  spoken  of  as 
precipitate  ^. 

Canning  wrote  home  that  there  were  moments 
when  he  found  Aupick  inchned  to  stimulate  rather 
than  to  follow  him  (which  latter  was  the  Frenchman's 
usual  function),  in  the  dehcate  and  dangerous  work 
which  both  diplomats  had  undertaken  with  no  other 
instructions  than  the  dictates  of  humanity  and 
considerations  of  the  Balance  of  Power.  Such  was 
not  the  case  in  London  and  Paris.  The  Roman  affair 
was  still  pending,  and  the  last  thing  the  French 
Government  wished  for  was  a  rupture  with  the  Czar, 
so  recently  grown  gracious  to  his  "good  friend"  of 
France.  "Don't  be  uneasy,"  the  French  representa- 
tives were  wont  to  comfort  their  Austrian  and 
Russian  colleagues  by  saying;  "nous  avons  Men  tine 
politique  a  nons."  On  the  first  day  of  October, 
de  Tocqueville  sent  a  private  letter  to  Drouyn  de 
Lhuys  in  London.  In  the  present  crisis,  he  wrote,  the 
action  of  England  would  have  the  greatest  influence 
on  France.  Therefore,  the  Enghsh  Cabinet  must  be 
asked  clearly  how  far  it  was  wiUing  to  go.  "If  they 
want  us  to  assist  them,  they  must  dot  their  i's." 
Drouyn  was,  also,  to  learn  the  views  of  every  shade 

^  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  2nd,  1849,  Refugees,  No.  25. 
s.  P.  9 


I50  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

of  Tory,  for  from  England  (commented  the  French 
Minister)  the  support  of  the  party  in  power  was  not 
always  a  sufficient  guarantee^. 

When  the  resolutions  of  the  Enghsh  Cabinet  finally 
arrived,  they  more  than  disconcerted  de  Tocque- 
ville;  England  risked  her  fleet  only,  but  France 
would  stake  her  "very  existence"  on  such  a  move. 
The  Assembly  would  certainly  abandon  the  Ministers, 
if  it  came  to  a  war.  De  Tocqueville  accordingly,  by 
his  own  confession,  attended  the  Council  which  had 
been  convoked  to  discuss  the  English  propositions,  re- 
solved to  oppose  what  had  so  belhcose  a  soundin  them. 
J  To  his  surprise,  he  found  Louis  Napoleon  already 
pledged,  and  in  a  moment  of  heat  asserted  that  the 
English  ambassador.  Lord  Normanby,  had  cajoled 
the  Prince-President's  mistress,  Miss  Howard.  Long 
afterwards,  he  confessed  to  Nassau  Senior  that  he 
had  been  mistaken;  Normanby  was  not  on  good 
terms  with  Napoleon  at  the  time^.  The  President  was 
doubtless  chiefly  influenced  by  the  regard  for  pubhc 
opinion  at  home,  and  the  dread  of  English  pre- 
ponderance at  Constantinople,  where  the  French  had 
commercial  and  poHtical  interests  equal  to  our  own. 
He,  too,  doubtless  knew  that  the  Czar  would  not 

1  De  Tocqueville,  Recollections,  p.  366.  Bapst,  op.  cit.  p.  92. 
De  Tocqueville  had  not  forgotten  Palmerston's  attitude  in 
July.  In  that  month  he  had  written  to  Boislecomte,  the 
French  agent  at  Turin,  that  France  would  defend  Piedmont  if 
the  Austrians  attacked  that  country.  When  Palmerston  heard 
this,  he  told  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  that  England  would  not  lend 
more  than  a  diplomatic  and  moral  support  to  Piedmont. 

*  De  Tocqueville,  Recollections,  pp.  367-8;  Marcel,  Essai 
Politique,  p.  413. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  131 

appeal  to  the  ultimate  argument  of  potentates.  Lord 
Normanby  did  not  fail  to  point  out,  moreover,  to  the 
.French  Government,  that  a  real  danger  of  war 
would  be  created  if  the  Austrians  and  Russians 
suspected  that  there  was  not  absolute  unanimity 
between  England  and  France.  On  October  9th,  as 
de  Tocqueville  wrote  to  his  friend  Beaumont  at 
Vienna,  the  Council  was  still"  divided  and  perplexed." 
Mole,  Thiers,  Broglie — almost  all  the  chiefs  of  the 
majority  in  the  Chamber — held  that  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  engage  in  war  for  the  refugees.  But  the 
President  was 

ardently  for  the  adventure.  I  think  that  the  step  is 
premature,  that  we  should  not  allow  ourselves  to  be 
engaged  otherwise  and  more  than  we  wish,  by  a  foreign 
nation  which  risks  nothing,  while  we  risk  all^. 

The  next  day,  Louis  Napoleon  was  victorious,  and 
the  Council  decided  that  the  French  fleet  should  be 
ordered  by  telegraph  to  put  to  sea  immediately,  to 
bear  up  towards  Smyrna,  and  put  itself  into  com- 
munication with  Sir  William  Parker  2.  After  this, 
the  French  diplomats  at  Vienna  and  St  Petersburg 
needed  every  ounce  of  tact  they  possessed. 

It  is  necessary  to  be  on  very  good  terms  with  the 
English  Embassy,  and  yet  not  display  an  intimacy  which 
could  not  fail  to  be  harmful  to  you  and  the  success  of 
your  negotiation ;  for  Lord  Palmerston  is  the  bete  noire  of 
Prince  Schwarzenberg.  Doubtless  you  know  that  already. 

1  De  Tocqueville  to  A.  G.  de  Beaumont,  Oct.  9th,  in  Marcel, 
op.  cit.  pp.  500-1. 

2  Lord  Normanby  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  nth,  1849  (secret). 
Refugees,  No.  30.   (A  very  colourless  extract  only.) 

'  9 2 


_  132 


PALMERSTON  AND  THE 


This  is  a  matter  of  tact  and  address,  respecting  which  we 
cannot  give  directions  from  a  distance.  For  the  rest  I 
rely  upon  you.  But  the  thing  is  to  emphasize  and  bring 
out  our  firm  desire,  while  saving  the  refugees,  to  prevent 
Turkey  from  becoming  a  receptacle  for  political  refugees 
and  a  hearth  of  revolution  i. 

Of  course,  nothing  of  all  this  was  laid  on  the  table  of 
the  House,  and  the  world  at  large  never  suspected 
what  the  "absolute  unanimity"  and  "cordial  co- 
operation" of  the  two  Western  Powers  in  the  autumn 
of  1849  really  meant.  "During  the  negotiations 
which  took  place  at  Constantinople,"  said  Palmerston, 
in  a  speech  in  the  Commons,  "the  most  perfect 
harmony  and  cooperation  existed  between  H.M. 
Ambassador  and  the  Ambassador  of  the  Republic 
of  France^";  which  was  undoubtedly  true. 

Meanwhile,  Fuad  Effendi,  after  being  cheered  by 
du  Plat  at  Warsaw,  had  arrived  at  St  Petersburg 
on  October  5th.  Very  soon  after  his  arrival  the 
British  Charge  d'Affaires  saw  him,  and  gave  him 
what  presumably — for  Buchanan  had  received  no 
instructions  as  yet — were  the  views  of  the  Govern- 
ment on  the  subject  of  the  PoUsh  refugees.  On  the 
8th,  the  Turk  had  an  interview  with  Count  Nessel- 
rode,  who  told  him  that  the  matter  was  susceptible 
of  arrangement,  but  that  all  depended  on  the  Czar's 
decision;  the  next  day  he  was  given  to  understand 
that  "if  Foreign  Powers  pretended  to  interfere  in 

»  De  Tocqucville  to  A.  G.  de  Beaumont,  Oct.  12th,  1849. 

>  Debate  on  Lord  Dudley  Stuart's  Motion  for  Papers 
respecting  the  Refugees.  Feb.  7th,  1850.  Hansard,  cviii. 
pp.  480-518. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  I33 

the  question  at  issue,  His  Imperial  Majesty  would 
not  listen  to  any  terms  of  accommodation  whatever  i." 
Finally,  Fuad,  after  a  discouraging  term  of  suspense, 
during  which  the  EngHsh  agent  offered  him  a  copy 
of  the  Times,  that  he  might  see  how  the  whole  of 
England  was  behind  him,  was  granted  an  audience 
with  the  Czar  on  October  i6th,  who,  more  suo,  was 
at  first  very  haughty,  but  afterwards  more  placable. 
That  same  evening  the  Czar  told  Count  Nesselrode  ^ 
that  he  gave  up  the  claim  of  extradition,  and  that  | 
normal  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Porte  were  to  ; 
be  estabHshed  as  soon  as  possible.    The  next  day,\ 
this  news  was  communicated  by  the  Chancellor  to  ] 
Fuad.    When  Bloomfield  asked  for  a  copy  of  this 
communication,    Nesselrode    refused,    "because    he 
could  never  admit  the  principle  of  foreign  interference 
in  the  relations  of  Russia  with  Turkey"^." 

Palmerston,  on  hearing  the  news  from  St  Peters- 
burg, wrote  to  Canning  in  great  glee : 

All  things  have  turned  out  well.  The  English  Govern- 
ment and  nation  have  shown  a  spirit,  a  generosity,  a 
courage  which  does  us  all  high  honour.    We  have  drawn 

1  Buchanan  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  loth  and  12th,  1849. 
Lord  Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  i6th,  Refugees,  No.  44, 
Bapst,  p.  107.  De  Tocqueville  says  {Recollections,  p.  373)  that 
Fuad  refused  to  see  anyone  until  he  had  seen  Nicholas.  This 
is  incorrect.  Fuad  did  not  see  the  French  representative 
Lamoriciere,  who  was  not  a  favourite  in  St  Petersburg,  and 
whose  whole  behaviour,  in  spite  of  the  eulogy  of  his  biographer, 
Keller,  at  this  time  was  somewhat  indiscreet.  Bapst  suggests 
(p.  104)  that  du  Plat  had  warned  Fuad  against  the  Frenchman. 
See  also  Buchanan  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  9th,  Refugees,  No.  88. 

2  Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  19th,  Refugees,  No.  48; 
and  Journql  de  Peter shourg,  Oct.  7th-i9th. 


134  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

France  to  follow  in  our  wake,  after  much  division  and 
difference  of  opinion  in  the  French  Cabinet  and  public. 
We  have  forced  the  haughty  autocrat  to  go  back  from 
his  arrogant  pretensions;  we  have  obliged  Austria  to 
forego  another  opportunity  of  quaffing  her  bowl  of 
blood;  and  we  have  saved  Turkey  from  being  humbled 
down  to  absolute  prostration.  All  this  will  be  seen  and 
felt  by  Europe;  all  this  should  be  borne  in  mind  by  our- 
selves, and  ought  to  be  treasured  up  in  grateful  remem- 
brance by  Turkey;  but  all  this  we  ought  not  to  boast  of, 
and,  on  the  contrary,  we  must  let  our  baffled  Emperors 
pass  as  quietly  and  as  decently  as  possible  over  the 
bridge  by  which  they  are  going  to  retreats 

Both  at  St  Petersburg  and  Vienna,  the  Turkish 
agents  were,  indeed,  wilhng  to  grant  more  than 
Canning  and  Bloomfield  thought  should  be  granted. 
The  vast  majority  of  the  refugees  (about  three 
thousand  three  hundred  of  the  rank  and  file)  accepted' 
the  Austrian  offers  of  amnesty,  and  returned  to 
Austrian  territory.  As  regards  the  principal  refugees 
who  were  Austrian  subjects,  the  Ottoman  Minister 
at  Vienna,  Musurus,  acting  on  his  own  responsibility, 
undertook  not  only  to  "  inter ner  et  sicrveiller"  them 
in  the  interior  of  the  Empire,  but  promised  that  the 
measure  "ne  cesser  ait  quaprh  une  entente  prealable 
avec  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne."  Ponsonby  saw  nothing 
objectionable  in  the  engagement,  and  it  was  this 
which  so  roused  Palmerston's  ire  against  the  ambas- 
sador that  he  wrote  the  letter  which  has  alread}^  been 
quoted  in  extracts  earlier  in  this  essay.   Canning,  of 

1  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Oct.  28th,  1849.    (Of  course,  a 
private  letter.)   In  Lane-Poole,  vol.  11.  p.  202. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  135 

course,  saw  much  that  was  objectionable  in  the 
promise,  and  set  to  work  at  once  to  obtain  the 
correction  of  a  "real  blot"  on  the  final  settlement  of 
the  question^.  The  Czar,  on  the  other  hand,  demanded, 
in  the  first  place,  the  expulsion  of  all  Russian  subjects 
who  had  fled  across  the  Danube,  whatever  their 
passports  might  be;  secondly,  the  Porte  must  come 
to  an  arrangement  with  other  Powers  in  whose 
dominions  Polish  subjects  had  been  naturahsed 
without  the  Czar's  consent,  to  expel  any  such  if  they 
should  appear  in  Turkey  and  engage  in  intrigues 
against  Russia;  lastly,  the  Porte  was  to  send  away 
into  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor  those  prominent 
refugees  whose  extradition  the  Czar  had  demanded,^ 
but  who  had  embraced  the  faith  of  Islam.  Of  these 
demands,  as  Palmerston  pointed  out,  the  second  it 
was  not  within  the  competence  of  the  Porte  to  grant, 
while  the  third  was  distinctly  at  variance  with  those 
very  treaty  stipulations  upon  which  the  Russians 
had  originally  based  their  claim. 

It  would  have  been  better  to  send  away  out  of  the 
country  all  the  refugees  without  distinction ;  however, 
the  Porte  had  tied  its  hands,  if  not  by  the  proceedings 
of  Fuad  and  Musurus  at  St  Petersburg  and  Vienna 
respectively,  at  least  by  the  terms  of  the  Sultan's 
letter  to  the  Czar,  and  of  AaU's  note  of  September 
i6th  to  Stiirmer.  If  the  Turks,  wrote  Palmerston, 
had  fettered  themselves  by  insufficiently  considered 

^  Ponsonby  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  23rd  and  Nov.  20th. 
Canning  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  3rd.  None  of  the  relevant 
despatches  was  laid  before  Parliament. 


136  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

communications,  there  must  be  no  breach  of  positive 
pledges^. 

Meanwhile,  new  cause  for  friction  had  arisen  in  the 
action  of  the  Enghsh  fleet.  When  it  was  first  known 
in  St  Petersburg  and  Vienna  that  Sir  Wilham  Parker 
was  sailing  eastwards,  the  Russians  and  Austrians 
had  declared  that  they  could  not  retire  in  the  face 
of  a  menace.  To  which  it  was  replied  that,  if  the 
Mediterranean  squadron  chose  to  exercise  in  the 
Levant  or  Archipelago,  it  was  still  in  its  proper 
sphere,  and  there  was  no  suggestion  of  menace.  On 
October  28th,  as  already  related,  the  Vice-Admiral 
had  anchored  in  Besika  Bay,  which  is  on  the  Asiatic 
coast,  south  of  the  Dardanelles.  A  fortnight  before 
he  arrived  the  immediate  reception  of  his  squadron 
in  the  Dardanelles,  and  even  its  passage  into  the 
Sea  of  Marmora,  had  been  provided  for  by  a  secret 
order  of  the  Porte  to  the  Pasha  of  the  Straits^.  This 
order,  of  course,  was  only  to  be  utilised  in  an  extreme 
case.  But  the  winter  season  was  coming  on;  Besika 
Bay  was  an  exposed  place,  and  its  bottom  entirely 
unsuitable  for  anchorage;  moreover,  Sir  William  had 
had  to  contend  with  a  heavy  gale  on  his  late  journey 
from  the  Grecian  Isles.   When,  therefore,  the  Enghsh 

^  Lord  Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  19th;  Canning  to 
Palmerston,  Nov.  5th,  7th,  and  12th.  Palmerston  to  Canning, 
Nov.  30th.  The  relevant  passages  were  not  printed  in  the 
Whitebook,  because  it  was  not  desirable  that  it  should  be 
known,  either  in  or  out  of  England,  how  much  "foreign 
mediation"  there  had  been  in  a  matter  which  lay  between 
the  Porte  on  the  one  hand,  and  Russia  and  Austria  on  the 
other. 

2  Canning  to  Parker,  Oct.  15th,  in  Phillimore,  vol.  iii.  p.  562. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  137 

vice-consul  at  the  Dardanelles,  Mr  Calvert,  told  him 
that  according  to  the  existing  general  regulations  of 
1845  he  was  at  Hberty  to  pass  the  Outer  Castles  and 
enter  the  Straits  proper,  Parker  decided  to  take 
advantage  of  the  permission  so  soon  as  the  weather 
was  favourable  to  such  an  operation. 

"Although  some  cavil  might  possibly  be  raised,  or 
jealousy  excited  by  your  reception  there,"  wrote  Canning, 
on  the  last  day  of  October,  "I  conceive  that  no  such 
ground  of  objection  can  be  expected  to  outweigh  the 
advantages,  essential  as  they  are,  of  a  sheltered  anchor- 
age and  an  easy  approach  to  Constantinople  1." 

On  November  ist  Sir  Wilham,  expecting  fresh  gales, 
left  Besika  Bay,  and  proceeded  to  pass  the  Outer 
Castles.  Even  while  he  was  doing  so,  a  sudden  squall 
sprang  up,  and  caused  two  of  his  weather-beaten 
vessels  to  run  foul  of  each  other.  On  November  3rd, 
as  has  been  seen.  Canning  heard  that  the  Austrians 
had  given  up  the  demand  for  extradition.  Titoff 
and  the  Internuncio  had  already  murmured  that  the 
Treaty  of  1841  did  not  allow  vessels  of  war  to  enter 
the  Straits,  and  they  would  be  sure  to  make  the 
most  of  a  peccadillo  on  the  part  of  Downing  Street. 
The  regulations  by  virtue  of  which  the  squadron  had 
passed  the  Outer  Castles,  ran  as  follows : 

Vessels-of-war  of  all  nations  arriving  in  these  Straits, 
without  the  necessary  permission  for  their  passage 
onwards  having  been  received  from  Constantinople,  are 
allowed  to  make  choice  of  any  anchorage  between  the 
Outer  Castles  and  Point  Nagara  which  the  respective 

^  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  31st,  1849. 

9—5 


138  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

commanders  may  consider  the  most  convenient  or  safe, 
and  where  they  will  be  required  to  remain  until  the 
arrival  of  a  firman  for  them  to  pass  on  to  Constantinople^. 

Sir  William  had,  certainly,  not  infringed  the  letter  of 
this  clause,  but  there  appeared  to  be  little  doubt 
that  the  vessels  referred  to  were — as  Palmerston 
wrote  afterwards — 

such  light  ships  of  war  as,  under  the  stipulations  of  the 
Treaty  above  mentioned,  the  Porte  reserves  to  itself  the 
right  of  permitting  to  pass  the  two  Straits  for  the  purpose 
of  communicating  with  Foreign  Embassies  and  Missions 
at  Constantinople  2. 

In  times  of  peace,  the  paragraph  was  too  narrow  to 
cover  a  powerful  squadron  of  line  of  battleships. 
The  present  moment,  just  when  the  West,  recruited 
by  an  enlightened  Zeitgeist  and  the  spirit  rather  than 
the  letter  of  the  law,  was  winning  a  great  victory 
over  reaction  and  the  lust  for  revenge,  was  no  time 
for  England  to  be  caught  in  the  slightest  deviation 
from  the  paths  of  diplomatic  rectitude.  The  Treaty 
of  July  13th,  1841,  which  was  intended  as  an  eternal 
safeguard  of  Turkish  independence,  was  the  gospel 
of  English  diplomacy  in  the  Near  East;  the  inde- 
pendence of  Turkey  must  never  be  purchased  by  an 
infringement  of  that  document.  Apart  from  the 
ethics  of  the  case,  there  was,  likewise,  a  strong  motive 
of  interest  which  ought  to  make  England  very 
scrupulous   in   the   observance   of   the   Treaty,   for 

^  Calvert    to    Vice-Admiral    Sir    W.    Parker,    Oct.    26th, 
Refugees,  No.  65  (Inclosure  2). 

2  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Nov.  24th,  Refugees,  No.  75. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  139 

Russia  would  readily  follow  any  example  of  its 
violation;  and  Russia,  as  Palmerston  sagely  remarked, 
would  have  more  occasion  to  enter  the  Bosphorus 
than  another  Power  to  enter  the  Dardanelles,  and 
could  thence  "directly  and  imminently  threaten  the 
Turkish  Capital^."  Information  as  to  what  was  the 
Foreign  Secretary's  view  of  the  matter  did  not  reach 
the  embassy  at  Therapia  until  all  was  over.  Canning, 
in  the  early  days  of  November,  thought  and  con- 
tinued to  think  that  there  was  no  infringement  of 
the  Treaty;  but  he  did  not  wish  to  imperil  the  half- 
attained  success. 


<< 


I  conceive,"  he  wrote  to  Parker  on  the  4th,  "that 
the  continuance  of  H.M.  Squadron  at  its  present  anchor- 
age can  no  longer  be  a  matter  of  immediate  urgency,  and 
I  only  wish  to  ascertain  the  wishes  of  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment in  that  respect  before  I  submit  the  expediency  of 
its  removal  to  your  consideration." 

On  the  7th,  he  knew  that  both  Austria  and  Russia 
had  given  up  their  original  demands,  and  became 
more  pressing : 

Under  present  circumstances  I  think  it  of  real  import- 
ance that  you  should  take  the  squadron  outside.  My 
promise  against  its  exposure  to  weather  in  a  less  sheltered 
situation  supposed  the  prospect  of  a  downright  danger, 
which  is  probably  more  than  you  see  reason  to  apprehend 
at  either  of  the  two  nearest  stations.  Anxious  for  your 
comfort,  I  am  sorry  for  the  change^. 

^  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Nov.   30th,   1849.    The  passage 
quoted  is  omitted  in  the  Whitebook. 
^  Life  of  Parker,  vol.  in.  pp.  579-80. 


I40  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

iBut  gales  were  still  blowing,  and  prudence  forbade 
W  attempt  to  leave  the  Straits  at  once;  nor  did 
the  winds  become  sufficiently  moderate  to  admit  of 
retirement  to  Besika  Bay  until  November  i6th^. 
The  legend  grew  up  that  the  storm  was  merely  an 
invention  of  Palmerston  and  Canning.  Sir  Theodore 
Martin  writes  in  that  sense;  "  onpretexta  ime  tempete," 
say  the  French  historians^.  The  truth  is,  Sir  Stratford 
Canning  certainly  wanted  the  fleet  inside  the  Straits, 
and  had  made  the  necessary  arrangements  with  the 
Porte  before  Parker  had  left  Greek  waters.  But  a 
sailor's  consideration  for  the  safety  of  his  ships  in  the 
teeth  of  an  actual  formidable  gale  was  the  real  reason 
why  the  squadron  entered  the  Straits:  of  that  no 
reader  of  the  correspondence  in  Phillimore's  bio- 
graphy can  entertain  any  doubt.  Fictitious  winds 
do  not  cause  ships  to  run  foul  of  each  other,  nor  do 
anchors  drag  in  tranquil  summer  seas.  Moreover, 
had  there  been  no  storm,  Parker  would  not  have 
stayed  in  the  Straits  during  almost  a  fortnight  after 
receiving  a  request  from  Canning  to  repass  the  Outer 
Castles  as  soon  as  possible. 

It  has,  also,  been  asserted  that  the  appearance  of 
the  squadron  in  the  Dardanelles  nearly  upset  all  that 
had  been  gained  at  the  last  moment.  This,  too,  is  an 
exaggeration.  When  the  Russians  knew  that  the 
fleet  was  moving  eastwards,  they,  indeed,  declared, 
as  they  had  so  often  before,  that  they  could  not 

^  Life  of  Parker,  vol.  iii.  pp.  581-4. 

2  Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,  vol.  11.  p.  242 ;  Le  Ghiiral  de 
Lamoricihe,  par  E.  Keller,  vol.  11.  p.  221. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  141 

retire  before  a  menace.  But  later,  when  it  was  known 
that  the  fleet  was  actually  in  the  Dardanelles, 
Nesselrode  seemed  satisfied  with  the  explanation*. 
And,  when  Bloomfield  communicated  to  them  Pal- 
merston's  disapproval  of  the  interpretation  given  at 
Constantinople  to  the  regulations  concerning  the 
Straits,  it  acted,  wrote  the  Ambassador,  "Hke  a 
charm  upon  my  relations,  as  well  as  those  of  my 
countrymen,  with  the  Court."  For  many  weary 
weeks  not  only  the  EngHsh  Legation,  but  obscure 
English  residents  and  travellers  in  St  Petersburg, 
had  been  placed  beyond  the  pale  of  imperial  favours 
— so  much  so,  indeed,  that  Bloomfield  would  fain 
have  had  recourse  to  diplomatic  reprisals,  but  was 
prevented  by  Palmerston's  common-sense. 

Schwarzenberg  sent  a  protest  against  the  entry  of 
the  fleet  into  the  Straits,  which  was  communicated 
to  Palmerston  on  December  4th.  Nesselrode  sent  a 
despatch — not  a  formal  protest — which  Baron  Brun- 
now  was  to  communicate  to  Palmerston ;  it  expresses 
entire  satisfaction  with  the  Foreign  Secretary's 
admission  that  a  forced  interpretation  had  been  given 
to  the  Treaty  of  1841  at  Constantinople,  and  with 
his  engagement  that  the  obligations  of  that  treaty 
should  be  more  strictly  observed  in  the  future  2. 
Palmerston  could  not  refrain  from  the  joy  of  replying 
to  Schwarzenberg,  and,  on  the  first  day  of  1850,  sent 

^  Bloomfield  to  Palmerston,  Nov.  15th,  1849;  and  private 
letter,  Dec.  28tli,  1849. 

2  Baron  Roller  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  4tli,  1849;  Baron 
Brunnow  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  2nd,  1850:  Refugees,  Nos.  87 
and  109. 


142  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

a  despatch  to  Ponsonby,  which  stated  that,  although 
the  Government  would  not  go  back  on  what  they 
had  already  said  as  to  the  entrance  of  the  fleet  into 
the  Dardanelles,  yet  it  might  very  well  be  argued 
that  that  entrance  was,  after  all,  not  contrary  to  the 
Port  regulations  of  1845.  And,  since  the  Treaty  of 
1841,  also,  recorded  the  determination  of  the  five 
signatory  Powers  to  respect  and  to  uphold  the 
independence  of  the  Porte,  the  appearance  of  the 
squadron  in  the  Dardanelles,  "even  if  it  was  an  in- 
fringement, was  at  all  events  not  the  first  infringement 
of  that  Treaty."  Moreover,  the  Clause  excluding  ships 
of  war  apphed  only  when  the  Porte  should  be  really 
and  substantially  at  peace ;  but  could  a  condition  of 
things  be  honestly  called  peace,  when  the  Austrian 
and  Russian  agents  at  Constantinople  had  declared 
that  the  escape  of  a  single  refugee  meant  war? 

If  the  Sultan  threatened  in  so  peremptory  a  manner  by 
the  official  organs  of  two  Great  Powers  immediately 
adjoining  to  his  frontiers,  had  actually  invited  into  the 
heart  of  his  Empire  the  armed  assistance  of  friendly 
allies  to  protect  him  against  a  formidable  danger,  the 
outbreak  of  which  was  made  to  depend  upon  a  contin- 
gency which  he  might  be  unable  to  prevent,  it  is  not  the 
Government  of  Austria  that  could  with  any  degree  of 
consistency  have  objected  to  the  general  principle  upon 
which  such  an  invitation  would  have  been  founded ^ 

The  French  Government  had  from  the  first  acted 
very  unwilhngly  in  despatching  their  fleet  (which, 
by  the  way,  did  not  enter  the  Dardanelles),  to  join 

»  Palmerston  to  Ponsonby.  Jan.  ist,  1850,  Refugees,  No.  103. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  143 

Parker's  squadron,  and  very  soon  began  to  agitate 
*  for  the  recall  of  the  combined  squadron.  Palmerston, 
however,  waited  until  he  had  reason  to  believe  that 
the  chief  differences  between  the  Porte  and  the 
Imperial  Governments  had  been  settled;  and  not 
until  the  last  week  of  November  did  he  write  to 
Constantinople  that  Parker  was  to  retire  to  his 
accustomed  station,  whenever  Canning  should  deem 
it  safe  and  prudent.  He  (Canning)  was  to  act  in 
conjunction  with  General  Aupick^.  But,  although 
the  main  difficulty  had  been  surmounted,  Austria  and 
Russia  still  demanded  that  which  Canning  thought 
an  independent  Government  should  never  grant,  and 
he  still  persisted  in  the  arduous  labour  of  keeping 
the  Porte  up  to  the  necessary  degree  of  firmness. 
Finally,  Russia  accepted  the  Turkish  modifications 
of  her  three  original  demands,  but  insisted  that  the 
agreement  should  be  drawn  up  in  a  formal  Protocol,  'i 
The  Protocol  was  signed  on  Christmas  Day,  and 
distinctly,  states  that  the  measures  to  be  executed 
were  adopted  by  common  consent;  Russia  was  thus 
placed  on  the  same  footing  as  Turkey  in  a  matter 
falling  within  the  exclusive  competency  of  the  Porte. 
Canning,  of  course,  deplored  such  ill-timed  compU- 
ance,  but  heartily  desired  to  see  the  affair  settled. 
"The  most  useful  and  best  intentioned  interference," 
he  wrote  wearily,  "has  its  Hmits.  Ours,  I  conceive, 
has  reached  them  under  the  present  circumstances." 
On  the  last  day  but  one  of  the  old  year,  Titoff  resumed 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Porte,  and  Canning 
1  Palmerston  to  Canning,  Nov.  24th,  1849,  Refugees,  No.  76. 


144  PALMERSTON  AND  THE 

thought  that  he  might  safely  inform  Parker  that  his 
presence  on  the  Turkish  side  of  the  Archipelago  was 
no  longer  necessary.  The  official  "hberty  to  quit" 
was  forwarded  on  the  first  day  of  1850^. 

Schwarzenberg  was  far  more  intransigeant  than 
ithe  Czar,  and  still  insisted  on  those  points  which 
the  Turks  at  Constantinople  declared  they  could  not 
accept,  but  which  the  Austrians  declared  had  already 
been  consented  to  by  Musurus  at  Vienna:  the  confine- 
ment and  surveillance  of  the  refugees  was  only  to 
cease  with  the  mutual  consent  of  Austria  and  the 
Porte ;  the  hst  of  such  refugees  was  to  be  kept  open  for 
the  inclusion  of  new  names;  and  an  Austrian  com- 
missary was  to  be  sent  to  Kutaieh,  the  town  in 
Asia  Minor  agreed  upon  as  the  locality  of  confine- 
ment, to  observe  how  the  insurgent  chiefs  were  being 
guarded.  These  demands,  pressed  forward  with  more 
than  Roman  arrogance,  would  have  made  the  chief 
of  the  Mahometans  Schwarzenberg' s  turnkey.  Pal- 
merston  was  not  behind  Canning  in  his  condemnation 
of  such  preposterous  articles.  "It  is  scarcely  less 
derogatory  to  the  Sultan,"  he  wrote,  "to  be  jailor 
for  Austria  than  to  be  purveyor  to  the  Austrian 
executioners^."  Week  after  week,  the  weary  negotia- 
tions dragged  on,   and  very  slowly  the  Austrians 

1  Canning  to  Palmerston,  Dec.  i8th,  Dec.  24th,  Dec.  26th, 
Dec.  31st,  Refugees,  Nos.  no  (extract),  113  (extract)  and  115. 

2  Quoted  in  Lane-Poole,  op.  cit.  vol.  11.  p.  204.  The  history 
of  the  Refugees  during  1 850-1  may  be  traced  in  the  second 
Whitebook,  Further  Correspondence  respecting  Refugees  from 
Hungary,  presented  to  the  House  of  Lords  by  command  of 
Her  Majesty,  June,  1852. 


HUNGARIAN  REVOLUTION  145 

abated  their  pretensions;  not  until  a  large  part  of  the  \ 
New  Year  had  gone  did  Francis  Joseph  finally  give 
way,  and  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Porte  were 
not  finally  renewed  till  the  first  week  of  April.  But 
a  weary  term  of  confinement  still  lay  before  the 
refugees,  for  the  Sultan,  though  he  had  saved  them 
and  defied  the  Austrian  Government,  was  still  pos- 
sessed of  a  wholesome  fear  of  that  Government's 
ire.  Sir  Stratford  Canning  still  laboured  ceaselessly  \ 
in  their  interests,  and  finally  obtained  the  Sultan's  1 
promise  that  they  should  be  released  in  September 
1851.  At  that  date  the  men  who  had  held  the 
chanceries  of  the  East  and  West  in  suspense  for  so 
many  weeks  and  almost  caused  a  universal  war,  left 
Turkish  territory  for  ever.  The  man  who  had  saved 
these  "miserable  rehcts  of  a  lost  cause"  was  Pal- 
merston,  who  had  declared,  again  and  again,  that  he 
knew  nothing  of  a  sovereign  independent  Hungary. 


^ 


INDEX 


Aali  Pasha,  17,  87  f.,  120,  135 

Aberdeen,  4th  Earl  of,  19 

Agram,  70 

Andrassy,  Count  J.,  26,  91 

Arad,  31 

Arthur,  Prince,  76 

Aupick,  General,  14,  120,  129, 

143 

Balkan  Confederation,  the 
proposed,  76 

Bastide,  J.,  39,  42,  43 

Batthyanyi,  Count  Kasimir, 
56,'  72,  74,  92,  93 

Batthyanyi,  Count  Louis, 
25  ft.,  36,  49 

Beaconsfieldj  Earl  of  (B.  Dis- 
raeli), 24 

Beaumont,  Lord,  96 

Belgrade,  Pasha  of,  89 

Belgrade,  Treaty  of,  114 

Bern,  General  T.,  114 

Besika  Bay,  126,  136 

Bikkesy,  Colonel,  54  ff. 

Blackwell,  J.  A.,  60,  62  ff..  69 

Bloomlield,  Lord,  80,  125, 
133,  134,  141 

Bosnia,  89 

Bosphorus,  the,  118 

Broglie,  A.  L.  V.  C,  Due  de, 

131 
Browne,  Major,  90  ff. 

Brunnow,   Baron    P.,    12O  f., 

141 

Buccari,  72 

Buchanan,  Sir  A.,  68,  79 

Budapest,  31.  33,  34,  36,  39. 

42.  53 
Bulgaria,  85 
Bunsen,  Baron  C.  K.  J.  von, 

27,  96 


Calvert,  F.  W.,  Consul,  137 

Canning,  Sir  Stratford.  Vide 
sub  Stratford  de  Redclifie, 
Lord 

Carlo witz,  82 

Cavaignac,  General  L.  E.,  4 1  ff . 

Charles  Albert,  King  of  Sar- 
dinia, 23 

Civita  Vecchia,  100 

Coburg-Kohary  family,  the, 
71,  76 

Colloredo,  Count,  108,  126  f. 

Cowley,  Lord  (first  Earl),  128 

Cracow,  67 

Croatia,  82 

Daehn,  General,  66  f. 
Danube,  the  Lower,  84 
Danubian   Principalities,    79, 

81,  82 
Dardanelles,  124  ft.,  136  ff. 
Deak,  F.,  26 
Debreczin,  30,  71 
Dembinski,  General  H..  114 
Drave,  the  river,  29,  70 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  E.,  99,  102, 

104,  122 

Eddisbury,  Lord  (Lord  Stan- 
ley of  Alderley),  45,  53,  61 
Esterhazy,  Prince  P.,  35 

Ferdinand,      Emperor     of 
Austria,  25,  28.  30 

Ferrari,  de  (Sardinian  Min- 
ister), 93 

Fiume,  53 

Flocon,  F.,  102 

Francis  Charles,  Archduke,  30 

Francis  Joseph,  Emperor  of 
Austria,  30,  145 


INDEX 


147 


Frederick  William  IV,  King 

of  Prussia,  18 
Fuad  Effendi,  119,  132  f. 

Galicia,  66 

Gorgei,  General  Arthur  von, 

31,  33.  113 
Grabbe,  General,  86 

Hamilton,  Lord  Claud,  96 
Haynau,    Baron    J.    J.    von 

(Master  of  Ordnance),  49 
Henningsen,  Charles,  52 
Howard,  Miss,  130 
Hungary,  proposed  Kingdom 

of,  70 

Jellacic    von    Buzim,    Count 
J.,  Ban  of  Croatia,  28  ff. 

Kainardji,  Treaty  of,  114 
Kapolna,  Battle  of,  31 
Karacsay,  Count  Fedor,  89 
Kemble,  John  Mitchell,  52 
Klapka,  General  G.,  34 
Koller,  Baron,  46 
Komorn,  31  ff. 
Kossuth,     L.,     26  ff.,     36  ff., 

45  ff.,  115  ff. 
Kremsier,  Diet  at,  31 
Kutaieh,  144 

Lacour,  E.  de,  104 
Lamartine,  A.  36 
Lamoricidre,  General  C.  L.  L. 

J.  de,  loi 
Ledru-Rollin,     A.     A.,      43, 

105 
Leflo,  General  A.  C.  E.,  42 
Liiders,  General,  82 

Magenis,  65 
Marmora,  Sea  of,  136 
Matkovics,  53  ff. 
Mehmed  Pasha,  123 
Metternich,  Prince  C,  10 
Milnes,    Monckton    (4ord 
Houghton),  98 


Moldavia,  79,  85 
Mole,  Comte  L.  M.,  131 
Musurus      Pasha,     Ottoman 
Minister  at  Vienna,  134  f. 

Napoleon,    Louis    (Napoleon 

III),  19,  43.  100,  130 
Nesselrode,  Count  S.  R.  de, 

15,  17,  42,  66  ff.,  80,  104, 

118,  132,  133,  141 
Newman,  Francis,  52 
Nicholas  I,   Czar,    11  ff.,    17, 

33,  65  ft'.,  loi,  128,  135 
Normanby,   Marquis  of,    99, 

1301 

Osborne,  Bernal,  94,  98 
Outer  Castles,  the  (Dardan- 
elles), 137  ff. 

Palacky,  F.,  21 

Palatine,  29 

Palmerston,  Viscount,  5  ff. 
and  passim 

Parker,  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Will- 
iam, 121,  125,  136,  143 

Passarowitz,  Treaty  of,  114 

Pazmandy,  Dionys  (Hunga- 
rian envoy),  34,  35 

Persigny,  J.  G.  V.  de  F., 
Count  (Due)  de,  100 

Pillersdorf,  Baron  F.  von,  35 

Plat,  Colonel  du,  661,  78, 
105,  132 

Ponsonby,  Viscount,  7,  40, 
59  ff.,  108,  125 

Pridham,  O.,  59 

Prince  Arthur,  76 

Prince  Consort  (Albert),  the, 
7,  18 

Pulszky,  F.  A.,  20,  50  flF., 
56  f.,  71  ff.,  93  ff. 

Radetzky,     Field-marshal 

Count  J.,  28,  33 
Radzivil,      Prince     Michael, 

ii7ff.,  121 
Reshid  Pasha,  75,  87  f. 


14  8 


INDEX 


Schmerling,  Baron  A.  von,  36 
Schwarzenberg,  Prince  F.,  45, 

66,  100,  108,  141,  144 
Semlin,  72 
Seniavine,  M.,  104 
Servia,  8g 
Smith,  Toulmin,  52 
Spl6nyi,  Baron  Ludwig,  90  ff. 
Stephen,  Archduke  ( Palatine), 

25 
Stratford  de  Redchffe,  Lord, 

5»  8,  13,  14.  58,  75.  80 
Stuart,  Lord  Dudley,  52 
Stiirmer,  Baron,  88,  118,  119, 

135 
Szalay,  Ladislaus  (Hungarian 

envoy),  34  ft-.  43.  4^.  47. 
50,  61 
Szechenyi,  Count  S.,  26 

Teleki,  Count  L.,  26,  42  f.,  51, 

76,  lOI 
Temesvar,  31 
Therapia,  86 


Thiers,  A.,  131 

Titoff,  M.  de,  86,  118.  143 

Tocqueville,  A.  de,  12,  100  f., 

105,  117,  129  ff. 
Transylvania,  82  ff. 
Turkey,  74  ff. 

Velenze,  engagement  at,  29 
Victoria,  Queen,  7,  19,  22  ft". 
Vilagos,  surrender  at,  33 

Wallacliia,  79.  82,  84.  85 
Wessenberg-Bach  Ministry, 

the,  27 
Widdin,  122 
Wieliczka,  67 
William  I,  German  Emperor, 

9 
Windischgratz,  Field-marshal 

Prince  O.  C.  F.,  29ff.,  43. 53 
Wyzocki,  General,  114 

Zamoyski,   Count  Ladislaus, 
114 


CAMBKIUliE:  PRINTBU  KV  J.   U.   PEACE,   M.A.,  AT  TMK  UNIVERSITY   PK«SS 


^, 


1^  r»AV  USE 

RET 

^TURN  TO  DfI^"^^  '^SE 

LifC^ddrc.  MAR  1  0  J9( 


LD2]A-60m.T  'TA 
(N5382.slO)4^^;.^32 


General  Library 


I 


lERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


'■ '      .    ■ 


'^ 


